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ABSTRACT

The nations of East Central Europe have traditionally been portrayed as “victims”
of Nazi German expansionism. In this work the foreign policies of Poland, Lithuania,
Hungary, and Romania from 1933 to 1939 were examined through the paradigm of
Hitler's major foreign policy achievements to explore this prevalent notion and to discern
why the foreign policies of these governments failed. These included his rise to power in
1933, the remilitarization of the Rhineland, the Anschluss with Austria, the
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia, and the invasion of Poland. Specifically, the
reactions of these four nations to German action and their relationships with each other
were examined. It was found that their foreign policies ended in failure due to their
inability to substitute shortsighted national objectives that focused on regional revision at
the expense of their neighbors for regional security directed against German
expansionism.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1919 the victorious powers of the First World War convened at Versailles to
decide the fate of the post-war world. Before them was no easy task. In their triumph,
three great empires had collapsed under the strain of four years of the most horrendous
warfare the world had yet seen. It was now their job to reconstitute Europe from the
rubble of the old. New nations were created. Existing ones were enlarged and expanded.
All this was done primarily at the expense of the defeated Central Powers. Poland and
Lithuania were returned to the map of Europe and, with the dissolution of the Habsburg
Empire, an independent Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Austria were created. Romania
also benefited, receiving Transylvania for its participation during the war. All told, from
the Baltic to the Black Sea in 1919, seven countries existed where three had been. While
unthinkable at the time, the treaty intended to preserve the peace would be shattered by
war within twenty years.
On September 1, 1939, Adolf Hitler again plunged Europe into conflict in his bid
to impose German hegemony across the continent and secure his Third Reich’s thousand
year future. His war would last until 1945, resulting in the deaths of more than forty
million Europeans. 1 Unlike the previous conflict, the Second World War was not the
result of a complicated chain-reaction that dragged the continent into war. Rather, it was
initiated by Hitler, with the singular purpose of conquest and extermination. The spark
that characterized the origins of the first was also absent from the second, as the
crescendo that led to the German invasion of Poland was long in duration. Given Hitler’s

focus on East Central Europe with an increasingly aggressive foreign policy, the question
was when, not how.
This work focuses primarily on the foreign policies of four of those East Central
European nations: Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania during the interwar period
from January 1933 until September 1939. During this period, each of the four countries
followed the continent as a whole in the long, slow slide towards war. Their relationships
with the Hitler regime were, however, fundamentally different from those of the other
European Great Powers, in that they were active participants in the revisionist process
that eventually culminated in the Second World War and the region’s downfall. This
leaves us, then, with the question: why did these four independent nations, each either
new to the map or newly configured by the treaty of Versailles, slowly succumb to
Germany and Hitler from 1933-1939? The answer is rooted in the complexities of the
region.
The tumultuous aftermath of the First World War deeply affected the
development of East Central Europe, with political power eventually becoming
consolidated by reactionary, authoritarian regimes. The governments of Poland,
Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania were each fervently nationalistic and, through their
political aims, sought to give expression to that sentiment. For Hungary and Romania,
this meant actively seeking or maintaining, respectively, their historic frontiers. The
Polish and Lithuanian regimes were equally committed to restoring their nations’ historic
territories and influence. Because their policies and political aims were directed against
each other, however, as a whole, the region was profoundly committed to collective
security as a means of protection from the ambitions of their neighbors.
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With Hitler’s appointment as German Chancellor on January 30, 1933, all that
changed. The relative stability that had characterized East Central European international
politics was jolted by the emergence of a regime that, at its core, was expressly
revisionist and committed to overturning the Treaty of Versailles. Hitler’s Germany was
a threat to the established order. But in that danger, the governments of Poland, Hungary,
Lithuania, and Romania each saw opportunity. The dynamism of the Third Reich’s
foreign policy could be utilized as a catalyst for their own national agendas. Initially, the
risks were minimal. Germany, in 1933, was not yet the military power it would become
later in the decade. Hitler needed calm, amicable relations with his neighbors while he
consolidated his hold on power at home. This afforded the Polish, Hungarian,
Lithuanian, and Romanian governments the occasion to advance their own foreign policy
aims. However, as the decade progressed and German foreign policy successes
accumulated, each nation began altering its policy goals in response to Hitler’s advance.
They began reacting to Hitler, and, in doing so, each found itself either outmaneuvered,
outfoxed, or overpowered by the Third Reich. In the end, all four countries became
subjugated by Germany, willingly or not.
The opportunities provided by a revisionist Germany were, however, a doubleedged sword. In working with Hitler in myopic pursuit of the rapid realization of their
individual foreign policy goals, each became complicit in the undermining of the region’s
already weak commitment to collective security. Without this system of support,
however weak or ineffectual it may have been, Hitler was able to exploit their national
interests and regional aims for his own purposes and slowly but surely isolate them from
each other. United, perhaps they could have checked German expansionism. Divided,
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they hardly stood a chance. Working with Hitler, they became instruments of their own
downfall.
This process was gradual, taking place over six years in three distinct stages. To
reflect this progression, the work is divided thematically into sections that encompass
each of those distinct phases. The first, in which Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and
Romania began to move away from their western alliances and towards cautious
friendship with Hitler, took place from 1933 until the remilitarization of the Rhineland in
March 1936. From the 1936 until the Anschluss, or union, with Austria in March 1938,
the four governments had shifted their alignment to a place somewhere in between the
two polemics. While not committed to either the West or to Germany, their behavior was
reflective of broader continental uncertainties. The final phase, which lasted from the
aftermath of the Anschluss until Germany’s invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939,
saw each nation become more directly involved with Hitler and the Third Reich. This
framework also serves a secondary purpose, and that is to demonstrate the importance of
Hitler’s foreign policy to the region and the effect it had on East Central Europe.
It is also the intent of this work to comment on the ongoing intentionalist and
functionalist debate. 2 In specific ways, each interpretation of Hitler’s foreign policy has
merit and validity in the proper context. Broadly, the foreign policy that Hitler presented
to Gyula Gömbös, the Hungarian Prime Minister from 1932-1936, during his state visit at
Berchtesgaden on June 17-18, 1933, was identical to the policy outlined in the later 1937
Hossbach memorandum. The latter document is often regarded by intentionalist
historians as proof of Hitler’s malevolent, expansionist objectives. 3 Taking into account
the similarities between the June 1933 conversation and the 1937 memorandum, it is
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clear that not only did Hitler have definite objectives in mind at this early date, but
expected to carry them out, as he eventually did, in 1938.
Conversely, the core of A. J. P Taylor’s argument forwarded in his Origins of the
Second World War – that Hitler reacted just as much as he acted – has demonstrated an
equal validity, although in a more limited way. For instance, had Hitler manipulated
events in their entirety during the Sudeten crisis in September 1938, the result would
have been Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment in a localized war by her three neighbors:
Germany, Poland, and Hungary. The affair did not, however, go according to plan.
Hungary’s armies were supposed to draw Czech forces from the German frontier,
allowing the Wehrmacht to cross the mountainous Bohemian border with significantly
less resistance. However, when events reached their climax, the Hungarians developed
an acute case of cold feet, and Budapest refused to do little more than engage in saber
rattling. 4 Their behavior was justified. The Hungarian military was woefully unprepared
for any offensive operations and had enough ammunition to sustain only two days of
fighting. 5 Even if war had broken out and the conflict remained localized, it is debatable
how useful Budapest’s divisions would have been to the operation. Poland’s
participation in the Czechoslovakian crisis of 1938, while complimentary to Hitler’s
plans, was not orchestrated by the German government. 6 Berlin had been made aware of
Polish designs earlier in the year, and since Warsaw’s political objectives complimented
their own operation, the Germans related their approval. 7 As it was with the Hungarians,
Polish action turned out to be less in practice than promise. Combined, the impact of
independent Polish and Hungarian policy decisions prevented Hitler from achieving the
fait accompli that he desired. This forced him to the negotiating table in 1938. 8 Even at
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this late stage, the Poles and Hungarians were still acting largely of their own volition.
By remaining inert when Hitler needed them to act, they retained their ability to act
independently and forced Germany’s dictator to react to them. This does not support
Taylor’s thesis that the Second World War originated from a confluence of random
events. It does, however, demonstrate that his views still have their place if put in the
proper context.
In researching this work, numerous sources, both primary and secondary, were
consulted. Interest in the region as a whole, and especially the foreign policies of East
Central European governments, has increased substantially over the last thirty years.
However, despite this, many of the primary sources remain economically and physically
unavailable. Fortunately, an excellent selection of secondary material that is drawn from
the primary sources is readily accessible. This has made it possible, in conjunction with
German, Polish, and British official sources, to cross-reference the unavailable material
with relevant secondary sources that base their argumentation on otherwise inaccessible
documents, making it possible to verify the accuracy of the secondary material.
Although an indirect approach, the methodology has proved to be reliable and accurate.
It is not a requirement for any nation to work with others for any reason. Survival
and the advancement of its own objectives are its mandate. However, it is necessary to
look beyond the present and into the future. The weighing of distant possibilities,
deciding upon desired results, and choosing a course of action to achieve those ends, are
charges demanded of responsible leadership. In this, the governments of Poland,
Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania failed. Although each regime understood the
importance of regional unity and collective security, they eventually abandoned that
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pursuit in favor of making gains at the expense of their neighbors. This undercut the
region’s strength, meager as it was, and eventually contributed to the nightmare of each
national leader: being caught in the middle of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet
Union. All Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and Romania had to offer to such an event was a
theater of war and subservience to the victor.
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CHAPTER 1: AWAY FROM THE WEST

Shortly after noon on Monday, January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler and the new
nationalist cabinet trooped into Reich President Paul von Hindenburg’s rooms at the
Reich Chancellery, still arguing over Hitler’s continued demands for new Reichstag
elections following his appointment as Chancellor. Their meeting had been scheduled for
an hour earlier, but bickering over this point had delayed Hitler’s “providential” moment,
much to the annoyance of the aging Hindenburg. Following formalities and a short
speech by the President, Hitler swore an oath to fulfill his constitutional obligations for
the good of the nation. Only twelve years later, upon the shattered ruins of the Third
Reich, would the hollowness of the words spoken that afternoon be clear. That wintery
January day was not, however, the downfall of Hitler’s Germany but the final death knell
for the republic that had preceded it. Democracy had been dead for some time, with only
its façade remaining intact. Its passing was not solemnly observed either. Instead, it was
mourned that day by an anxious, silent crowd gathered along the Wilhelmstrasse by
Joseph Goebbels and given its funerary procession later that evening by torchlight. 1
Much as it eventually went down in flames, so was the Third Reich born.
For the Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei, that otherwise nondescript
day and short, unremarkable ceremony was the culmination of more than a decade of
struggle. The violence in the streets, the fighting over how to achieve the party’s ends,
the electoral victories and defeats, the political compromises and the near dissection of
the party were all vindicated in that moment. To the average German, its meaning was
largely derived from an individual’s political persuasion. Communists and socialists

shortly came to view it as a day of dread, while to the political Right it was a triumph.
For the rest, their ballot decision in November 1932 tacitly expressed their discontent
with what the chaotic republican system had become and their ideological sympathies for
National Socialism. 2 To Germany’s East Central European neighbors, it equally was a
day of mixed emotions.
I
Poland, the recipient of vast swaths of German territory as a result of the
Versailles settlement and perennial target of revisionist rhetoric, viewed this as merely a
changing of the guard and expected a continuation of Berlin’s anti-Polish policies. 3
Relations between the two countries had, since Poland’s reemergence following the First
World War, been strained due to their mutually antagonistic behavior. At the heart of
their rancor was the territorial concessions Germany had been forced to make to its newly
created neighbor, a condition that successive Weimar governments never accepted.
Consequently, a “Prussian” policy was actively pursued by Berlin throughout the 1920s
and early 1930s, which aimed at recovering the Corridor, the small strip of land that
provided Poland with access to the sea, and reuniting East Prussia with Germany proper.
The return of Danzig (Gdańsk), which had become a Free City under the administration
of the League of Nations, and the coal rich region of Upper Silesia was also desired. 4
Because of the military limitations imposed upon Germany by the Versailles Treaty,
Berlin was forced to pursue its revisionism peacefully. On numerous occasions, though,
the German leadership was keen to articulate that this was not their preferred
methodology and that whenever the military option became viable, it could be pursued. 5
This tense atmosphere over territory created a powder-keg-like environment in
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which any minor incident seemed to have the potential to ignite an armed conflict
between the two nations, although the bluster was more for international prestige and
appearances. One such incident on July 31, 1932, involved Baron von Rintelen, the
German charge d’affaires in Warsaw, angrily removing a Polish naval ensign from his
fence during a national celebration. Von Rintelen had taken particular exception to the
flag’s placement, because it reminded him that Poland had become a naval power at
Germany’s expense. The Polish government viewed this action as a direct insult to its
national honor, and August Zalewski, Poland’s Foreign Minister, formally demanded von
Rintelen’s resignation. 6 Berlin attempted to smooth over the incident but found no
sympathetic ear. Even the normally moderate Colonel Józef Beck, who was vying to
replace Zalewski and was conducting a shadow foreign policy different in character from
his superior’s, was highly vocal in his condemnation and outrage over the incident.
As was characteristic of German-Polish relations during this period prior to
Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor, this rather innocuous matter was blown entirely out
of proportion by both sides. National pride and bitterness aside, the behavior of the two
governments in this instance was demonstrative of the antagonism between Berlin and
Warsaw. This downward spiral carried the indelible mark of Versailles but was more the
result of conscious foreign policy decisions made by each government.
Germany had, since Gustav Stresemann’s brief Chancellorship in 1923, pursued a
policy that fostered better relations with Britain and France and recognized the Reich’s
western border while deliberately precipitating uncertainty and mistrust with Poland.
This is evidenced in the 1925 Locarno treaties, specifically the Rhineland Pact portion
signed by Germany, Italy, Britain, France, and Belgium, which renounced the use of
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violence between the signatories and pledged mutual assistance by all parties in the event
one was attacked by the other. A similar treaty was signed with Poland, although it
offered nothing in the way of territorial guarantees, only pledging to eschew violence in
the resolving of differences and to subject disagreements to international arbitration. If,
in the latter half of the 1920s, Berlin remained true to the “spirit of Locarno” and worked
for a general Western European détente, then the Reich government made only the most
cursory efforts in the east. No bullets were fired, but a war of words raged. The German
government had made a technical distinction between the requirements of the treaty and
the geist that it was supposed to embody, noting that only war was forbidden, but that
Locarno expressly said nothing about verbal assaults. 7 It was with this attitude that the
German government dealt with Poland, making liberal use of inflammatory rhetoric that
was intended to for domestic consumption. This tactic allowed Berlin to assuage public
demands for border revision and portrayed the government as actively seeking that end. 8
In reality, it was all Germany could do. The Treaty of Versailles limited its armed
forces to a strength of 10 divisions, 3 of which were arrayed on the Polish border. Facing
it across the frontier were five Corps (15 divisions), totaling half of the entire Polish
army. The German Defense Minister, the retired General Wilhelm Groener, even
remarked that in the event of a conflict with Poland, the “German army would have to
withdraw to the Oder” and would be unable to undertake offensive operations.
Compounding the fear of a Polish surprise attack and the Reichswehr’s numerical
inferiority to its potential adversary was a belief that any attempt at bringing about
territorial revision in the east would unite the Locarno Powers against Germany in a war
that it stood no chance of winning. On the other side of the border, the Polish army was
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in an equally defensive posture, held in check by the fear of a qualitative German edge in
troop training and tactics. In the event of hostilities, its battle-plan called for the
elimination of the German exclave of East Prussia to ensure access to the sea, but no
drive for Berlin. 9
It was, equally, all Poland was capable of. For all of Warsaw’s blustering and
bravado, the horrendous state of the Polish economy prevented any possibility of
launching and sustaining a major offensive against Germany. The Stresemann-initiated
tariff war had exacted its toll, compounding the effects of the Great Depression and
exacerbating the nation’s socioeconomic woes. 10 Poland’s trust in its once staunch ally
France was also beginning to wane, and the construction of the Maginot Line raised
serious doubts as to the true nature of French commitment to the region. 11 If a conflict
were to erupt, it was very likely that Poland would face Germany alone while threatened
by massive civil unrest on the home front. These were possibilities on which Marshal
Józef Piłsudski, Poland’s dictator since seizing power in a military coup d’etat in 1926,
was not willing to gamble.
Thus, on the eve of Hitler’s rise to power, the threat of war between the two East
Central European neighbors was far more imagined than real, although the two sides did
not behave as if that were so. In Warsaw, it was generally expected that the fury of the
Nazi movement would be directed against Poland first, and, consequently, the
government warned all of its diplomats abroad about this likely reorientation of German
policy. 12 Hitler himself was equally fearful of hostilities, warning Colonel Walther von
Reichenau in East Prussia in December that the uncertain political situation in Germany
provided a conducive atmosphere for a surprise Polish attack. 13 However, it is the

12

perception of reality rather than reality itself that ultimately influences behavior. In the
case of German-Polish relations in the months following Hitler’s appointment, this
shaped the interaction between the Hitler and Piłsudski regimes and created the
emergence of a new demeanor in Polish foreign policy.
The years of bad relations between Germany and Poland had created an
atmosphere filled with tension and mistrust, and this mood carried itself over,
inaugurating the new era with a crisis that was little more than a continuation of the
problems of the past. On February 15, 1933, the Danzig senate notified the Polish
government that it intended to withdraw the Polish detachment of harbor police and
replace it with a force under its own jurisdiction; coincidentally, on the same day,
Colonel Józef Beck, the new Polish Foreign Minister, was presenting his first official
address stressing calm in dealing with Hitler and National Socialism. 14 As Warsaw had
no control over this force, it was feared that this act was a precursory step to facilitate a
Nazi takeover of the city through the infiltration of undetected Sturmabteilung (SA) or
other German nationalist paramilitary units which, once gaining control of Danzig, would
then ask Berlin to be annexed to the Reich. 15 Rumors of an impending assault on the
Polish garrison and munitions depot on the Westerplatte further fueled this concern, and
on March 5, 1933, Piłsudski decided to reinforce the garrison with 120 additional
troops. 16 The next morning, the military transport Wilja landed at the Westerplatte with
the reinforcements, bringing the total Polish presence up to 208 soldiers who secured the
munitions depot. The attack and takeover that prompted the action never occurred, and
the entire matter was resolved through an emergency meeting of the Council of the
League of Nations on March 13. 17
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While on the surface this incident is nondescript and characteristic of GermanPolish relations as they had been conducted prior to Hitler’s rise to power, several
important distinctions must be made. Although the reinforcement sent to the garrison
was little more than a token gesture, it was the first time that a German affront to Polish
interests had been met with direct action. 18 The response was not random but carefully
calculated and conceived by Piłsudski as a lively “energetic act” that was intended to be a
psychological and tactical test of Hitler and his regime’s mettle. 19 Strategically, the
move was designed to be provocative and elicit a response that could be closely observed
so as to ascertain Germany’s actual state of readiness in the event of armed conflict. 20
The date for the action was also chosen for shock value, as it coincided with the German
Reichstag elections. To add yet another layer of complexity to the matter, Beck and
Piłsudski had also intended for the move to serve as a message to Britain and France that
Poland would no longer tolerate any ideas of border revision to satiate German claims
and to indicate to the French that Poland would, in the future, be conducting an
independent foreign policy. 21
The cumulative effect of this scheming was twofold. First, it dispelled the
international belief that Poland was merely one of France’s numerous East Central
European clients. 22 This message was particularly directed at Great Britain, a nation that,
according to Beck, Poland had no direct contact with before 1933, but it was equally
intended for the international community at large. Second, it was the first conscious step
by the Polish government to assert itself as the Great Power that it was beginning to
believe itself to be. Although such a claim would not be made publicly by Warsaw, the
behavior and decisions made by Piłsudski and Beck indicate that Poland was taking an
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affirmative step in that direction. The positive resolution of the incident, from Warsaw’s
perspective, also initiated the process of psychological confidence in that reality-divorced
schema.
On the heels of this modest success, Piłsudski apparently unleashed the boldest
and most audacious Polish foreign policy initiative since Poland’s reconstitution in 1919:
an offer of preventative war against Hitler to Warsaw’s principal ally, France. But was
such a proposal ever made? Accounts of this offer permeate the historiography covering
the period and, judging by the frequency with which references to this appear, it deserves
special consideration. Although the various accounts disagree as to exactly how far along
Piłsudski’s scheme developed, it is clear that it was, at the very least, conceptualized. 23
As to the extent that consideration was given to this scheme, accounts differ wildly.
Some sources relate that it was carefully considered before being rejected by Piłsudski
himself, while others indicate that the proposal was formally extended to the French
before being declined. The truth lies somewhere in between.
According to Beck and his wife Jadwega, the Marshal considered the idea,
weighing both the pros and cons and even going as far as to conduct an informal survey
of opinion in government circles. Ultimately, the relative weakness of the Polish military
caused him to discard the notion of preventative war as a plausible policy line. 24
The fact that Piłsudski even considered the issue seems odd, given that he was
quite pleased with Hitler’s rise to power and believed him to be less dangerous to Poland
than previous German leaders. What Piłsudski truly wanted was an understanding with
Hitler based on the existing territorial settlement, as his greatest fear was a further
reduction of Poland’s territory. 25 To achieve this end and bring the Germans to the
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negotiating table, he purposely concocted and spread rumors of a preventative war in
conjunction with France and Britain through diplomatic channels.
The entire episode, then, was a ruse. Jules Laroche, the French Ambassador to
Warsaw from 1926 to 1935, would have been the logical recipient and messenger in the
event such a proposal was offered, but recorded in his memoirs that he received no
communication to that effect. Laroche found the entire matter unbelievable, as he could
not see Piłsudski risking his military reputation on an uncertain war with Germany when
he had already secured his warrior’s legacy by defeating the Soviet Union in 1920.
Poland’s ambassador to Berlin, Józef Lipski, speculated that Piłsudski likely sent the
offer through military channels, which the Marshal trusted for discretionary reasons,
although no proof that the suggestion was floated to the French in this manner exists
either. Édouard Daladier, the French Defense Minister, was unaware of the proposal, as
was General Maxime Weygand, the French Army’s Chief of Staff, who stated that he
“never heard of any such overture of Piłsudski.” 26
Naturally, the French could not reject something that they never received.
However, the offer, or rather the rumor of it, was never intended for them. The entire
affair was a diplomatic follow-up to the Westerplatte incident and designed to be a
continuation of Piłsudski’s new approach to foreign policy and furthering of Warsaw’s
ongoing psychological test of Hitler. Within that framework, from the Polish
perspective, the ruse was a complete success. Towards the end of the year, feelers put
out by Warsaw began to indicate that the Germans were interested in reaching an
understanding with Poland.
This rising tide of amicability resulted in the January 26, 1934, German-Polish
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non-aggression pact. Although little more than a hollow expression of superficial
goodwill, the temporary security it offered was exactly what Piłsudski wanted. However,
the Marshal was pragmatic in assessing the document’s true meaning, noting that it likely
meant that Hitler had merely postponed his designs on Poland until Germany was as
strong as the Führer wished before he would risk war. 27 This was in agreement with
Piłsudski’s conceptions of foreign policy, which predicted behavior based on a simple
risk-return assessment. Within this framework, Piłsudski and his protégé Beck were
certain that internal and external forces precluded any chance of Germany gaining
meaningful and lasting results from military action, leaving the Reich predisposed to an
accord. 28 Placing faith in prognostic formulas is always highly dubious, but in this
instance, Beck’s instincts proved correct.
The degree to which the threat of preventative war played a part in bringing about
the German-Polish rapprochement is debatable, as there were numerous factors that
contributed to the conclusion of the agreement. First and foremost was the state of affairs
within Germany, which was no less chaotic in the inaugural months of Nazi rule than
during the dying days of the republic. The daily orgies of street violence instigated by an
unleashed SA were spiraling out of control, resulting in public anger in even pro-Nazi
circles. 29 For political reasons, Hitler did little to rein in the Brown Shirts even though,
as the year progressed, the organization began to constitute a serious threat to his power.
Ernst Röhm, the head of the SA, was calling for a second revolution and, by the end of
1933, had all but publicly split with Hitler. Röhm’s continued calls for incorporating the
SA into the Reichswehr were also creating difficulties for Hitler with the military, which
was ramping up to its crescendo at nearly the same time the non-aggression treaty was
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signed in late January. 30 The German economy, for all the NSDAP rhetoric and
propaganda to the contrary, was still in a relatively dismal state. By January 1934, Nazi
work programs had reduced unemployment totals by roughly 2 million, but this still left
the overall figure hovering near 4 million. 31 Rural areas were the main beneficiaries of
the Battle for Work, with its focus on road construction and other unskilled, manual
labor-intensive activities, while industrial and major urban centers felt little relief. 32 To
strengthen his position domestically and prepare for expansion on a grand scale in the
east, Hitler needed calm and quiet, conditions that war with Poland certainly would not
provide.
Piłsudski’s rumor of preventative war, which he began spreading in March,
coincided with the initiation of both the German works programs and the escalating
problems with Röhm and the SA, adding yet one more concern to an already extensive
list. This undoubtedly had some sort of psychological effect on Hitler, making him
anxious to lessen the tension with his eastern neighbor, as he could not be entirely sure
whether Piłsudski was bluffing or not. 33 However, he would not cave to Polish threats.
At a May 1933 meeting with Alfred Wysocki, the first Polish ambassador to Berlin,
Hitler flatly refused to consider any special position for the Poles in Danzig but did
emphasize that territorial revision could not be achieved by war, a position that resonated
positively when it was related back to Warsaw. 34 He followed this encounter with a
speech at the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, that stressed his desire for peace in Europe and
outlined a broad foreign policy that Germany would follow to that end, subtly aiming it in
Warsaw’s direction. 35 To demonstrate sincerity, Hitler restrained the Danzig Nazis,
ushering in a period of relative calm and nullifying, for the moment, the most contentious
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issue between the two countries. 36 An ending of the Stresemann-instigated eight-year
tariff war further sweetened the pot. All of these gestures were contrary to the advice
Hitler was receiving from Constantin von Neurath, Germany’s Foreign Minister, and
Herbert von Dirksen, the German ambassador to Moscow, who both stressed that only
continuous revisionist agitation with regard to Poland rather than conciliation could effect
a proper territorial settlement. 37 Germany’s Führer did not, however, heed their council,
as his main objective was rearming the Reich and preparing it for war. An arrangement
with Poland, like all other foreign policy matters, would be a temporary exigency that
was not intended to outlast its usefulness. A deal would be made.
Piłsudski and Hitler were both seeking the same end but by contrary means and
for drastically different purposes. It was Piłsudski who took the first step toward
rapprochement, sending Lipski to Berlin in late autumn with orders to speak directly with
Hitler on the matter. The diplomat and the dictator met on November 15, with Lipski
relating Piłsudski’s critical message about “the necessity” of taking “steps to reinforce
security” not only for the present, but for the future as well, as anything less would result
in “the loss of a security factor in German-Polish relations.” 38 The threat was implicit
and, although no direct reference to the possibility of preventative war was made, it was
fear of that scenario that Piłsudski hoped to conjure in German minds. It was not
necessary. At the meeting Hitler spoke of his desire to work with Poland bilaterally to
resolve differences between the two countries and even alluded to a future settlement of
certain problems via compensation, and, unknown to Lipski, a draft non-aggression
agreement had already been drawn up by the Auswärtiges Amt, or German Foreign
Office. 39 The draft was presented to Piłsudski in Warsaw the next week on November 27
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at the same time Lipski received a copy from von Neurath. Piłsudski gave no immediate
reply and departed the same day for Vilnius to mull the proposal over.
Given the context of the German document, it is understandable that the Poles
were less than enthralled. The draft, in its opening paragraph, offered a direct insult to
Polish national honor, alluding to the fact that Poland owed its very existence to the
Treaty of Versailles and in further paragraphs made numerous references to the need for a
“just” settlement between Germany and Poland. 40 Such innuendos pertaining to the
lands stripped from Germany were not unnoticed, nor was the fact that the “important
problems” were left undefined and vague, theoretically enabling either party to elevate
any issue to that level and pursue arbitrational recourse without guilt. 41 Whether the
language of the draft was specifically chosen by Hitler to test Poland’s upper-limits of
accommodation or the text was inserted independently by hostile bodies within the
Auswärtiges Amt intending to kill the agreement is unclear, as either possibility was
equally plausible. Whatever the case may have been, Piłsudski remained mute on the
issue and made no counterproposal until January 9, 1934. 42
Talks continued until January 20, with the Germans growing anxious for the
finalization of the declaration. It was during this period of intense negotiations over
highly technical but immensely significant language that Lipski truly shined as a
plenipotentiary, gaining Berlin’s acquiescence to virtually all the Polish demands,
including Piłsudski’s requirement that the agreement be short and devoid of “chancery
devices.” 43 On January 24 the document was complete, requiring only signatures to
make it official.
In a rare instance of mutual satisfaction with a negotiated agreement, both the
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parties involved were able to leave the table contented. Hitler had achieved his main
objective, a temporary détente with his eastern neighbor, which freed his hand to focus on
other equally pressing foreign and domestic issues. He also added a significant reference
of peaceful intent to his resume, which he could, in the future, exploit. Piłsudski was
equally pleased with the outcome, as he had had to give up nothing to secure the
arrangement. Further, the declaration, coupled with Warsaw’s similar 1932 nonaggression treaty with the Soviet Union, placed Poland in a position the Marshal felt was
favorable, as it allowed for some semblance of balance between Poland’s historically
hostile neighbors. 44 More important and dangerous for Poland was yet another
confirmation that Warsaw’s new approach to foreign policy was correct, as it was based
on the belief that Great Power posturing had effected the results rather than the specific
circumstances that actually did. Piłsudski may have been pragmatic about the whole
episode, but success is like liquor: the more one tastes, the drunker one becomes. The
Marshal may, in this instance, have been stoically holding his vodka, but his protégé
Beck was certainly becoming emboldened by its effects.
II
In Hungary, the initial reaction to Hitler’s appointment as chancellor was
generally positive in government circles. The Prime Minister, Gyula Gömbös, was one
of the first world leaders to send a letter of congratulations to the Nazi leader, alluding to
the common principles and ideology of the two regimes and urging closer trade relations.
In that letter, Gömbös also expressed a desire for closer cooperation between the Magyar
and German minorities in the various successor states of East Central Europe, as this was,
in his mind, essential to any future political collaboration. 45 Although the latter point
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never materialized in any concrete fashion, the ideological similarities to which Gömbös
alluded would shortly form the cornerstone of a very complicated and deeply intimate
relationship that was to last until the fall of the Third Reich.
Hungary, like Germany, had been divested of much of its historic territory by the
Treaty of Trianon in 1920, with almost two thirds of the kingdom being either awarded to
neighbors that had fought with the Allies during the First World War or used to create the
successor nations of the defeated Dual-Monarchy. 46 Every country that shared a frontier
with Hungary profited in some way from the redistribution of its lands, although
Romania was by far the greatest beneficiary, receiving a larger portion of Hungarian
territory than what remained of the Magyar state itself. 47 The economic impact of
Trianon was equally devastating, stripping Hungary of 59 percent of its transportation
infrastructure and incredible amounts of natural resources. 48 Hungarian manufacturing
and industry were not affected nearly as much in terms of lost capacity potential as most
of its factories were in and around Budapest. However, its industry was severed from its
primary raw material supplies and markets, placing the nation largely at the mercy of its
neighbors. 49 To add further insult to injury, more than 3 million ethnic Magyars were
expatriated from their homeland and placed under the rule of foreign governments. 50
While the combined effects of Trianon did not specifically predispose Hungary to
eventual collaboration with Nazi Germany, the indelible mark the treaty left on the
national psyche all but ensured that revisionism would never be more than a fleeting
thought away.
This was especially true and made manifest in all aspects of political life in
Hungary throughout the 1920s and early 1930s, where Trianon revisionism enjoyed

22

virtually unanimous support and endorsement on both sides of the political spectrum.
The only dissenting voices came from the few Social Democrats who were generally
willing to accept the loss of the non-ethnic Hungarian lands but still demanded revision
of the treaty to bring the Magyar majority areas outside Budapest’s domain back under
Hungarian control. Such sentiments were limited in their acceptance, failing to permeate
down to the working classes or their parties, and were entirely absent from the dialogue
of the conservative and radical Right, which called for, and actively sought, revision of
Trianon. 51 Revision was, however, well nigh impossible to achieve in any material way.
The Treaty of Trianon had severely reduced Hungary’s military, limiting its size to
35,000 men and prohibiting the retention of a General Staff, rendering the institution
largely a glorified police force. 52 Hungary’s neighbors Yugoslavia, Romania, and
Czechoslovakia were also arrayed in a defensive alliance, known as the Little Entente,
which was directed at preventing Hungarian revision and aggression, providing for a very
real deterrent against such hubristic inclinations.
This inability to effect the desired revision did little to quiet the voices calling for
its realization within the country, resulting in a slow but steady increase in the
radicalization of populist right-wing domestic politics. The crass nature of these quasifascist movements had a limited influence on the aristocratic and traditionally
conservative elements that dominated Hungarian society, as the aspirations of the
national elite were already directed at restoring the glory of the kingdom’s historic past.
As border revision was implicit in their thinking, this lead to a certain degree of
intermingling between the factions based solely on the ends they wished to achieve. 53
Still, by the autumn of 1932, economic instability and the effects of the global depression
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forced Admiral Miklós Horthy, the Hungarian regent and much clichéd naval commander
without a fleet, to incorporate elements of the radical Right into the government; and in
October he asked Gömbös to accept the position of Prime Minister and form a cabinet. 54
Despite Gömbös’ advocacy for the reorganization of Hungary as a one-party state
along totalitarian lines, the aristocratic conservatives that put him in power effectively
curtailed his more extreme positions once he assumed the driver’s seat. As a condition of
his appointment, Gömbös was forced to publicly disavow his rabid anti-Semitism and
place members of the rightist, conservative István Bethlen era political machine in key
administration positions. He had to promise to maintain the current governmental
structure, theoretically limiting his freedom of action in an effort by Horthy to purchase
his services, rather as Hindenburg and von Papen attempted to do with Hitler three
months later. 55 Although similarities between the two situations seemed parallel, Horthy,
unlike Hindenburg with Hitler, was indebted to Gömbös, whom he had come to know
and respect during the tumultuous year 1919, when the latter sponsored his command of
the Hungarian counterrevolutionary army and later directed the more violent aspects of
the “white terror” that followed in the wake of the Hungarian Socialist Republic’s
collapse. 56 Whatever the true nature of Horthy’s personal feelings, the move was entirely
tactical on his end and only really intended to placate the growing extreme-right.
However, once in power, the energetic Gömbös wasted little time in making his presence
felt, forwarding a ninety-five point national work plan that was entirely fascist in
character, promising, among other things, national unity and economic reform. 57 In the
realm of foreign policy, he followed up the April 4, 1927, peace and cooperation
agreement Bethlen signed with Mussolini, by reaffirming its general position and
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extending the treaty’s trade aspects to provide relief for Hungarian farmers desperate for
markets to offload their surplus wheat. 58
The next major foreign policy initiative for Gömbös would come in June 1933,
when he worked out a trade and compensation agreement between Hungary and
Germany. Although a rather mundane matter, the deal was significant for two important
reasons. The first was that it further alleviated the national economic woes by providing
another outlet for agricultural surplus, and the second because it inaugurated the new
Southeast European policy of Hitlerite Germany. 59 With regard to the former, the
benefits for Hungary were obvious. The nation had been virtually isolated internationally
until the late 1920s, with the Bethlen-Mussolini deal marking the first diplomatic step
towards ending that status and providing Budapest with an ally that could potentially
assist Hungary in realizing its revisionist aspirations. This new deal further extricated
Hungary from international pariahdom and bolstered domestic support for Gömbös and
Horthy by casting their lot with an international figure who was dedicated to the
destruction of Versailles and the existing European order. For Germany, it was an
important inroad into the region, which held vital resources that were essential to Hitler’s
autarkic policies and the first tentative move toward economic domination of
Southeastern Europe. 60
Fifteen days later, on June 17, Gömbös claimed another international first,
meeting Hitler at Berchtesgaden to discuss potential future political and diplomatic
collaboration between the two countries. As was the German dictator’s style, Hitler
monopolized the conversation and frankly related to Gömbös the future course of
German foreign policy. Specifically, Hitler told the Hungarian Prime Minister that the
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current European peace settlements could only be revised by force and that, even if
concessions were wrested from the powers that be, his true aims could only be realized
through war. 61 Conflict with the French would be inevitable and Czechoslovakia would
be smashed in due course as well. 62 Being somewhat of a Hungarian exploratory mission
in and of itself, Gömbös sounded Hitler out on several issues important to Budapest,
placing particular emphasis on the state of German-Austrian relations and Berlin’s
intentions toward its southern neighbor. The Hungarian leadership viewed an Anschluss,
or union, between the two German states as something of an inevitability, but, as it was
expressly forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles and Austria was a vital trading partner
and conduit for Hungarian goods, such an event was not highly desirable. 63 It would, in
effect, give Germany great power over Hungary through the absorption of one of the
nation’s key markets and thereby limit its international activities unless Budapest decided
to forsake a major outlet for its agricultural products. However, these fears were allayed.
According to Hitler, there would be no immediate Anschluss. 64 On the subject of
Hungarian revisionism, Gömbös was bitterly disappointed. Germany would not support
Hungary in any attempt to regain Transylvania from Romania and would accede to the
return of only its former lands that contained Magyar majorities in Czechoslovakia. 65
If Hitler’s rejection of Hungarian aims was a bitter pill to swallow, then the
uproar, both domestically and abroad that awaited Gömbös when he returned to
Budapest, was equally difficult to ingest. At home, many thought that the visit had
occurred too soon, as the disposition of the West and Little Entente in regard to Hitler
was still to be seen, and it might elicit a negative international response from those
sectors. 66 Of equal concern was the reaction of Mussolini, who considered Hungary and
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the Danubian region very much within the Italian sphere of influence. Moreover, the
Italian leader was uneasy about any extension of German power in this direction. Despite
his initial apprehensions, Mussolini was soon assuaged by Hungarian overtures
confirming Budapest’s commitment to Rome. It is probable too that the fact that
Gömbös left Bavaria with little to show other than personally impressing Hitler with his
bravery for making the trip amid the uncertainty of its international reception contributed
to the clamor. He had risked much and only returned with vague promises to extend the
trade agreement signed earlier in the month, which would not be completed until
February 1934. 67 As a consolation prize, Hitler reciprocated the Hungarian gesture of
goodwill by sending von Papen to Budapest in September. The meeting was of little
consequence and simply reaffirmed Germany’s position on Hungarian revision, stressing
the need to focus it northward against Czechoslovakia and to accept the loss of territory
to Romania and Yugoslavia. 68
For the remainder of 1933 and into the early months of 1934, Hungarian-German
relations were courteous in character and the demeanor of their exchanges reserved.
Budapest’s major concern, German annexation of Austria, seemed like a remote
possibility for the moment, and Gömbös used this period of relative calm in an attempt to
further consolidate his domestic position. He pushed to create the position of vice-prime
minister and a new economics ministry that would be under his direct control, allowing
him to shape the economy along fascist lines, but these moves were met with resistance
by Bethlen conservatives within the business sector, and Gömbös was forced to abandon
these schemes. 69 Ironically, for all his efforts at expanding his own power, the only
political victory he scored during this period was a measure that greatly extended those of
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the regent.
This brief respite was shattered on July 25, 1934, with the assassination of the
Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß by members of the Deutsche
Nationalsozialistische Arbeiterpartei (DNSAP), the Austrian wing of the Nazi party, in a
botched coup attempt. Hitler’s involvement in the putsch was limited and, although it is
clear that he was aware of it and had given the attempt his tacit approval, it seems that his
judgment was based on faulty information provided by the Austrian Nazis. There was to
be no general uprising and the Austrian military, which Theo Habicht, the titular head of
the DNSAP, had promised Hitler would support and participate in the putsch, instead
acted in defense of the government and rapidly subdued the insurrection. 70 Mussolini’s
mobilization and deployment of forces to the Brenner Pass provided a further deterrent
for any possible action by the Reichswehr, should the situation have developed into a
full-blown attempt at Anschluss.
Although the assassination and July Putsch was largely an internal German affair,
its occurrence and aftermath placed the Hungarian government in an awkward position
between Hitler and Germany on one side and Italy and Mussolini on the other. Gömbös
had been working on a policy directed at facilitating cooperation and collaboration with
both Berlin and Rome, aiming towards an eventual tripartite arrangement that included a
fascist Hungary dominating all of Central and Southeastern Europe. 71 The botched
putsch put a major kink in those plans, generating animosity and discord between the two
powers that Gömbös wished to bring together. Equally problematic were Hungary’s
relations with each country in regard to Budapest’s position on union between Germany
and Austria. Acquiescence would improve relations with Berlin and move Hungary
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closer to Germany, which was exactly what Gömbös desired. It might even win Hungary
enough favor with Hitler to regain the Burgenland, a strip of territory lost to Austria as a
result of the Treaty of Trianon. However, Mussolini was still opposed to such an event,
and any outstanding support from the Hungarians in favor of an Anschluss was all but
certain to complicate relations with Rome. The sentiment of conservative circles within
Hungary was equally reserved, as an independent Austria, to a degree, afforded the
government some latitude in dealing with Germany and maintained the country’s
freedom of action. Fortunately for Horthy and Gömbös, no decision on the issue was
required and the entire matter largely resolved itself. In this instance, inaction was the
obvious choice to make amid two equally bad alternatives, and this was exactly what the
Hungarians did, preferring to defer action until it became clear as to how the situation
was likely to play itself out. This would, in the future, become characteristic of
Budapest’s political behavior, only there would be much more on the line and serious
consequences for remaining inert when called to act.
III
Lithuania, situated on Europe’s cold Baltic coast, reacted to Hitler’s appointment
as Reich Chancellor with surprisingly little fervor, treating the Nazi “seizure of power” as
merely a personnel rotation. There were no demonstrations, no protests or even outward
expressions of concern by the government. General Petras Kubiliūnas, the head of the
Lithuanian army, related his belief that he did not foresee Germany being a threat to
Lithuanian interests. 72 In fact, it seems that the event only served to confirm the
prevailing notion that a major shift in the European political climate was occurring and
that the Lithuanian government had only to decide whether it wished to be part of it or

29

pursue a course in line with the political mainstream. 73 However, this was a somewhat
paradoxical crossroads, as, in its compositional character, Lithuania’s government was
already part of that discernable rightward movement.
Democracy in Lithuania had died on December 17, 1926, during a coup instigated
by the military and ultranationalist conservatives that toppled the leftist government of
Kazys Grinius, under the pretext that a communist takeover and invitation for Soviet
occupation of the country was imminent. This excuse was a sham, given the fringe
position occupied by the communist party in Lithuania and its active repression by the
government. Widespread enmity for Russian imperialism and a strong sense of
nationalism, tempered by the war fought between the Bolshevik forces and the nascent
republic from 1919 to 1920, further made this scenario untenable. In all probability, the
entire affair was prompted by a gross overreaction on the part of the “secret association
of officers” to an unfounded belief that the Siemas, or national parliament, was selling
out the farmers and peasantry. 74 After a brief two-day struggle, Antonas Smetona,
Lithuania’s first president and one of the primary leaders of the coup, was restored to his
former office and inaugurated a period of dictatorial rule that was to last until the
country’s fall and occupation during the Second World War.
One of Smetona’s first acts as president was to install Augustinas Voldemaras as
prime minister. 75 Strong-willed, fervently nationalist, and farther to the right in his
ideology than Smetona, Voldemaras soon molded Lithuania into a state almost entirely
dependent upon himself, Smetona, and the military for its direction and defense. Political
opponents were dealt with through extra-judiciary use of the Geležinis Vilkas, or Iron
Wolf, organization, which was quasi-fascist in character and loyal to himself and the
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paramilitary guard of his Tautininkai, or Nationalist Party. During his tenure as prime
minister, he crafted a foreign policy that was centered on Lithuania’s two most vital
issues: the recovery of the historic capital Vilnius from Poland and maintaining the status
of the Memel (Klaipėda) region.
Memel had been detached from Germany following the First World War and was
administrated by the French from February 15, 1920, until January 10, 1923. During this
three-year period, there had been an ongoing debate as to how the territory would be
administered in the future, with the arguments being entirely derived from the national
outlook of the interested parties. Germany desired the reunion of the region with the
country proper, and these sentiments were echoed by the large German minority that
resided there, although free city status was considered a viable alternative, with Poland
calling for the latter as well. 76 The Lithuanian government wanted the Memelland for
itself, as it would largely unite the majority of Lithuanians under one flag and, perhaps
more importantly, provide the nation with a desperately needed port. 77 The entire
situation was further complicated by Lithuanian fears that Poland, which Kaunas had had
no real relations with since the disastrous 1920 war that cost the country Vilnius and onethird of its territory, may have been willing to exchange the Corridor and Danzig for
Memel. 78 Within the region itself, an organization known as the Supreme Salvation
Committee of Lithuania Minor provided agitation for annexation to Lithuania proper and
clandestinely organized the citizenry for a future uprising.
On January 10, under the cover of Germany’s default on its war reparations and
subsequent occupation of the Ruhr industrial region by the French, the Supreme
Salvation Committee and detachments of the Lithuanian army, disguised in civilian
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clothing, invaded the Memelland and took control of the local government. 79 There were
protests of the action by the British, French, and Germans, but, as each was encumbered
by the Ruhr crisis, Lithuania was able to present them with a fait accompli and
consolidated its gains in relatively short order. The annexation was later confirmed by
the League of Nations with the provision that the Memelland be administrated as an
autonomous region within Lithuania proper, with that status being guaranteed by the
Great Powers. 80
This action and the manner in which the Memel territory was administered by
Lithuania became the focal point of German-Lithuanian relations, with each side using
the region as leverage against the other for its own ends. Germany utilized rumors of an
exchange of the Polish Corridor for acquiescence to Polish acquisition of Memel and
threatened to refer instances of ill-treatment of the German minority to the League of
Nations, both matters to which Kaunas was highly sensitive, to extract concessions for its
expatriates. 81 In this way, Berlin was able to block and reverse attempts by Smetona to
dissolve the regional Seimelis (Landtag for the Germans) in 1927 and 1930, respectively.
The Lithuanian government was equally opportunistic, dangling promises of better
treatment for the Memel-Germans in return for Berlin’s support in regaining Vilnius from
Poland.
As a part of the “Voldemaras Course,” the foreign policy scheme that Lithuania
followed from roughly 1927 until the early 1930s, the conciliatory gesture had almost no
discernable impact on the country’s relations with Germany. 82 Certainly Lithuanian
prima facie adherence to the League of Nations statues guaranteeing the autonomy of the
Memelland brought about a degree of amicability in their interactions, but the Reich’s
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desire for the territory’s return never dissipated. Germany needed no impetus to
stimulate its anti-Polish rhetoric, and the cumulative result of the convenience friendship
was a one-sided bargain that gave Berlin a potential ally to safeguard East Prussia in the
event of a conflict with Poland without necessitating any reciprocity. 83 This made
Lithuania somewhat dependent upon the Soviet Union for help in regard to the Vilnius
issue, although in reality little tangible assistance was offered. 84 Overall, the
“Voldemaras Course” was a dangerous charter for Lithuania, as it actively sought the aid
of two countries, Germany and the Soviet Union, that had very specific designs on the
Baltic nation that were detrimental to the nation’s health. Further, collaboration with its
two neighbors severely undermined Lithuania’s credibility in the West, particularly in
France, although its true impact was negligible in this regard, as Paris favored Poland
over Lithuania in the region. 85
In 1929, Voldemaras was dismissed from office while in Geneva and replaced by
Juozas Tūbelis. This was in response to Voldemaras’ increasing involvement with the
Geležinis Vilkas and movement to the political right, which threatened Smetona’s
position and was in conflict with his own ideological preferences. 86 The installment of
the new prime minister had little practical bearing on national policy, as Tūbelis was
Smetona’s brother-in-law and the appointment only served to cover Smetona’s seizure of
absolute power. This move also signaled a fundamental change in Lithuanian foreign
policy, which, under the guidance of Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis, was to favor
policy coordination with Lithuania’s neighbors and, more importantly, to attempt to
restore diplomatic ties with Poland. 87
In theory, the scheme ensured Lithuanian security through a clash of German,
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Soviet, and Polish interests predicated on each country’s aversion to Lithuania being
drawn too far into any one sphere. Should that occur, Lozoraitis assumed that the other
two would oppose the aggressor. In practice, affairs were far more complicated. The
“Lozoraitis Concept,” as the policy came to be called, did not adequately account for
Vilnius, which was the lynchpin of Lithuanian policy, but merely served as an
exploitative issue to Germany and the Soviet Union. Both countries signed nonaggression pacts with Poland in 1932 and 1934, respectively, which, for Lithuania,
dictated that policy coordination entail a détente with Warsaw. The Lithuanian
government regarded the return of Vilnius as a prerequisite condition for any easing of
tensions, but on this issue, the Poles were not to be moved. Attempts at rapprochement
were further stymied by Smetona’s insistence that Germany and Russia continue to be
solicited for support in the Vilnius issue, as the continued attempts only provided Warsaw
with a pretext for rebuffing Lithuanian overtures. 88
The “Lozoraitis Concept” and Smetona’s own Viduraine Linija, or non-alignment
schema, lost their momentum and viability with Hitler’s rise to power, due to his lack of
immediate interest in Lithuania and Germany’s steadily improving relations with Poland.
Lithuania, along with the rest of the Baltic region, was a part of Hitler’s Lebensraum
concept, but that was work for the future. For the time being, the German dictator needed
a period of international calm while he consolidated his domestic position and, to this
end, he signed a trade agreement with Lithuania in 1933 that provided a modest boost to
the Lithuanian economy and partially repaired flagging relations. 89
By the winter of 1933 and early 1934, affairs between the two countries had taken
a decided turn for the worse as a result of increased National Socialist activity among the
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Memel-German population in Klaipėda. The Lithuanian government suspected that the
agitation was being orchestrated from Berlin and began a series of crack-downs on the
NSDAP affiliated groups, arresting local party leaders and banning the parties on July 13,
1934. 90 The situation continued to simmer for the remainder of the year and into 1935
when, under the auspices of preventing a National Socialist revolt, the Lithuanian
authorities arrested and imprisoned many leading figures in NSDAP associated circles. 91
In all, 128 Germans were put on trial for treason against the Lithuanian state and
undesirable association with the Third Reich, which outraged Hitler and brought about
economic reprisals. 92 The actions of the Lithuanian government may have also
contributed to the ultimate downfall of an “Eastern Locarno” treaty, as when that issue
was being discussed by Hitler, Anthony Eden, and John Simon in Berlin on March 25,
1935, Hitler flew into a spastic rage at the mere mention of Lithuania. 93
The remainder of 1935 passed in similar fashion, with Germany continuing to
exert economic pressure on Lithuania with little effect. However, by the spring of 1936,
it became clear to Germany that its attempted punishment of Lithuania was having a
negligible impact and was only really affecting Memel-Germans, as Kaunas had offset
the economic blow by seeking out new trading partners. 94 This forced a reappraisal of
the situation in Berlin, although Germany’s options were limited. Hitler had withdrawn
the country from the League of Nations on October 21, 1933, which became official on
that same date in 1935, leaving no recourse through that body. Even if Germany had still
been a member, it is unlikely that protests would have accomplished much, as the League
Council had all but given Lithuania carte blanche to handle affairs in the Klaipėda region
as it deemed appropriate. 95 Appeals to the Memelland statute signatories also proved
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fruitless, with little more than stern warnings being issued to the Lithuanian government,
all of which were ignored. 96
Were Germany a lesser power, this would have been a tremendous setback, but
such was not the case. In the greater scheme of Hitler’s foreign policy, this difficulty
with Lithuania was a subplot, adding only a contextual layer. The German dictator’s
gaze was fixed elsewhere and his attention devoted to matters far bolder and more
audacious. Lithuania could wait for the moment.
IV
Hitler’s coming to power was viewed as a serious threat to national interest and
security in Romania, although this attitude prompted no immediate reorientation of
Bucharest’s policy towards Germany. 97 The Third Reich was a distant menace with
which Romania shared no common border, affording the country a measure of security,
both physical and psychological. An alliance with France, still in force, offered further
comfort. However, events soon conspired to draw Romania into a position that
necessitated direct interaction with Hitler’s Germany and an adjustment of policy to
accommodate the changing international landscape.
As a member of the Allies during the First World War, Romania benefited
immensely from its participation in the conflict. It had entered the war in 1916 after
sitting on the fence in cautious neutrality for the first two years, considering offers by
both the Allied and Central Powers and, after gaining the acquiescence of the Entente for
possession of Transylvania through the secret 1916 Treaty of Bucharest, invaded the
Habsburg Empire on August 27. The offensive was a disaster and resulted in the
occupation of nearly the entire country by German forces. After Russia withdrew from
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the war, Romanian options were severely limited and the government was forced to make
peace with Germany, signing the Treaty of Bucharest on May 7, 1918. In accordance
with that document, the Dobrudja region was ceded to Bulgaria and several mountain
passes in the Carpathians to Austria-Hungary. 98 The collapse of the German war effort
later in the year provided an opportunity to make significant gains and strengthen
Bucharest’s position at the bargaining table. To that end, on November 10, Romania
reneged on its treaty with the Central Powers and launched a new offensive into
Transylvania in the closing moments of the conflict. This invasion was far more
successful than the first, given the meager resistance offered due to the utter collapse of
the Austro-Hungarian state, and the entire region was occupied with minimal military
effort by December. 99 Formal annexation followed later that month. 100
The experience of the Great War had a profound effect upon Romanian foreign
policy over the next two decades, shaping its framework and providing guidance for its
course. Occupation and defeat imbued a conviction among the country’s leading
statesmen that peace could only be preserved through collective security and, in that
endeavor, Romania actively participated in the League of Nations. In that forum, the
country’s permanent representative and sometimes Foreign Minister Nicolae Titulescu
continually pushed for diplomatic resolutions to international disputes and argued for the
need to maintain good relations among all nations, both large and small. Altruism aside,
there was a calculated rationale behind the position. Titulescu believed that the only way
in which Romania could ensure its continued independence was through international
order and, based on this scheme, he pursued that agenda with great zeal. 101 In
accordance with that objective and in an effort to guard against Hungarian irredentism,

37

Romania, along with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, formed the Little Entente in 1921,
with France supplementing the defensive arrangement. 102 Bucharest was also concerned
about Soviet designs on Bessarabia, as Russia had never accepted the region’s union with
Romania during the confusion of the Russian Civil War. Although the two neighbors had
pledged to resolve the matter peacefully, an air of suspicion lingered. 103
Romania held to this policy for the duration of the 1920s, primarily focusing its
attention inward in an attempt to master the country’s myriad of social and economic
woes. Land reform was instituted by the government in an attempt to ward off
communism and, although drawing criticism from some medium sized landholders, the
redistribution policy was mostly effective. 104 The economic benefits from this policy
were, however, not forthcoming. Overall agricultural yields during the decade and into
the 1930s were significantly less than their pre-war levels, and the government’s
emphasis on manufacturing and heavy industry dictated that insufficient capital was
earmarked for the new smallholders, leaving them in the lurch. 105 The reform process
also encumbered the recipients of plots with debts to the previous land-holders, although
the mechanics of redistribution technically made them indentured to the state. 106 This,
coupled with low international market prices for wheat and cereals, Romania’s primary
crops, negated any profit, however meager, for the peasantry and inclined Bucharest to
seek out trade agreements that would keep the country fiscally solvent.
Expansion of the nation’s borders at the end of the war drastically remolded the
compositional ethnography of the country, creating considerable minority friction that the
Romanian government found difficult to manage. Alien nationalities such as Hungarians,
Germans, Jews, and Ruthenians were never truly integrated into the larger societal
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construct or accepted by the Regateni (Romanians who resided within the pre-World War
I borders, or the old-kingdom) and faced discrimination at the hands of the Romanian
bureaucracy. Anti-minority policies were enacted and, in Transylvania, demagyarization
was encouraged among all groups. Germans in the region quickly took to the spirit
embodied in the effort and, with alacrity, began to rediscover their cultural identity while
Jewish residents responded with far less enthusiasm, outwardly demonstrating a fondness
for the old Magyar administration that they believed to be fairer and more efficient. The
considerable Hungarian minority was especially feared for its political acumen and
subsequently became the target, both direct and indirectly, of Bucharest’s xenophobic
onslaught. Although harsh in tone and direction, the effects of the Romanian
government’s policies were mitigated by the inefficacy of the country’s highly
centralized and clumsy bureaucratic system. However, the slack was compensated for by
the younger generation of Romanians who, having seized the banner of nationalism, put
the governmental line into practice, much to the detriment of Magyar, Jew, and German
alike. 107 This created a cycle of antagonism that compounded already existent internal
division, which, in turn, was detrimental to relations with both Germany and Hungary.
Thus, when Hitler came to power, the Romanian disposition towards Germany
was decidedly negative. Poor treatment of the ethnic-German minority played a role in
souring relations with the Nazi regime, although attempts by the NSDAP AuslandsOrganisation, or Foreign Organization, to meddle in Romanian domestic politics had an
equally detrimental effect. 108 Initially neither side displayed any interest in rectifying the
situation, and Titulescu, ever the opportunist, used the unfriendly atmosphere and
perceived menace from the Reich as an expedient in his designs to make the Little
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Entente a more cohesive alliance. The “Pact of Reorganization” was signed in Geneva in
mid-February 1933, theoretically inaugurating a new period of cooperation between the
Entente members, who now swore to respect and consider each other’s vital interests
when conducting foreign policy. In reality, little changed. The alliance was still only
aimed at Hungary and remained strictly defensive in nature. Titulescu’s primary
motivation for the reorganization was his concern about the possibility of Czechoslovak
and Yugoslav rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which would undermine Romania’s
position in the long-standing dispute with Moscow over Bessarabia. To gain support on
that particular issue, he had to agree to a wide-ranging statute that encompassed all the
member states’ foreign policy concerns as well, which, due to the continuing animosity
between Germany and Czechoslovakia, made Bucharest party to Berlin and Prague’s
mutual hostility without any real cause. 109
At this early stage of the Hitler-era in Europe, this action had no significant
impact on the general course of Romanian foreign policy, but it is demonstrative of the
manner in which Bucharest conducted and would continue to administer its relations.
The “reorganization” of the Entente was a stopgap measure intended to fulfill a specific
and immediate need in Romanian policy, and Titulescu pursued the matter with that aim
strictly in mind. At the time, the cards seemed to be in his favor. The Little Entente was
supposedly more cohesive and viable as an alliance, which, in keeping with Titulescu’s
principle of collective security, offered a measure of protection in international relations.
France, the broker of Eastern Europe, was still interested and participatory in the region,
providing a further defensive bulwark against aggression. However, the house was
flimsy. Romania’s alliance, for all its propaganda of being a “superior international unit”
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that constituted a multinational Great Power, was a far cry from that status. 110 The
Entente was capable of handling Hungary or punishing Bulgaria, but incapable of
warding off a concerted effort by a major European power. 111 Relying upon the French
was equally a gamble. Although vocally pledged to the security of East Central Europe,
political divisions within the French government and an uncertain British commitment to
its once erstwhile ally made dependence on Paris a risk. 112 Further, the entire affair
subtly placed Romania in a position between Germany and the Soviet Union, exactly
where Titulescu believed it foolish to be, lest the country be swallowed by either. 113
Still, the short-term gain was enough to justify the endeavor.
Relations between Germany and Romania remained cool for the rest of 1933 and
into 1934, with Hitler finally taking steps towards rapprochement that autumn. In
October, he instructed Hermann Göring to inform the Romanian government via their
minister in Berlin, Nicolae Petrescu-Comnen, that the Reich had no interest in supporting
Hungarian irredentism and was committed only to revision of the non-territorial aspects
of the Versailles treaty. 114 The move was intended to facilitate a rapprochement with a
message tailored to Romanian concerns and meant to diffuse responsibility for revisionist
clamor onto Italian shoulders. As further enticement and to demonstrate Germany’s
sincerity, an offer was made to increase the level of German trade with Romania from 5
million to 25 million Reichsmarks. 115 The overtures were treated with skepticism, as
both Titulescu and King Carol II feared this was a cover for German political penetration
of the country. 116 However, despite these concerns, economic need won out and the two
sides entered into a series of negotiations, with a deal finally being concluded on March
23, 1935. 117
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The German-Romanian Commercial Treaty was beneficial to both sides,
alleviating some of Germany’s grain needs and inserting much needed foreign capital
into the Romanian market. 118 Berlin also achieved its desired economic penetration of
Southeastern Europe, which it hoped would lead to increased political influence. 119
However, absent from the agreement was the one resource vital to Hitler’s clandestine
rearmament program: oil. Romania and Germany had had a preexisting treaty for
petroleum signed in June 1930 and, because of this arrangement and Bucharest’s
insistence that petroleum be purchased with currency rather than industrial equipment, no
provision for its delivery was worked in to the new treaty. Because of this snag and the
lack of resolution on the issue, it appears that the Germans assumed that oil would still be
received as per the 1930 deal until a satisfactory work-around could be devised, whereas
the Romanians behaved as if the new arrangement replaced and invalidated it. Owing to
the duration and detail of the negotiations, it is highly unlikely that the issue simply fell
through the cracks and was lost amid the shuffle. Rather the Romanians purposely
stalled on the issue, using promises of future resolution and numerous accusations of
German recalcitrance to offload their grain without making any concessions on oil. This
was Titulescu’s method of maintaining freedom of action and staving off a German
monopolization of Romanian trade. 120
As a Francophile, Titulescu was very much interested in seeing Romania continue
to be aligned towards France, although circumstance made this a difficult course. French
economic needs did not mesh well with Romanian output, whereas the German market
was complimentary to its Southeastern European counterpart, which led to a gravitating
of the two countries towards each other due to mutual interest. 121 The trade agreement
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exemplified this and, from 1935 onward, German imports from Romania steadily
increased. 122 Still, Titulescu tried to keep his government from sliding too far into the
German orbit and, while conducting the economic negotiations, he actively tried to
facilitate an expansion of the French alliance system in Eastern Europe by pushing for
Soviet inclusion. By adding Russia to the pact, he hoped to kill two birds with one stone,
by creating a formidable deterrent to potential German aggression and to deprive the
Third Reich of a possible ally. 123 The scheme never came to fruition as Titulescu
planned, despite the conclusion of French-Soviet and Czechoslovak-Soviet mutual
assistance agreements in May 1935, since King Carol and the majority of the Romanian
government were opposed to any involvement in the arrangement because it would
require allowing the Red Army to transverse Romanian territory. 124 Consequently, Carol
forbade Titulescu to enter into negotiations with the Soviet Union, and Romanian
participation in the Paris-Prague-Moscow axis was stifled.
This did not immediately produce a wave of relief in Berlin, even though the
rumor of Romania becoming party to such an arrangement was cause for concern.
German diplomats were continually requesting updates regarding Titulescu’s views on
rapprochement with the Soviets, and the issue almost completely dominated relations
between the two countries for the remainder of 1935. 125 Even confirmation that no
negotiations were taking place from King Carol failed to diminish German interest in the
issue, and it would not be until December that Titulescu himself publicly denied the
rumors in the Romanian parliament. 126 Titulescu had, by this time, virtually no domestic
support for what was quickly becoming a personal crusade but was still vocal about the
plan until February 1936, when he finally put the matter to rest. From his vantage point
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in Berlin, Hitler could only have viewed the turn of events with a certain degree of
delight. German fears of encirclement by a ring of French allies were reduced and, with
Soviet troops unable to reach the Reich directly without illegally entering either Romania
or Poland, cover was offered for a major foreign policy endeavor that he was about to
unleash.
V
Following the conclusion of the 1934 German-Polish non-aggression pact,
relations between the two countries became less tense, and attempts were made by each
nation to portray each other positively at home. 127 Still, serious issues remained
unresolved. Specifically, the long-standing tariff war and minority difficulties, both
complications that were sidestepped in the effort to negotiate the pact, needed to be
addressed promptly lest the goodwill personified by the agreement should ebb
prematurely. 128 The former was settled in relatively short order with a supplemental
trade agreement signed on March 5 that ended the customs war and was intended to
bolster the general upswing in public sentiment in both Germany and Poland, while the
latter remained a thorny matter. 129 However, amid the more positive atmosphere, doubts
were being raised on the Polish side as to the longevity of the pact. Lipski in particular
believed that internal forces within Germany would eventually counteract the
agreement’s spirit and that Warsaw would do well to continue to approach relations with
Berlin with caution. 130
The Polish ambassador’s concerns were not unfounded, although for the
remainder of 1934, German-Polish relations were more or less amicable with the only
contentious issues arising between the two countries being disputes over attempts by the
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German government to economically control coal mines in Silesia and Polish
management of German industrial assets. 131 Even the issue of Danzig failed to surface,
but not for lack of effort. On this issue, Hitler chose to fund the city and restrain the local
Nazis, earmarking roughly 1.1 million Reichsmarks monthly for this purpose. 132
Discussion of an “Eastern Locarno” treaty, similar in structure and thrust to the
series signed in 1925 by Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Belgium, prompted
further collaboration between Warsaw and Berlin in November. The concept was not
well received in either capital, although for markedly different reasons. For Hitler, the
proposal would require him to accept multilateral restrictions on German freedom of
action and was tantamount to soliciting his acquiescence to and participation in a pact
largely directed against himself. 133 The latter sentiment was shared by Beck, who
believed the whole affair was little more than a thinly veiled French attempt to forge an
anti-German bloc under the guise of collective security that pushed Eastern Europe closer
to the Soviet Union. 134 This presented the Polish foreign minister with a dilemma. To
reject the proposed arrangement would curry favor in Berlin but alienate Poland from its
traditional ally and possibly antagonize Russia unnecessarily. Because Beck was
intimately familiar with the German position, he knew that accepting the French plan
would incur Hitler’s enmity and likely torpedo all that had been accomplished over the
past year. 135 Inaction and maintenance of the status quo was the pertinent course to
follow and, to that end, he hinged Polish participation on Germany’s and refused to
provide any guarantees for Czechoslovakia. 136 This effectively killed any chance that
Poland would play a further part in Eastern Locarno discussions and helped to sink the
entire affair, which was shelved altogether in the autumn of 1935.
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German-Polish relations continued to improve throughout 1935, building upon the
goodwill born over the previous year. Both countries remained solid in their opposition
to the Eastern Locarno agreement despite French pressure for its realization, and strove to
maintain their fragile détente. Danzig was still the primary issue that, at any juncture,
could cause a hiccup in relations, but so long as the Nazi regime respected Polish rights
to the city and restricted its activities to meddling in matters that only affected ethnic
Germans, Warsaw was content to look the other way. Even Hitler’s announcement of
open German rearmament and the reintroduction of conscription on March 16, both
measures that were flagrantly in violation of Versailles, failed to elicit any significant
reaction from the Poles. Certainly both Beck and Piłsudski were less than ecstatic about
the German move but realized that, given Poland’s own armaments deficiencies, it would
be imprudent to take any action. 137 However, events beyond Warsaw’s control soon left
the Polish government in the lurch.
The Final Declaration of the Stresa Conference on April 14, which reaffirmed the
Locarno treaties and provided for a united front against further German violations of
Versailles, placed Warsaw in an awkward position. The Polish government, which
considered its nation among the ranks of the great European powers, felt slighted at not
being invited to participate at Stresa, as this was both an affront to that self-perception
and a not so subtle indication that this image was not widely accepted. 138 As a result,
Beck was faced with a dilemma. He could act as a leader of the great power he professed
Poland to be, and have his country constitute the lone voice of support for German action
by standing in opposition to the Stresa Front, possibly sacrificing Warsaw’s alliance with
France in the process. Alternatively, he could bow to Western pressure and tow the
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conference line, which would complicate relations with Germany and slightly diminish
Polish prestige. Prevalent sentiments within the country made the second option the
more sensible and, consequently, Beck decided to join the Western Powers in a united
front against Hitler. 139 This came as a shock to Berlin, as conversations between the
German ambassador to Warsaw, Hans Adolf von Moltke, and the Polish Deputy Foreign
Minister, Count Jan Szembek, in early April had confirmed Poland’s negative disposition
to multilateral arrangements and a desire to build upon what had already been
accomplished in the East. 140 In a possible retaliatory move, on May 2 the German
government decided to suspend its subsidization of Danzig, which instigated a trade and
currency crisis that was not resolved until the end of August 1936. 141
The economic predicament was not sufficient in and of itself to seriously damage
German-Polish relations, but the flaring of Danzig issues and the revival of talk about an
Eastern Locarno pact over the remainder of 1935 and into 1936 served to create tension
between the two countries. In May, Beck reaffirmed to Moltke the long-standing Polish
position on any eastern multilateral arrangement and since France had just recently
concluded bilateral treaties with both the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, he
considered the matter dead. 142 During a subsequent conversation Beck clarified the
situation further, relating to the German ambassador that discussions with Pierre Laval,
the French Foreign Minister, had resulted in a clearing of the air of Franco-Polish
difficulties and he had gained Laval’s acceptance of Poland’s special circumstances,
which now afforded Warsaw a free hand in the handling of its affairs without risk to its
alliance with France. 143 This, coupled with a requisite period of amicability following
Marshal Piłsudski’s death from liver cancer on May 12 and assurances from Beck that
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Poland intended to continue its late leader’s policies, stemmed any abrupt deterioration in
relations but could not indefinitely halt that process. 144 Questions over the Danzig
currency issue remained unresolved and, by August, the entire matter had morphed into a
larger discussion of German-Polish trade discrepancies. 145
Specifically, the Polish government believed that it was owed 29.5 million złoty
in rail-transit dues, which Warsaw believed the Germans were withholding in an attempt
to extort Poland’s acceptance of National Socialist revision to the Danzig constitution. 146
Arthur Greiser, a member of the Schutzstaffel, or SS, and eventual Obergruppenführer
within that organization, had been elected president of the Danzig senate, and his
confrontational methods of administration created an atmosphere that raised Polish
concerns about possible infringement upon the nation’s vital interests in the port. In a
tactical move, Hitler chose not to restrain the Danzig Nazis as he had done in the past and
let the situation play itself out, even going so far as to propose an alliance against Soviet
Russia and offering the Ukraine and control of Lithuania as a way of testing Warsaw’s
limits. 147 Poland was not, however, to be moved by promises without guarantees,
rebuffing the proposal and sticking to its position. Eventually, the Polish government
suspended all rail traffic across the Corridor in its own effort to bring the Germans to the
negotiating table, although by February 1936, discussion of the issue was becoming more
infrequent due to Hitler’s attention being focused on other pressing business.
VI
In the aftermath of the botched Austrian Nazi coup attempt and murder of
Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuß on July 25, 1934, the Hungarian government sought to
gather as much information as it could on German intentions as regarded Austria. The
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reply recieved to its official inquiry from Hitler was lengthy, idealistic, and overtly
neutral, expressly desiring a manifestation of popular will, much like himself, to lead the
country, but doubtful that such a scenario would come to fruition. 148 Contained within
the message were subtle undertones to the effect that an Anschluss was inevitable and that
Hungarian acquiescence to such an enterprise would not be forgotten. Although not
specifically expressed, Hitler’s message was clear: resign Austria to its fate and focus
Hungarian attention elsewhere. The locale the German dictator had in mind was
Hungary’s northern neighbor, Czechoslovakia, and directing Budapest’s attention there
served two distinct purposes. First, it would shift Hungarian revisionism away from
Yugoslavia and Romania, and second, it would allow for combined pressure on Prague.
As an added benefit, collaboration with Germany would afford Hungary protection from
the Little Entente. 149
For Gömbös, the Hungarian prime minister, the scheme was a hard sell
domestically. National irredentism was largely Danubian in focus and there was a
prevalent skepticism as to the true nature of German intentions. The warming of Berlin’s
relations with Yugoslavia and the negative portrayal of Hungary in the German press
seemed to confirm this duplicity. Despite these obstacles, Gömbös saw his country’s
future aligned with Germany and, once the international fervor over the assassination of
the Yugoslav King Alexander and French Foreign Minister Jean Louis Barthou by the
Croatian Ustaše, or revolutionary movement, had dissipated, he began to take steps to
move Hungary in that direction. In late 1934, he sacked twenty-two generals and
replaced them with cronies loyal to himself, ensuring the military’s support of his
policies, and in 1935 he signed a grain for arms deal with Germany. Gömbös continued
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to press his luck, forcing Béla Imrédy and Miklós Kállay, two key supporters of the
Bethlen opposition faction, to resign from the government, which facilitated its rapid
collapse and prompted Admiral Horthy to call for new elections in March. 150
The scheme, while producing the absolute majority Gömbös had hoped for,
quickly backfired on him. Bethlen, his staunch opponent, was re-elected and able to
attract enough support from conservative circles to block the Prime Minister’s plans to
reorganize the country as a corporate state along the Italian model, forcing Gömbös to
drop the plan altogether. This precipitated a split in the fascist coalition, with the more
extreme faction of the Hungarian right moving away from Gömbös, believing him not to
be truly committed to the ideology’s tenets. 151 The cumulative result was an unstable
parliamentary majority that could only rarely be brought together on specific issues and
the slow but steady isolation of Gömbös within the government.
Hungarian foreign policy was also becoming increasingly impotent due to
Germany’s reorientation of its own policies. Budapest’s guarantee of Austrian
independence in the March 1934 Danubian Agreement had never sat well with Hitler, and
the support he had once given to Gömbös was now becoming a hindrance to friendship
with Romania and Yugoslavia due to their concern over Hungarian revisionism. 152 A
late 1935 meeting between Hitler and Gömbös confirmed this new German attitude, and
the message then was the same as it had been in June 1933, although now Hitler stressed
the need for Hungarian rapprochement with its neighbors. 153 Despite running counter to
national aims, Gömbös related to Hitler that this could be made domestically palatable
regarding Yugoslavia, as the Vojvodina territory ceded to the southern Slavic kingdom
was miniscule in comparison to Hungary’s other territorial adjustments. However, any
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easing of the tensions with Romania would be difficult due to Titulescu’s
untrustworthiness. 154 Though not explicitly stated, it is likely that Gömbös was making
reference to the Romanian government’s treatment of its Hungarian minority. Whatever
the case may have been, the result of the meeting was that revision would only take place
within a German approved framework and that Berlin’s goodwill was becoming
increasingly tied to economic and military concessions. The German-Italian détente that
resulted from Hitler’s support of Mussolini during Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia earlier in
the year further boxed the Hungarians in, removing Budapest’s only viable source of
support.
For a man like Gömbös who believed that domestic political support was
intrinsically related to the ability to achieve foreign policy success, this was more of a
death-sentence than were his rapidly deteriorating kidneys. The political base Gömbös
once had been able to count on was now abandoning him, and he was losing Horthy’s
confidence. 155 In government circles, there was also a growing fear that, should Admiral
Horthy suddenly die, Gömbös would declare himself regent with unlimited power,
establish a Hitler-esque dictatorship, and throw Hungary headlong into an alignment with
Germany at the expense of the country’s vital interests. 156 Plans were made to remove
him from power, but Gömbös saved them the effort. In March 1936 he left the country to
seek treatment for his kidney disease in Munich, and in Budapest it was decided to let
him expire there, which he did on October 6.
His death marked the end of a specific chapter in Hungarian foreign policy that
saw the Hungarian government move closer to Germany in a manner that, in the
immediate aftermath of Gömbös’ departure from power, was beneficial for Hungary in
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the short-term. Increased trade had initially brought high prices for Hungarian
agricultural surpluses and, after 1935, armaments and industrial capital. This helped to
stabilize the national economy. It also contributed to stemming the rising tide of fascism,
much to the dismay of Gömbös and his supporters, but to the relief of the traditional
conservative Magyar elite who were loathe to see their grip on power erode. There were,
however, long-term risks that came with these gains. Prosperity was largely the result of
Gömbös tying the German and Hungarian economies together, which gave the Third
Reich an incredible amount of power over Hungary and made disengagement nearly
impossible. 157 By 1936, this process was well underway but by no means complete, and
if Budapest had so chosen, escape from the German orbit was still an option, although a
difficult one. At the time, though, there was no need to consider such a contingency, as
the European political landscape was testy but not odious or threatening. However,
shortly after dawn on March 17, that atmosphere would drastically change.
VII
Relations between Poland, Hungary, Romania, and Lithuania over the period
from January 1933 to March 1936 were highly subject to the particular national aims of
each country and dependent upon how a potential partner fitted those plans. With the
exception of the Polish and Lithuanian governments, which were in a de facto state of
war, each country remained in diplomatic contact with the others, with either
ambassadors or ministers occupying posts in the various national capitals. The
mechanics of their intercourse were also polite, and no institutional dysfunction inhibited
their interactions. This created a diplomatic environment that was every bit as active as
that of the western powers and just as well connected: perhaps even more so, given that
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regional politics in east central Europe were highly subject to the actions of the traditional
powers. On the periphery of Europe, the Soviet Union was also an omnipresent actor in
these nation’s considerations due to Russia’s proximity, requiring Moscow to be treated
with more gravitas than in the west. The effect of this was that, as a region, there was a
strong focus on collective security beyond that of the League of Nations or French and
British guarantees and a strong desire to base that on internal strength without “great
power” assistance.
Lithuania was perhaps the exception to this generalization, although not for lack
of need or effort. The 1920 war with Poland and subsequent loss of its historic national
capital, Vilnius, injected a degree of rigidity into Lithuanian foreign policy, which
became entirely directed at regaining the city and subordinated all other considerations to
that aim. 158 Consequently, the cultivating of relations with Hungary and Romania
suffered, as neither country was interested in helping Lithuania achieve its objective, and
both were more favorably disposed to Poland anyway. This forced the Lithuanian
government to attempt to utilize Soviet and German pressure as leverage against Warsaw,
although this was a dangerous proposition, as both powers had interests of their own in
the Baltic, which were detrimental to the region’s continued independence.
The failure of both the “Voldemaras Course” and the “Lozoraitis Concept” by the
time Hitler had ascended to the German Chancellorship, caused President Antanas
Smetona to drastically reappraise Lithuania’s current policy and to discern the country’s
true friends and foes. The options were few. Great Britain had long lost interest in the
region and the French were in alliance with Poland, offering no potential for the return of
Vilnius. Earlier schemes that had involved both Germany and Russia had resulted in
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failure and, like the Lithuanian gestures, their friendship was little more than thinly veiled
opportunism. Turning to the other Baltic nations, Latvia and Estonia, was a possibility,
but there were complications there as well. Neither governments had any interest in
embroiling themselves in the ongoing conflict between Lithuania and Poland over a city
in which they had little interest. Estonia even went so far as to rebuff Lithuanian
advances in 1934 so as not to damage its relationship with Warsaw. Faced with a myriad
of poor prognoses, Smetona decided that the only viable option was to seek a
rapprochement with Poland, despite the outstanding Vilnius issue. 159
Initial Lithuanian attempts at restoring relations in 1934 through indirect and
unofficial means were rebuked out of hand by Piłsudski, who refused to deal with the
Lithuanian government in any manner other than official. 160 However, the Marshal soon
relented, realizing that with the state of German-Polish relations being as good as they
had been in years and German-Lithuanian relations suffering due to increased NSDAP
agitation in Klaipėda, this would be an opportune moment to normalize relations between
the two countries. Unofficial talks began in late January, but nothing came of them. The
discussions became stalled over Vilnius and Lithuania’s insistence that Poland at least
recognize the legitimacy of Lithuanian claims to the city, which was not forthcoming.
No further movement occurred on the issue until a year later in January 1935, when
Smetona and Foreign Minister Lozoraitis decided on a new approach to the same issue.
Reestablishing relations with Warsaw would become the primary goal of Lithuanian
policy, and to this end, the two men favored a plan that worked in gradual steps, avoiding
any direct discussion of Vilnius while at the same time not relinquishing national claims
to the city. 161 Despite these conciliatory gestures, the effort ended in failure.
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In reality, it was unrealistic of Smetona or Lozoraitis to believe that any offer, no
matter how finely worded or delicately packaged, would move the Poles on the issue.
Piłsudski and Beck had no obligation to do anything, as Poland controlled Vilnius and,
consequently, held the trump card in negotiations. Certainly, Warsaw desired normal
relations with its northern neighbor, but on its own terms. However, in 1934 and 1935,
these were somewhat unclear. There were those within the Polish government, Piłsudski
among them, who wished to see the old Commonwealth of the seventeenth-century
reconstituted and thought that if Vilnius was denied to Lithuania, Kaunas would
eventually warm to the idea of union along that historic model. Others went as far as to
deny the legitimacy of the Baltic republic itself. 162 Although such extreme sentiments
were pervasive within the Polish government, they had little bearing on Piłsudski, who,
despite his vacillating tactical approach to the situation, ultimately desired reconciliation
with the Lithuanians as part of his greater Międzymorze, or between the seas, concept. 163
Piłsudski had long been a proponent of Prometheism, the notion that the best way
to destabilize the Soviet Union was to support non-ethnic Russian nationalism within that
country’s borders, but events in the early 1930s had caused him to change his views
regarding the pursuit of that agenda. 164 Specifically, the 1932 non-aggression pact with
Moscow and the rise of Hitler in Germany made it clear to the Marshal that a shift of
focus was required, and, consequently, the entire project lost steam. 165 Still, Piłsudski
did not let the slow, gradual demise of Prometheism deter him from actively seeking to
facilitate the creation of his Polish-dominated Międzymorze bloc, to which Lithuania and
the entire Baltic region was integral. By the time of his death in May 1935, both
governments were on the verge of normalizing relations, and the project seemed one step
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closer to realization. The détente was, however, short-lived, and in January 1936 the
Marshal’s protégé Beck berated Lithuania in a public speech, eliciting a similarly harsh
response from Smetona and effectively slamming the door on any further improvement in
relations between the two countries. 166
This did not put an end to Polish aspirations for a Międzymorze alliance in East
Central Europe; rather, it merely signaled a change in the tactical approach that Beck, as
Piłsudski’s foreign policy protégé and successor, would adopt in his prosecution of the
scheme. Although Lithuania could be crossed off the list of potential allies, Latvia and
Estonia, two nations with which Poland had good relations, were still possibilities.
Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, the Scandinavian countries, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria,
Italy, and Greece were all equally positively disposed to Poland and, in mid-1935 and
early 1936, were potential alliance partners should Międzymorze be presented
properly. 167 However, this was nearly impossible. Disputes between the various
countries proved to be insurmountable obstacles and Beck, although a talented diplomat,
had neither the charm nor charisma to unite such a broad bloc under any kind of
leadership, let alone manage to get it to agree to look for direction from Warsaw. As a
result, he began to shift his own focus and that of the whole Międzymorze concept to
something far more realistic: his “Third Europe” project.
Technically, Beck envisioned a “Third Europe” bloc to be no less expansive than
Piłsudski’s Międzymorze, encompassing much of the same territory and still to be
dominated by Poland, although there were key differences. First, Czechoslovakia, a
country whose existence Beck was not entirely wedded to, was to be excluded from the
concept, as was Lithuania. 168 The Polish Foreign Minister had also decided to narrow his
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focus to Poland’s southern neighbors, Hungary and Romania, working to establish good
relations with each. To that end, his task was eased by Poland already possessing an
alliance with the Romanians, having signed a series of defensive treaties with Bucharest
in 1921, 1926, and 1931, although differences between Beck and Titulescu had soured
the relationship considerably by 1934. 169 Conceptually, the two were not far removed
from each other, both holding collective security to be fundamental to regional safety.
Where they differed was in tactical demeanor. Titulescu sought to include the whole of
Europe in containing a revived Germany, whereas Beck desired to see the creation of an
independent bloc that was capable of providing for its own protection and able to abstain
from the affairs of the Great Powers. An effort was made to incorporate Poland into the
Little Entente before Piłsudski’s death, but even Romanian mediation proved unable to
reconcile the territorial dispute between Warsaw and Prague. 170 Further complicating
matters were rumors of Titulescu’s attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet Union, a
fundamental violation of the 1931 defensive treaty’s spirit and an undermining of Beck’s
scheme. 171 This left Polish-Romanian relations by early 1936 in a state of steady decline,
although the damage was not irreparable.
In contrast to Warsaw’s relationship with Romania, Polish-Hungarian relations
had taken an opposite course from 1933 to 1936. Due to historic bonds, the two countries
harbored impressions of each other that were generally positive, and their diplomacy was
courteous and cordial. Though long in gestation, Hitler’s appointment as Chancellor in
1933 prompted Piłsudski to reach an understanding with the Hungarians, as the nation
formed both an integral part of his Międzymorze concept and offered an opportunity for
Polish influence to penetrate beyond the Carpathians. 172 Kálmán de Kánya, the
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Hungarian Foreign Minister, and Gömbös both held international designs similar in scope
to Piłsudski, envisioning a similarly large bloc consisting of Hungary, Poland, Austria,
Germany, and Italy. Working towards this end, official meetings were held in Warsaw
during October 1934 to strengthen the ancient bonds between the two countries, but
ultimately nothing significant was accomplished. Gömbös and the Hungarian delegation
returned to Budapest with little more than assurances from Piłsudski that Poland would
never take up arms against Hungary and the lingering echoes of the Marshal’s lecture on
the need for Hungary to mend its relations with the Romanians. 173
This latter point, centered almost entirely on Romania’s acquisition of
Transylvania in the aftermath of the First World War, proved to be a huge obstacle in the
development of Hungarian-Romanian relations. The stakes were too high for any simple
fix, and the fact that the region was regarded by the Magyars as the ancient cradle of their
civilization all but ensured that Budapest would be loathe to temper its irredentist
clamor. 174 At the time, this was of little consequence to the Romanian government,
which could rely on the relative safety the Little Entente provided and combined German
and Polish pressure on the Hungarian government to seek reconciliation with its neighbor
as further insurance. However, it was a tenuous security guarantee, as in principle,
neither Warsaw nor Berlin recognized the validity of the Treaty of Trianon and it was
only their conflicted views on exactly how East Central Europe should be politically
oriented that prevented that particular issue from surfacing. 175
Regional scheming was at the collective heart of East Central Europe and each
nation pursued its international agenda with its own vital interests in mind. Although the
dividends gained, if any, from January 1933 to early 1936 were few, they were
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significant because they set the precedent for future activity. Poland, with its foreign
policy becoming almost exclusively directed by Beck, worked toward the realization of
his “Third Europe,” a tactical restructuring of Piłsudski’s Międzymorze project and
domination of the region. By 1936, he still had far to go in that endeavor, but it is clear
from those first tentative steps that this was the direction in which the pseudo-Great
Power was being steered. The Hungarians were thinking in broadly similar terms, with a
grand Central European alliance system central to both Gömbös and Kánya’s plans.
National weakness made such machinations unrealistic and, compounded by German
economic penetration, began the slow process of drawing Budapest to the brink of an
unalterable decision, although that point of no return was still in the future. Romania was
in an equally unenviable position, faced with the allure of German currency and capital
for its fragile economy, but wary of the consequences of intimate dealings with the Third
Reich. Circumstances were, however, favorable to Bucharest. The Reich was still
distant, and faith in the Little Entente and collective security embodied in the League of
Nations provided a measure of comfort. As it had done before, Romania could hedge its
bets and make its decisions without haste. Only Lithuania was hemmed in by
circumstance. Three of its neighbors were hostile, and the Baltic Entente, created in
1934, was inadequate to counter a serious threat by any of them. Poland, Lithuania’s
arch-nemesis and possessor of Vilnius, was unfriendly, but the possibility of
rapprochement offered the potential to reintegrate the country into the region. However,
the Lithuanian government’s rigidity on the Vilnius issue provided Beck with the
initiative and control of the entire situation, leaving Kaunas subject to international
whims. Further muddling the picture for the region’s governments was Hitler and his
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Third Reich, which on Saturday, March 7, 1936, entered the demilitarized Rhineland in
violation of Versailles.
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CHAPTER 2: IN THE MIDDLE

Shortly after one in the afternoon on March 7, 1936, elements of the newly
rechristened Wehrmacht crossed the Hohenzollern Bridge in Cologne. Their arrival was
unannounced, but as word began to spread throughout the city, an air of excitement soon
spread. Men and children greeted the force with cheers and applause, while all along the
soldier’s path women strewed flowers. The reoccupation of the Rhineland had begun.
Although the selective press coverage by Joseph Goebbels depicted the scene as a
veritable triumph of German will and a bold, brazen stroke by Hitler against Versailles,
the situation was far removed from the confident reconquest shown on newsreels
throughout the country and around the world. 1
The move had been a gamble and, during the immediate forty-eight hours
following the Rhineland’s remilitarization, Hitler and the German high command were
wrought with anxiety over the possible Western response. Their fears were not
unjustified. The force that had been ordered into the demilitarized zone numbered only
30,000 men in total, with a scant 3,000 advancing into the region in depth, and faced a
potential adversarial force that, with French allies included, was nearly 200 divisions
strong. 2 With German rearmament only recently begun as outlined by the army High
Command in 1933, the Wehrmacht in 1936 was not yet the formidable force it would
demonstrate itself to be in 1939 and, being ill-equipped to face such massive opposition,
had been ordered to offer no resistance and withdraw if confronted by the French. Even
Hitler later confided that “we would have had to withdraw with our tails between our
legs” 3 in the event of any reprisal from Paris. However, the repercussions that

Germany’s dictator and his Minister of War, General Werner von Blomberg dreaded,
were not forthcoming.
Unknown to the Germans, the French government had already made the decision
not to oppose any move by Berlin into the Rhineland, eliminating the principle threat that
Hitler and his generals had expected and rendering their concern unnecessary. 4 Although
the German force that eventually marched into the region was only 30,000 men, the
French military included SS, SA, and other Nazi organizations among its combatant
projections and estimated German actionable strength to number roughly 295,000 men,
far more than the skeletal active army France maintained along its eastern frontier. Those
soldiers already in the field were intended to do no more than defend the border while the
army was mobilized, which would take seventeen days to complete. This afforded the
Germans precious time to consolidate their gains and prepare a defense with their
phantom army for a French offensive that its psychology, spirit, and capabilities
precluded. Further, the military possessed no plan for any action in the event Germany
moved to remilitarize the Rhineland. This, coupled with a lack of will to fight by the
British and an indication from Mussolini that, as far as he was concerned, both Locarno
and Stresa were dead, left France isolated in its resistance to German revision of
Versailles and restricted its possible responses accordingly. Indeed, for Hitler, it truly
was the psychological moment to act. 5
On the other side of Europe, all eyes were trained westward with great interest in
how the aftermath of Hitler’s fait accompli would resonate on the international scene, for
each country was very interested in the result. What was dismissed as a domestic
political act in the West and explained away to minimize its broader impact was viewed
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quite differently by Germany’s East Central European neighbors due to their differing
relationships with the Third Reich. Hitler had thrown down a gauntlet, and France and
Britain failed to accept the challenge. This fact did not go unnoticed by the regional
governments and began the process of pushing them towards Germany. 6
I
In Budapest, the Hungarian government’s reaction to Hitler’s “Saturday surprise”
was generally positive, although it did not come as much of a shock, as Kálmán de
Kánya, the foreign minister, had been made aware of the move the previous day.
However, others within the government were less well informed. Gyula Gömbös, by
now Prime Minister in name only, applauded the German move from his hospital room in
Munich with satisfaction, although he was unable to influence Hungarian policy from
what was to become his deathbed. Admiral Miklós Horthy, the widely popular regent,
was equally impressed by the bold stroke and thoroughly pleased with the manner in
which he believed Locarno to have been rendered void. As Hungary was too weak to
follow Germany’s example, Horthy hoped that this reassertion of German might on the
world stage would lead to benefits for Hungary. Specifically, he wished to see Hitler
pursue a Danubian policy much as Bismarck had, with the Magyars to be utilized as
proxies for German hegemony in the region. 7
Oddly, the enthusiasm expressed by members of the Hungarian government failed
to disseminate into the country’s foreign policy, since, following the remilitarization of
the Rhineland, Budapest began to institute a program that attempted to move the country
away from Berlin’s influence rather than closer to its erstwhile friend. Known as the
“Free Hand” policy, it was designed to keep Hungary aloof from not only Germany but
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from the western Allies as well until one side emerged dominant. This was in stark
contrast to Gömbös’ policy that sought alignment with Germany and his and Kánya’s
later abortive plans to incorporate both Hungary and the Reich into a larger European
bloc consisting of the two along with Austria, Italy and Poland. 8 Kánya, surprised only
by the timing of Hitler’s action, saw the potential danger for Hungary shrouded in the
otherwise broader positive ramifications, for though the current international order
appeared open for reinterpretation, it was limited to German designs. 9
The name “Free Hand” belied the policy’s reality, as it was conceived out of
necessity rather than choice. 10 With Kánya’s previous attempt to check growing German
power having ended in failure, it was the only option that was left. However, technically
another still existed: pushing Hungary directly into Berlin’s orbit completely on German
terms, which was no choice at all. That would have rendered Hungarian aspirations of
regaining Transylvania from Romania and the Vojvodina district from Yugoslavia
subject to Hitler’s whims, based upon how those goals fit his particular needs at a given
moment when the issue was broached. Consequently, Kánya formulated his policy
purely out of pragmatism, though it was not entirely devoid of creative merit.
Theoretically, alignment with Britain was still possible in 1936, although such a drastic
reorientation of national foreign policy only truly existed in Horthy’s delusions. 11 Britain
was too far away and uninterested in Hungary for any tangible results to be yielded and
tended to defer to France, which was allied with Budapest’s enemies, in regard to
Danubian politics. For the scenario to retain any viability, Hungary likely would have
had to renounce, or, at the very least, tactically set aside its irredentist aims, which the
government was unwilling to do.
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Conversely, working with Germany held several advantages. Unlike Britain, the
Reich was within close proximity and had expressed interest in Hungarian affairs within
the context of its greater regional strategy. This made Berlin exploitable for the pursuit
of Budapest’s own designs in a way that the West was not. The similar social and
political development of the two countries since the end of the First World War had also
produced regimes that were complimentary in their political outlook and shared the same
basic regional goals, namely Danubian border revision and hegemony. 12 No firm
German commitment to any other nation offered potential that alignment with the West
did not, as Hungary could become a principle collaborator with Germany without being
forced too deeply into the arms of the Third Reich. Still, there were risks. Moving
Hungary towards Germany required a delicate balance that, if not properly maintained,
could throw the country headlong into Germany’s orbit by alienating Budapest from the
rest of Europe. However, this was deemed worth the risk in the interest of revision.
Once the initial fervor over the remilitarization of the Rhineland had died down,
Kánya sought to influence Hitler regarding the duration of the non-aggression pacts he
had offered to each of Germany’s neighbors in his Reichstag speech of March 7. Of
concern was the twenty-five-year term, which, if allowed, would have conflicted with
Hungarian interests. Certainly Hungary was not, in early 1936, in any position to act on
its revisionist aims, but with the assistance Budapest expected from the Third Reich,
Kánya undoubtedly assumed that the country would be by 1961. His mind was, in
particular, on Czechoslovakia, and he pushed Hitler to consider a ten-year offer similar in
structure to the treaty between Germany and Poland. In his thinking, this would afford
Hungary the time to rearm and eventually participate, along with the Germans, in the
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destruction of the Czech state within the framework discussed by Hitler and Gömbös in
1933 and 1935. Based upon his concern and lightning quick inquiry regarding the
extension of a pact to Czechoslovakia, it appears that even the well informed Kánya was
deceived as to Hitler’s true intent and actually believed the offers to be genuine. He
pestered the Wilhemstrasse until the end of April regarding that issue before finally being
given confirmation that the entire matter was nothing more than a “utopian delusion” and
that the Reich had no interest in pursuing it further. 13
During this time, the Hungarians were also probing the Germans for an official
expression of friendship or consultation, preferring a document that encompassed both
notions as a reward for their hitherto Germanophile policies. Their groping was flatly
rebuffed on the grounds that the aftermath of the Rhineland action was not an opportune
moment for such a gesture and that it would be Germany, not Hungary, that would
determine when such an hour had come. This left the Hungarians in the lurch, since for
all their shows of support and friendship toward the Reich, the government in Budapest
was left with little tangible benefit. Although the economic deals signed in 1933 were
still in effect, they did not offer the kind of capital Kánya, Horthy, and the new prime
minister in waiting, Kálmán Darányi, desired. Even a meaningless extension of gratitude
in the form of a friendship pact would have served the Hungarian government well to
raise its international standing, but the Germans would not budge. 14
This did not deter the Hungarian government from its course, which was slowly
becoming very much counter to its official “Free Hand” policy. However, in the interest
of revision, Hungary needed to remain on good terms with Germany to secure
armaments, even if this meant being relegated to a subordinate position in the
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relationship. 15 Still, the Magyars saw opportunity in this, as even from their subordinate
position they were very much a part of Hitler’s Danubian scheming and felt that they
were advantageously placed to influence German policy in the region. Of particular
interest to the Hungarian government was the continued independence of Austria as well
as the Czechoslovakia question, and in August, Horthy made an unofficial visit to
Berchtesgaden to sound Hitler out on both issues. In a meeting that lasted nearly three
and a half hours, the Admiral stressed patience in regard to Anschluss with Austria,
noting that it was only the older generations that hindered union with Germany and that,
when they died out, the younger would invariably seek to become absorbed into the
Reich. 16 Ostensibly Horthy was attempting to persuade Hitler to allow what the
Hungarians viewed as inevitable occur organically, but Hungarian national interest was
what he was actually attempting to preserve. An independent Austria guaranteed an
alternative outlet for Hungary’s agricultural produce and staved off German domination
of its market, leaving Hungary with some room to maneuver. Horthy also reaffirmed
Hungary’s position that Czechoslovakia was a “cancerous tumor” and that Budapest was
still committed to action against Prague in conjunction with Germany as long as British
or French intervention could be prevented. 17 Although the meeting dealt only in broad
generalities, both Hitler and Horthy walked away from the encounter pleased.
Gömbös’ death from kidney failure on October 6, 1936, in Munich and the lavish
funeral arranged for the Hungarian Prime Minister in Budapest presented yet another
opportunity for the two governments to come together. In a tribute to the morbid setting,
Herman Göring, the morphine-addicted, multi-titled and utterly corrupt head of the
Luftwaffe, presented Kánya with Germany’s Danubian plans that threatened to suffocate
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Hungary’s own regional policy. Much of what had been stressed to Horthy by Hitler in
August was reiterated, although this time the German message carried a more sinister
undertone. Hungary was to settle its border disputes with Romania and Yugoslavia and
focus its revisionism on Czechoslovakia, which was to be occupied and Austria annexed
to the Reich. The matter of Germany’s rapidly accumulating debt to Hungary was also
broached by Göring, but rather than seeking to work towards a balancing of the deficit,
the Germans instead demanded more foodstuffs in exchange for increased armaments
deliveries. Kánya, undoubtedly expecting simple pleasantries and official sympathy, was
taken aback by Göring’s brashness and could only promise that Gömbös’ policies would
be continued. For all his many faults, Gömbös, in the last days before his death, made a
final and rather astute observation about the Third Reich. Germany was friendliest when
it was weak, but when it regained its strength, Hungary would no longer be a vital partner
when other suitors sought Germany’s affection. 18 Göring’s words to Kánya confirmed
the dead Magyar’s prediction.
This left Kánya, Horthy, and Darányi in a serious predicament, for how could
Hungary justify revision against Czechoslovakia if it peaceably settled equally
outstanding disputes with both Romania and Yugoslavia? The Hungarian regime did not
enjoy the total national political control that the Nazis commanded, further complicating
matters for Budapest. Any overt renunciation of revision, even if purely for tactical
expedience, would bolster domestic support for the rapidly growing fascist movements
within the country that possibly could directly threaten the government. 19 However, the
fear of alienating the Reich was an even greater concern and, with few international
friends, Hungary could not afford to slight Germany.
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With Budapest thrust between a rock and a hard place, the Hungarian government
fell back upon the tenets of its “Free Hand” policy and attempted to split the difference,
balancing its own and German prerogatives throughout the end of 1936 and into 1937.
The balance, though, was precarious and could be thrown off-center at any given
moment. Such a destabilization occurred following a November 1 speech by Mussolini
in which he expressed solidarity with the Magyars in their revisionist aspirations. 20 His
words sparked a frenzy in Hungary and led to a brief elevation of the public imagination
that, with Italian assistance, restoration of the kingdom’s historic borders might be at
hand. This was cause for concern in Germany, as Constantin von Neurath, the German
foreign minister, and Hitler feared that were Budapest to act on public sentiment, it could
bring the Little Entente powers closer together. This would wreck all previous German
efforts to wrench the alliance apart. 21
In an effort to prevent any such action, Alfred Rosenberg, the head of the Nazi
party’s foreign section and principal intellectual, penned a November 15 article for the
Völkischer Beobachter, that openly chastised Hungarian aspirations. The same
sentiments were expressed in person a week later in Berlin to Budapest’s minister, Döme
Sztójay, by the German Foreign Minister. According to von Neurath, the Hungarian
government needed to understand that total revision was impossible and that its aims
were unachievable through peaceful means. For all of Mussolini’s rhetoric, von Neurath
made it clear that he did not believe that any assistance would be forthcoming from Rome
unless the Hungarians were willing to accept political gestures as capital. Germany was
the only nation that could, within reasonable limits, help Hungary to realize its goals and,
with that in mind, it would be prudent to focus Budapest’s attention on Czechoslovakia. 22
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The writing was on the wall and, while the Germans in late 1936 and throughout
1937 were still not able to force Hungary to abide strictly by Berlin’s revisionist scheme,
their increasing economic domination of the kingdom ensured that Hitler’s word was
heeded. To further rein in the Hungarians, Hitler stepped up his support of the German
minority in Hungary, ostensibly in response to Horthy’s continuing Magyarization
policies, although the measure was more akin to political blackmail. In a communiqué
issued to Hungary’s foreign ministry on December 1, 1936, Hitler effectively tied the
future of German-Hungarian relations to an immediate cessation of Budapest’s
assimilation policies and further upped the ante by ordering Nazi agitators to infiltrate
Hungary under the guise of tourists. So as not to alienate the Hungarian government,
whose help the Germans believed they needed to take apart Czechoslovakia, Berlin later
softened its approach, veiling the demand for ethnic-German political autonomy within
Hungary in a geopolitical rationale. 23
If, so went the German argument, Magyarization ceased and the treatment of
Hungary’s ethnic minorities improved, then the national groups whose territory
Hungarian revisionist aspirations encompassed would be more positively disposed to
return to the kingdom. 24 Such a scenario was highly unlikely, but it was conceived with
German, not Hungarian, interests in mind. While Berlin was courting the Hungarians,
similar overtures of friendship had been made to the Romanian and Yugoslavian
governments. According to the proposed German policy, a tempering of Hungary’s
forced assimilation of its minorities would further Germany’s strategic aim of stabilizing
Southeastern Europe and bringing the region under German sway. Realizing they needed
the Reich to have any hope of overthrowing Trianon, the Hungarians quietly agreed to
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the German demands and, although Magyarization of Hungary’s other minorities
continued, its German population received a reprieve.
The minority issue notwithstanding, 1937 passed relatively quietly, with GermanHungarian relations focused primarily on Czechoslovakia. Specifically, Budapest was
concerned about Hitler’s still open offer for a non-aggression pact with Prague and how,
if the signing of such a treaty were to occur, this would impact Hungarian revisionism.
Several official requests for updates on the matter were made by Kánya through Sztójay,
much to the annoyance of von Neurath, who grew weary of continually reiterating the
unchanging German position. According to von Neurath, the offer remained on the table
as a matter of diplomatic good faith, although he believed the likelihood of any
movement on the issue to be nil, as Berlin’s relations with Prague were too poor to be
revived in the short-term. However, if the Hungarian concern proved to be too great,
both he and Hitler gave their consent to a Hungarian-Czechoslovak rapprochement but
stressed that this might not be best for Hungary’s long-term interests. Czechoslovakia
was now little more than a satellite of the Soviet Union and, although von Neurath did
not explicitly state it to Sztójay, working towards a détente with Prague would be akin to
siding with Bolshevism. The allusion was likely intended to conjure memories of
Hungary’s brief experience with communism under the short reign of Béla Kun and,
given that the Horthy regime owed its hold on power to portraying itself as a reactionary
bulwark against Bolshevism, subtly present the Hungarians with a black or white
decision. An alternative strategy, with German interests at its core, was provided. Von
Neurath argued that Romania was a country with which Hungary had equally poor
relations, but if the Hungarian government was serious about rapprochement with its
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neighbors, that nation was the most promising candidate. Though not overtly stated, a
modus vivendi could be arranged regarding Transylvania, which would be requisite for a
general improvement in relations between the two governments. Certainly, that would be
a bitter pill to swallow domestically, but appropriate measures could be taken to
minimize the public uproar. 25 In this endeavor, Hungary would not be acting alone, as
the Reich was also actively attempting to alter Bucharest’s disposition towards Germany
and move the country away from the Little Entente. A similar demonstration of goodwill
by Budapest was likely to have an equally positive effect and would contribute to the
realization of a scenario in which Czechoslovakia would be isolated from its former allies
to the benefit of both Germany and Hungary. 26
When this line was related to Kánya, he took it to heart, and for the remainder of
the year based Hungarian policy on this framework. In February and June he rebuked
advances by the Czechoslovakian government for an understanding with Budapest.
Although he undoubtedly had German strategy in mind when doing so, Prague’s attempts
to link general rapprochement to a Czechoslovak-Hungarian non-aggression pact in
exchange for a formal recognition of Hungary’s right to rearm made rejecting the
proposals much easier. Hungary had already begun that process and the right to do so
was considered to be inherent, rendering the Czechoslovakian offers strategically useless.
Hungarian rearmament, although slow and strictly within the nation’s tight budgetary
constraints, was common knowledge and had already been given de facto approval by the
other members of the Little Entente through their lack of protest regarding that violation
of Trianon. The non-aggression pact would have been equally worthless, as Prague was
unwilling to make an explicit promise that would have taken precedence over
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Czechoslovakia’s Entente obligations, leaving Hungary in virtually the same relatively
poor strategic position it currently occupied. 27
By June, no movement had been made on either the Romanian or Yugoslavian
fronts, leaving Hungary exactly where it stood at the beginning of the year, with the
diplomatic impasse continuing through late summer and into autumn. Then, during the
fall, Hitler sent a message to Budapest and requested that both Kánya and Darányi come
to visit him at Berchtesgaden. Upon their arrival, they were informed that decisions had
been made to annex Austria and intervene militarily in Czechoslovakia, to which neither
man offered any objections. In an effort to entice the Hungarians, Hitler offered an
undefined portion of Czechoslovakia in exchange for participation in the attack and
improvement in Budapest’s relations with Romania and Yugoslavia. Even in the absence
of firm compensation for their participation, the two leaders left satisfied and, upon
returning to Budapest, related the information to Horthy, who later wrote a letter to Hitler
expressing his satisfaction with the plan, emphatically noting that Austria was a part of
Germany. 28 However, despite being aware of German intentions, Budapest did not
anticipate the speed with which Berlin was prepared to move. Foreign Minister Kánya
had expected that Czechoslovakia would be the Reich’s first victim, with both it and
Austria being swallowed sometime in 1940, and the messages received throughout the
close of 1937 and into 1938 seemed to only confirm this assumption. 29 Thus, the
Anschluss with Austria on March 12, 1938, came as a mild surprise to the Hungarian
government due to its timing, although its leadership was aware of its imminence and had
already resigned the country to its fate. 30 When official word was communicated to
Sztójay from Göring, the Hungarian minister did not even mention Austria in his reply.
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Rather, he asked when Czechoslovakia’s turn would come.

II
The remilitarization of the Rhineland thoroughly impressed the Lithuanian
government, and its hopes for improved relations with the Reich were buoyed by Hitler’s
peace speech that same day, March 7, 1936. In his address to the Reichstag, Hitler
applauded the conciliatory steps taken by the Lithuanian government regarding the
Memel-Germans, specifically citing the government’s allowing of an autonomous
legislature and easement of restrictions on the minority. As a consequence of these
measures, German opposition to the future treaties with Lithuania was ostensibly dropped
and a non-aggression pact offered. 31 However, this apparent rising tide of goodwill was
as shallow as Hitler’s words were hollow.
Given Lithuania’s relatively weak international position and poor relations with
its powerful neighbors, Kaunas took the proposition seriously and, when no official
extension was forthcoming, contacted the Wilhelmstrasse in May to explore the matter
further. A meeting on the fifteenth between von Neurath and Jurgis Šaulys, the
Lithuanian minister in Berlin, highlighted the disingenuity of Hitler’s offer. The German
foreign minister side-stepped the matter, focusing instead on issues related to the
supposedly resolved Memel dispute from the previous September. According to von
Neurath, “all kinds of disagreeable things” had resurfaced in the region, which had led
the German government to believe that Lithuania was not serious about rapprochement.
Although the statement was likely intended to remain vague, the matter of lingering
German resentment from espionage conducted by Lithuanian governmental agencies on
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Reinhold von Saucken, Berlin’s Consul General in Memel, was brought up to provide
something substantive at a time when, in the wake of British mediation of the dispute
during the previous autumn, affairs in the region were corrected. The tactic worked and
the entire conversation devolved into a tit-for-tat exchange of grievances that, upon
parting, each minister promised to work towards remedying. 32
In truth, the Germans did not want a non-aggression pact with Lithuania, as a
treaty would inhibit Hitler’s freedom of action in the Baltic region. 33 However, they
were interested in the conclusion of an economic treaty with Lithuania, for which
negotiations had been ongoing since the Memel elections in September 1935. At issue
was what the Lithuanians viewed as an advantageous slant in the German proposal in
favor of the Reich pertaining to the purchase of pigs, an issue on which Berlin refused to
budge. The remilitarization of the Rhineland and Hitler’s offers of a non-aggression pact
inadvertently provided the Germans new leverage in the resumption of those
negotiations. They were now able to make the finalization of that agreement requisite for
the general improvement of relations deemed necessary to the non-aggression treaty. The
Lithuanian government did not see the link between the two issues as the Germans did,
but, without recourse, could force neither. Finally, after nearly a year of intermittent
negotiations, in early August the Lithuanians relented and signed the economic treaty
with the understanding that the agreement was the first step towards a détente and would
ultimately lead to the conclusion of the non-aggression pact offered in March. 34
There is no indication that the Lithuanians were deceived into signing the trade
treaty on August 5, but the entire episode exemplifies the manner in which, due to its
increased strength abroad, Germany was able to exert pressure on Lithuania to bring
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about its own ends. The traditional Lithuanian strategy of utilizing good, or at least
amicable, relations with either Germany, Poland, or the Soviet Union as a balance to
encroachment by the other powers had broken down to such a degree that Kaunas was
forced into a purely dichotomic relationship with the Third Reich, exposing its inherent
weakness and leaving the country with little room to maneuver. With no other options
and a desperate need for security, the government could only sign the treaty with the hope
that it would inspire a magnanimous German gesture. The German government
understood this, realizing that with the West increasingly uninterested in the region, it
now had a free hand to conduct its affairs as it pleased as long as it refrained from
violence. British mediation in the Memel dispute brought an international eye to a
technically resolved but still irresolute situation that was only further complicated by the
reoccupation of the Rhineland. This tempered Germany’s conduct of its relations with
Lithuania. For the time being, tact and restraint were necessary, but Hitler’s aims were
set and required only a more opportune moment to be acted upon. The Lithuanians could
be strung along until then.
For the remainder of the year and into 1937, German-Lithuanian relations saw no
further improvement, with direct contact between the governments limited to a single
meeting that occurred on March 9. The Lithuanian Foreign Minister Stasys Lozoraitis,
on his way to the French Riviera, stopped in Berlin and, accompanied by Kaunas’ envoy
to Berlin, Jurgis Šaulys, called on von Neurath to discuss the state of relations between
the two countries. While all parties agreed that relations had seen a steady improvement
since the signing of the economic treaty the previous August, there were still matters that
the German government considered outstanding and in need of redress before any further
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rapprochement could proceed. In particular, von Neurath noted that the continued
imprisonment of pro-Nazi German Memellanders was a hindrance to reconciliation, and
he made their release a new precondition for better relations. Judging by Lozoraitis’
evasion of the issue during the ensuing conversation, he was surprised by this demand
and, rather than address it further, sought instead to probe the German foreign minister
for the German government’s stance on broader European matters. Specifically,
Lozoraitis was interested in Germany’s relations with Spain, Austria, the Little Entente
and Great Britain. He was particularly interested in the impact British rearmament would
have on Berlin’s relations with London. For his efforts, Lozoraitis received little more
than a restatement of the official German position regarding each matter and departed
with only the new German demand for the release of its political prisoners. 35
Again, just as the Germans the previous year had forced the economic treaty, they
were now utilizing the same tactic to pressure the Lithuanians into meeting their demands
in exchange for vague promises with little concrete value. Although Hitler had no
intention of signing a non-aggression pact with Lithuania and, over the past year, that
idea had almost entirely disappeared from their discourse, as a theoretical end it remained
on the table. This contributed to an easing of what had previously been tense relations,
with the Lithuanian government eventually yielding, though not without considerable
chagrin, to all of Germany’s demands. Considering the worsening of Lithuania’s already
poor relations with both Poland and the Soviet Union and an increasingly distanced
affiliation with the Baltic Entente, Lozoraitis and Smetona had few options. 36 The
Germans were able to take advantage of this and treat the Lithuanians casually for the
remainder of 1937 and into 1938, offering no concessions as a counter to their increased

77

pressure, while content to string the Smetona government along until circumstances were
favorable for action. Following the events of March 12, 1938, such a situation presented
itself.
III
In Bucharest, the government of King Carol II reacted to Hitler’s reoccupation of
the Rhineland in a necessarily duplicitous manner. Nicolae Titulescu, the foreign
minister, expressed his congratulations to Hitler through Berlin’s charge d’affaires,
Wilhelm von Pochhammer, praising him on the ostensibly peaceful content of his
accompanying speech, while at the same time expressing regret over the decision. So as
to not offend Hitler, Titulescu couched Romanian security concerns amid the trappings of
international law, subtly reprimanding the German leader for acting without the consent
of the Locarno Powers or the League of Nations and indicating that his government
would staunchly support the ultimate decisions of the latter body in the interest of
preserving its legitimacy. As diplomatically as possible, he even went so far as to
question the German justification for the move, noting that unilateral action was
premature and that it demonstrated to the international community an unwillingness to
work with arbitrative bodies. Given the diplomatic storm he believed to be rising against
Germany, Titulescu announced his desire to move closer to the Reich, but noted that, as a
result of Hitler’s aggressiveness, he was forced to follow a different path. 37
Confident that he had balanced the need to warn Berlin of the consequences of its
actions while not burning any bridges, he later related his true beliefs and intentions to
the American minister in Bucharest, Leland Harrison. Titulescu felt assured that there
would be repercussions from the League, likely in the form of economic sanctions similar
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to those imposed upon Italy following Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia in 1935. There
might even be a call for the forceful expulsion of the Wehrmacht from the Rhineland,
although he believed the time for the latter had already passed. The sanctions, though,
were of great necessity, for if there were none and Hitler learned from this experience
that international order could be flaunted, then the entire system upon which European
security was based would shortly see its end. This would inevitably lead to conflict, “not
today, not to-morrow, perhaps – but, if the situation is allowed to continue, war is bound
to come.” 38
While making this assessment, Titulescu had not only collective security, which
he had spent his entire career championing, but his own eroding grip on power in mind,
for the two were intrinsically linked. Failure for the League would be his downfall, a
proposition he understood. To prevent this, he took affirmative measures to prolong his
relevance. Though ill, he traveled to Geneva for a summit of representatives from both
the Little and Balkan Ententes and, under the auspices of speaking for the alliances as a
whole, issued a hastily conceived dispatch imploring the League of Nations to strictly
interpret the relevant treaties that Germany had violated. He threatened an official
distancing of the Entente member states from the League should no punitive action be
forthcoming. Even before the hollow condemnation of the League Council that he
feared, his scheming with the powers of both Ententes began the end of his political
career. The dispatch he had issued came before any of the representatives of the two
alliances had an opportunity to consult with their governments on the matter and, shortly
thereafter, Belgrade, Ankara, and Athens each issued communiqués repudiating
Titulescu’s, labeling it unrepresentative of their views, and each privately informed
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Berlin of their intent to remain neutral in the event of any international dispute.
Previously, the Romanian foreign minister had been able to speak with authority for five
nations. Now only Czechoslovakia remained loyal to him. This left him virtually
discredited and, along with him, Danubian faith in collective security. So began the
region’s slide away from that concept and towards the pre-1914 international order. 39
Caught up in his own idealism and world-view, Titulescu underestimated the
impact of German economic penetration in Danubian Europe, which greatly contributed
to his being jettisoned as regional spokesman in international affairs. By this time
Turkey had accommodated its economy to the Third Reich and, in the aftermath of the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, moved to further that process, accepting German goods
to the detriment of trade with other nations, while providing Hitler’s expanding warmachine with vital chrome and other resources. Yugoslavia and Greece were equally
under the German sway, with the Reich representing the majority market for their exports
and an equally significant source of capital. Siding with Titulescu’s combative
communiqué would have been tantamount to economic suicide should Germany have
sought new, more politically friendly partners. The lack of a direct perceived threat,
coupled with a weak regional economy based primarily on agriculture and a few raw
materials for which the Germans were willing to pay handsomely, made siding with
Titulescu dangerous and unnecessary. 40
Despite this particular failure, Titulescu was able to extend his tenure in office
until August 1936, when a confluence of factors precipitated his downfall. Most
significant was his controversial policy of rapprochement with the Soviet Union, which
was unpopular both at home and abroad. Domestically, his diplomatic style and
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perceived sacrificing of Romania’s traditional international friendships created numerous
critics, who viewed him as little more than a Soviet agent. It was feared that should the
country move closer to communist Russia as the foreign minister desired, the territorial
gains Romania had made following the First World War might be jeopardized, possibly
along with national independence. Certainly, Germany would be alienated and, with its
growing power, many Romanian moderates like Gheorghe Brătianu and Grigore Gafencu
feared that this would draw Romania into the conflict they believed to be brewing
between fascism and communism. There was also domestic concern that extreme-right
organizations like the Iron Guard would threaten the government if provided with such an
impetus. Although economic reforms enacted in the 1920s had held off widespread
communist agitation, the continued poor state of the Romanian peasantry ensured that
concern about its influence remained. The fascism of the green-shirts was equally
undesirable, but, if the current balance were maintained, the Iron Guard could be utilized
as bulwarks against communism’s further spread. This would have the added benefit of
directing extreme-right attention away from the government. 41
Internationally, Titulescu’s policy of shifting Romania towards the Soviet Union
created as much enmity abroad as it did at home. The Germans were particularly
concerned about the growing intimacy they perceived between Bucharest and Moscow,
as they feared that should even the permission to fly over Romanian territory for military
purposes be given, French encirclement of the Reich would be completed. As long as
Titulescu still held influence over Romanian policy, Berlin believed that grandiose
political promises would be ineffectual. Consequently, another strategy had to be
employed to ensure that Germany was “more seen and felt.” 42 What this meant were
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veiled threats and a subtle assertion of the country’s growing power. To avoid alienating
its desired partner, these came piecemeal and concurrent with overtures of friendship, but
the intent was to present stark black or white alternatives. Germany was willing to forego
an alliance with Hungary and recognize the current status of Transylvania as final if
Romania accepted Berlin’s friendship. However, the German government was equally
content to align with countries that harbored revisionist aspirations towards Romania,
should these advances be rejected. 43 At the very least, Berlin wanted Bucharest to
remain neutral in the brewing German-Soviet conflict. No guarantees or incentives
would be offered to entice the Romanians, only the express understanding of what the
consequences were for choosing wrongly. 44
By the end of the summer of 1936, Romania was at a crossroads. Following
either path was fraught with uncertainties and, in his first decisive act as king, Carol
chose the one that led to Germany. In a tactical move intended to discredit Titulescu and
prevent his expected future criticism of the government from holding any merit, he was
dismissed rather than being allowed to resign. 45 Although there were reasons that made
the move desirable on a purely domestic level, the manner in which Titulescu was
relieved of his duties was also intended to be a symbolic gesture to Germany, indicating
the future direction of Romanian foreign policy. The decision was momentous, as it was
the beginning of what would eventually develop into a total alignment with Hitler and the
Third Reich. However, at the time, none of this was apparent. Caught between Germany
and the Soviet Union, Romania viewed Germany as the less dangerous power and, with
the placement of sufficient safeguards and astute diplomatic maneuvering, the
government of King Carol believed that Romania would be able to resist any mounting
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pressure from Berlin. 46
To replace Titulescu, Carol elevated his finance minister Victor Antonescu to the
post of foreign minister, although in reality it was the king who was now in charge of
Romania’s foreign policy. Realizing the dangers inherent in aligning his country with
either power, Carol attempted to maintain friendly but uninvolved relations with both
Germany and the Soviet Union. Such a course was believed to be the only way in which
Romania could avoid becoming a “theater of war” in the conflict towards which he feared
the current political climate was moving. To safeguard the country from this potentiality,
Romania would, in addition to limiting its dealings with both Germany and the Soviet
Union, take a less active role in European affairs so as to prevent the possibility of being
indirectly drawn into a conflict. 47 In order to accomplish this, it was necessary to undo
much of what Titulescu had achieved during his tenure.
The first step was to bring the burgeoning rapprochement with the Soviet Union
to a halt, a task only complicated by Carol’s desire to do so without torpedoing the
friendly atmosphere Titulescu had fostered. This was accomplished by sinking the
discussions pertaining to a mutual-assistance pact the former foreign minister had begun
the previous year. However, in doing so, by mid-1937 the Romanians quickly returned
relations between the two countries to the same simmering hostility that had
characterized their intercourse during the 1920s. 48 Though unintended to the degree that
the retrogression eventually reached, this crumbling of Romania’s Eastern policy was
buoyed by an improvement in Bucharest’s relations with Germany.
On September 24, 1937, three economic treaties were signed with the Reich and,
during an October 6 meeting between Carol and Wilhelm Fabricus, the new German
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minister in Bucharest, the king expressed his desire to build upon those agreements and
have closer, friendlier relations with Berlin. However, despite this wish, he related
numerous concerns that prevented the adoption of a policy that would move Romania in
that direction. Of all the factors prohibiting such realignment, Germany’s friendship with
Hungary was the most disturbing, for as a power that had a vital interest in maintaining
the current territorial integrity of Europe, it was difficult for Romania to reach out to a
nation that support revisionism, let alone revision directed against itself. In an attempt to
allay the king’s fears, Fabricus noted that despite Germany’s own truncation as a result of
the post-war settlements, the Reich had never put forth a claim for the restoration of
Hungary’s former dominions. The friendship was one of sympathy and, given
Budapest’s anti-Bolshevik stance, common purpose. In that fight Europe needed to be
united regardless of whether a nation was irredentist or not, for the only true division of
any importance was Bolshevism and those governments that were aligned against it. To
this end, other considerations must not be viewed as impediments to the cultivation of
relations between states. Such an argument may as well have come from Hitler’s own
mouth based upon the manner in which Fabricus juxtaposed the two unrelated strategic
considerations. However, it resonated with the king. Carol emphatically put forth his
own anti-Bolshevik stance, but because of Titulescu’s policies, related that he was unable
to “put about the helm and steer a different course forthwith.” Placing the onus of
shifting his country’s foreign policy on Germany, he warned Fabricus that Berlin needed
to pursue its agenda with Romania cautiously – a subtle indication that threats could
potentially have the opposite effect Hitler sought – lest the Reich ruin what both it and
Carol wished to see come to fruition. The king also made it clear that while Romania
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wanted to improve its relations with Germany, it would do so on its own terms and any
rapprochement was to fit within the tenets of a Romano-centric policy. This entailed
maintaining Bucharest’s alliances with France, Poland, and the Little Entente. The
easiest way for Germany to bring about closer relations with Romania would be to
establish good relations with France and work towards reconciliation with
Czechoslovakia. Such a demonstration of good faith would enable the Romanian
government to come forward more openly. 49
Although the king was speaking honestly from his own considerations about the
best way in which both his and what he believed German goals to be could be achieved,
he inadvertently committed a tactical blunder. By explicitly outlining his foreign policy
strategy, he gave the Germans an advantage. Berlin now knew the lynchpin of Romanian
strategy – the Little Entente – but also recognized how delicate a business it would be to
implement it. If the Little Entente were wrenched apart and Romania’s confidence in
France shaken, ends which the Reich had already been working towards in its efforts to
isolate Czechoslovakia, then the country could easily be drawn into the German sphere.
There was no need to conduct affairs gently. As long as Romania was not treated too
roughly, it was unlikely that the country would be pushed towards the Soviet Union.
Until the moment was ripe to pounce on Czechoslovakia and snatch its ally, Romania
could be brought closer to Germany through slow, gradual, economic dependence. 50
To accomplish this, Germany needed to prevent Romania from becoming part of
the Franco-Czech-Soviet alliance, a plan originally forwarded by Titulescu and now
resurrected by the Czechoslovaks with French support. Little assistance was needed, as
widespread public abhorrence to the proposal had, by mid-November, forced the new
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foreign minister Brătianu to abandon the plan. 51 However, the vague promises offered by
the Romanian government that the proposed alliance was dead did not satisfy Hitler, as
Germany had nothing to use as leverage against Bucharest to prevent another
reorientation of its policy. In an effort to gain such insurance, in December Göring called
upon Bucharest’s minister in Berlin, and during a conversation with Nicolae PetrescuComnen, reiterated his October proposal. This time, the exchange of a security guarantee
for long-term economic agreements and a prohibition on entering into arrangements
directed against Germany was given an underlying threat. If the Reich were refused, the
German government would be compelled to enter into friendship with Romania’s
revisionist enemies. 52
In the short term, Göring’s meddling backfired and drove the Romanians to
consider a secondary French proposal, which entailed reorganizing the Little Entente into
a defensive alliance that included France within its framework. This placed Bucharest in
a temporarily advantageous position. The French offers forced Germany to relax its tone
and focus its efforts on bringing the Romanians into the fold through economic means
with promises of even more lucrative trade deals. This in turn tempered mounting French
pressure to harangue the Romanian government into its new conception of the Little
Entente for fear of driving it towards Germany. In the end, economic considerations won
out over security, and by April 1937, Brătianu related to the Germans that the French
proposal was dead. This was all the Germans needed to hear and, with the threat of
Romania aligning with the Reich’s enemies removed, all further discussion of a security
agreement was dropped. 53
Although Hitler wanted Romanian friendship, amicable relations were secondary
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to his desire for the country’s resources. It was only this motive that dictated German
policy towards Romania. When it appeared that Bucharest might turn in another
direction, generous offers were made to entice Carol and his government, but when that
threat passed they were rescinded because the situation no longer required such
beneficence. The result was that for the remainder of 1937 and into the early part of
1938, there was little movement on relations between the two countries. There was no
need. Economically, trade was at the largest volume Bucharest would allow without
further guarantees from Berlin, which would only be forthcoming if there was a threat to
the status quo. With France mired in its own problems and the British uninterested in the
region, the danger of that occurring was minimal. With German affairs in the Danubian
region stabilized, Hitler was free to turn his attention closer to home.
IV
To the Polish government, the remilitarization of the Rhineland was a test of
strength that its foreign minister Colonel Józef Beck understood was to have far-reaching
consequences, although it was a situation that he knew could not be indefinitely
sustained. The move should have come as no surprise, as Józef Lipski, Warsaw’s
minister in Berlin, had been informed of Hitler’s intent to violate the Versailles treaty
several days earlier by the Italian ambassador to Germany, Bernardo Attolico. However,
due to illness, Lipski did not transmit a report of this conversation before March 7, which,
though allowing Hitler to catch Beck and the Polish government unprepared, did not have
any negative impact on Warsaw’s immediate response. 54
The Polish government, which until this point had been pursuing a subtle dualpolicy both domestically and abroad, had prepared a carefully thought-out response in
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case Hitler made precisely this move. Beck privately thought that, if presented with a fait
accompli, the French response would be limited. In this case it would be necessary to
demonstrate to Paris that Poland still held its alliance obligations seriously.
Consequently, before any official word on the French reaction had been received, Beck
summoned Léon Noël, the new French ambassador in Warsaw, to the Raczyński Palace
and informed him that he might communicate to his government that, “should it come to
any clash under conditions in accordance with the spirit of the alliance, Poland would not
hesitate to carry out her obligations as an ally.” Noël’s account of the meeting presents
Beck quite differently, appearing anxious that morning and, in the communiqué issued to
the Quai d’Orsay, he couched this declaration in vague language. In either case, it seems
that the official Polish line was dictated in part by a statement made by André FrançoisPoncet, the French ambassador to Germany, who, just days before the remilitarization of
the Rhineland, assured Lipski that if the Rhineland Pact resolutions of the Locarno
treaties were violated, “ce sera la mobilization générale, ce sera la guerre.” 55
However, Poland was not prepared to participate in any conflict, even if it were in
conjunction with the French and, presumably, Great Britain and Belgium. Hedging his
bets that, unlike in 1923 when Paris had sent its forces in alone to occupy the Ruhr to
ensure the payment of reparations, the government of Pierre Laval would not act without
support, Beck played both sides. Following his audience with Noël, he personally drafted
a contradictory statement for both German and Polish consumption. In it, he indicated
that Poland had no interest in the matter and, consequently, would abide by its 1934
agreement with Germany. This incited a flurry of remonstrances from Noël, who felt
betrayed by the policy discrepancies between what he had related to Paris and the true
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Polish position. The French Ambassador blasted Beck and his justifications, noting that
the matter was directly related to Polish security, as now, without France able to quickly
penetrate into Germany’s industrial heartland, it would be less able to come to Warsaw’s
aid. Embarrassed, Beck could only respond by stating that the situation had not worked
itself out when he had issued his press statement. Coming to the Foreign Minister’s aid
and defending his own institution’s honor, Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the head of
Poland’s military, later contacted Noël and argued that the reason Poland was not able to
stand by France was Paris’ refusal to grant Warsaw desperately needed credit to rebuild
its military. Rydz-Śmigły insinuated that France was directly responsible for Poland’s
consequent policy line through the violation of the moral tenets of the two countries’
alliance by hindering Polish rearmament, absolving Warsaw of French scorn. 56
If Beck’s objective was to test the French alliance, then he achieved his goal,
although at the cost of generating discord between the two allies. 57 It is doubtful that
Polish actions during this time had any substantive effect upon the crisis before
Germany’s invasion of Poland in 1939. In the wake of Czechoslovakia’s
dismemberment, a move which confirmed Hitler’s disregard for the agreement signed in
Munich, French action was all but guaranteed. For the moment, the only real damage
was to Beck’s pride. France had called upon Poland to act the part of the power Beck
pretended his country to be, and Poland had failed.
While dealing with the various aspects of Poland’s French commitments, Beck
sought to maintain amicable relations with the German government, permitting the
reoccupation of the Rhineland to pass without incident. The only concern he lodged that
day with Hans Adolf von Moltke, Germany’s ambassador to Poland, pertained to the
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twenty-five year duration of the non-aggression pacts Hitler offered in his Reichstag
speech. He feared that the difference between those proposals and the length of the 1934
German-Polish agreement might lead to public mistrust of the German government.
Concerns over outstanding trade issues were also broached, although for the moment the
matter was put on hold. Following a subsequent meeting with von Moltke on March 12
when he promised to represent Germany’s views to the upcoming Council of the League
of Nations in London, Beck traveled to the British capital for what he expected was to be
a toothless recrimination of Hitler’s actions. On March 13, the Locarno Powers, the
supposed guarantors of Western security, had already balked in response to the German
challenge and offered only a weak resolution that, while finding Germany in violation of
Articles 42 and 43 of the Versailles treaty, deferred the matter to the League Council for
adjudication. 58
At the conference, differences of opinion and political realities helped to assure
Hitler that the German success would be complete. Despite recognizing the dangers
highlighted by the French, the British were unwilling to risk war over the affair.
Economic sanctions were also ruled out, as many of the smaller powers relied heavily
upon German trade for the maintenance of their own economies. Even if such punitive
measures had been adopted, it was unlikely that many would have adhered to the
resolutions anyway. 59 To a degree, Poland fit into this latter category, but political
considerations were of equal importance. Beck was primarily interested in gaining an
extension of the existing German-Polish agreement and sought to do so by
overrepresenting Warsaw’s interest in the affair so as to be in a position to temper the
Council’s declaration, gambling that his beneficence would be reciprocated by Hitler. 60
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In the end, it is unlikely that the Polish delegation had any significant impact upon the
course of events, as backing either Germany or France too openly risked alienating
Warsaw from either power. All that could be done was to ensure the situation did not
escalate into an armed conflict, for war would have brought Beck’s policy crashing
down. When it came time to vote on the resolution, Poland abstained. 61
In the following months, the Polish government sought more earnestly to ensure
its own security, particularly in the face of weakening French resistance to German
aggression. Over the summer, Warsaw began receiving subsidies from Paris for
rearmament, and the two governments provided each other with mutual reassurances that
their alliance was strong and still viable. However, despite French pressure, the Polish
government refused to move away from its cautious friendship with Germany or be
drawn closer to Czechoslovakia. 62 Doing so would have contradicted the underlying
principles of the policy Beck had been pursuing, along with casting serious doubt upon
Warsaw’s Great Power posturing. It also would have required Poland to make amends
with the very nation against which its irredentism was directed against. In the end, the
French need to produce a show of strength in the face of a foreign policy defeat prevailed
over any serious policy reorientation, and the Poles were able to walk away from the
negotiations gaining much while giving little.
Concurrently with those negotiations, Beck approached the Germans about the
possibility of including the Reich in a larger collective security scheme, with the 1934
non-aggression pact being worked into such a system. The idea of an “Eastern Locarno”
treaty had resurfaced in Geneva and, in light of a perceived British and Italian hesitancy
to act as guarantors for such an arrangement, he may have been probing whether the
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Reich, in conjunction with Poland, would assume that role. Aside from the inclusion of
Germany, the formation of a regional collective security bloc would have been a shortcut
to Beck’s pet “Third Europe” project, making use of the German Peace Plan framework
forwarded at the end of March, which, according to the Polish foreign minister, had
aroused much interest. If this was Beck’s intent, it would have provided an additional
measure of security against both Germany and the Soviet Union. However, for it to be
viable, the Soviets would need to be included unless it were specified that defense against
Soviet attack was a principle tenet of the agreement. The latter sentiment may have had
broad regional ideological sympathy, but as a practical measure, it was impossible. This
is all, of course, speculation. Beck never clarified his strangely abrupt, short-lived
change of heart regarding collective security, and by the end of May he had again taken
an unfavorable disposition to both the concept and an Eastern Pact. 63 The lack of
German interest in his proposal certainly contributed to its quick abandonment, as did
Berlin’s cold-shoulder to similar British inquiries. With the fervor over the
remilitarization of the Rhineland dissipating and it becoming clear that the move would
be allowed to stand, the Germans no longer needed to maintain the façade of commitment
to an ideal that they had no intent of honoring. By June Berlin had resumed its more
aggressive stance.
This entailed a resumption of the Danzig issue, instigated this time by an
international slight to the League of Nations High Commissioner to the city, Sean Lester,
when the German cruiser Leipzig put into port and failed to call upon the League
representative. Ostensibly, Captain Schenk was ordered to refrain from calling upon
Lester to prevent a recurrence of what the German government considered the “tactless”
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invitation of Danzig opposition party members to the officer’s reception as had happened
when the Admiral Scheer visited the city the previous August. In reality, the indignity
was part of a calculated scheme designed to precipitate Lester’s downfall and test Polish
resolve. Coinciding with the formal affront, a scathing article by Albert Forster, the Nazi
Gauleiter in the city, was published in both the German and Danzig press. The piece was
intended to incite Lester to refer the matter to the League Council in Geneva, which he
did. A hearing was scheduled for July 4 and, to take advantage of the international stage
with which he was presented, Hitler sent Arthur Greiser, the hotheaded President of the
Danzig Senate, to deliver a well-coached tirade against not only Lester but also the
superfluous position of the High Commissioner and League itself. 64
Greiser’s inflammatory and highly theatrical performance made it clear that the
episode was less about Lester and more about German dissatisfaction with the
administrative character of the city. Although Poland’s interest in Danzig was limited to
the safeguarding of its own interests, such a threat to the governmental structure that
ensured Polish rights were respected was too great a risk to Poland’s fundamental
position in the city. The consequences would certainly have been dire, for without the
presence of the League and High Commissioner, Germany would have a free rein to
Nazify the area, which would have amounted to virtual annexation. However,
championing the League carried the risk for Poland of becoming a defender of the
Danzig-German minority that opposed National Socialism, a group Warsaw had no
interest in protecting. Though in many ways the two were aspects of the same issue that
Beck tried to separate, they were too intrinsically linked to be dealt with separately. 65
The delicacy of the situation mandated a careful and measured response. Beck
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desired a compromise, but in seeking one was encumbered by the need to demonstrate
firmness in dealing with what he viewed as a violent German attack on the foundation of
Danzig’s political structure. Too resolute a defense of the existing status quo risked
inciting a political conflict within the German population of the city that Poland had no
hope of winning. On the other extreme, conflict between Berlin and Warsaw in Danzig
could lead to war. However, Lester was negotiable. It was not the person but the
position that Poland wished to preserve. After a month of negotiations between the two
governments, it was finally agreed that both sides would be satisfied with a new face in
the same role, and the crisis was resolved. 66
Germany had pushed and Poland pushed back. Based upon the Polish response, it
quickly became evident to Hitler and the German government that only a slight
modification to the status quo in Danzig was acceptable to the Poles, although that was
itself a success. By disposing of Lester, the last authority that was expressly concerned
with the political independence of the Danzig-Germans had been eliminated, and coupled
with a lack of Polish interest on that facet of the issue, it was now possible for Berlin to
exercise complete tactical control over the domestic situation in the city. Further changes
would have to wait for circumstances that were more favorable. Such opportunities were
bound to occur, as the Polish government was now the body charged with the
management of Danzig-German relations according to the deal that resolved the crisis.
As long as the city’s bureaucratic structure maintained intact, Polish objections to
German activities were likely to remain negotiable. With the office of High
Commissioner preserved, Beck could also claim success, although his was a pyrrhic
victory. The charge given to Poland could certainly be viewed positively in terms of
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prestige, as Warsaw now, in Beck’s own words, was to “screen the League” and, through
this responsibility, could prevent it from “fleeing the battlefield in Danzig before some
new form of additional guarantee for Polish interests had been found.” Whether this
could be translated from theory to practice remained to be seen. Screening the League
required that Poland deal directly with Germany over matters relating to Danzig, which
advantaged the Reich, as Hitler was able to treat the situation more aggressively and with
the understanding that any deterioration in relations could only reflect upon the German
and Polish governments. 67
Following a brief respite during August for the Berlin Olympics, Danzig
continued to be the flashpoint of German-Polish relations throughout the autumn of 1936
and into 1937. The German government alternatively ordered Forster to instigate an
incident and then, when Polish resistance to the challenge became firm, restrain his
activities. The difference in character following the remilitarization of the Rhineland
from previous incidents was that, with Germany’s consolidation of continental power, it
could afford to be more aggressive in working towards its objectives and make attempts
at real gains rather than simply test Polish resolve. 68 For the moment, these were modest
successes. The League presence in the city had been effectively marginalized and, as a
consequence, Hitler was able to dismantle the remaining political opposition to National
Socialism. However, Warsaw would let Berlin go no further, insisting that the High
Commissioner remain, if only to retain an alternative outlet of protest should the two
governments be unable to resolve disputes. Assurances from the German government
that it had no desire to violate Poland’s interests in the city helped to prevent such an
impasse from occurring and resulted, by September 1937, in a détente that placated
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Warsaw and afforded Hitler the time needed to prepare for other foreign policy actions. 69

V
The alteration of the European political landscape following the remilitarization
of the Rhineland, in addition to changing the dynamic between Germany and its eastern
neighbors, changed their relations with each other as well. The move was not an
imminent threat that needed to be countered, but the statesmen of East Central Europe
were perceptive enough to realize the balance of power was shifting in favor of Germany
and away from the Western Allies. Britain and, more importantly, France had failed to
act decisively and, though there were numerous factors that contributed to their mutual
decision to allow Hitler’s fait accompli to stand, the signal sent to the other side of
Europe did not include the details that resulted in that decision. Reliance upon either
power now carried risks similar to those that trusting Hitler did. Additional measures
would be required to ensure peace and security in the region. Fear of the Soviet Union
and a hesitancy to completely trust Mussolini’s government limited the options available
to the governments in Warsaw, Kaunas, Budapest, and Bucharest, forcing them to look to
each other in order to prevent Germany from completely filling the vacuum left by the
Western departure from the region’s affairs.
This occurred haphazardly among the national leaders and reflected more of an
attempt, from March 1936 until March 1938, at collusion to maximize potential gains in
response to the impetus provided by Hitler’s foreign policy. Following the Rhineland
reoccupation, the Polish and Hungarian governments initiated discussions that built upon
the groundwork laid by Gömbös and Piłsudski in late 1934. During a state visit by
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representatives of the Polish government to Budapest in 1936, it was agreed that the
creation of a common border would be greatly beneficial to future relations, although
there was no concrete resolution. Still, the foundation for a coordinated policy had been
laid, and during a conference in February 1938, discussions were held in Warsaw that
expanded upon these points. An ascendant Germany that was rearming and exerting
what Beck described as “maximalist pressure” in Danubian Europe prompted him to
pursue his “Third Europe” project more vigorously and, with Horthy and Kánya as weeklong guests, he broached the subject for the first time. 70
The Hungarians were receptive to the idea, agreeing that in order to counter the
threat of German and Soviet expansion, the governments of Poland, Hungary, Italy,
Romania, and Yugoslavia needed to align together and oppose the Third Reich. In
previous talks with the Italians, they had indicated an interest in the proposal, noting with
chilling accuracy that unless such a non-aligned bloc came into being, Italy would shortly
become the lesser power in the Rome-Berlin Axis. The first step then was achieving a
common border between Poland and Hungary, an idea that Count Galeazzo Ciano, the
Italian Foreign Minister, echoed during his visit to Budapest shortly after the conference
in Warsaw. Although there were differences of opinion in exactly how the proposed bloc
would posture itself – either German friendly but not dominated by Berlin or explicitly
united in opposition to Hitler – it was significant that all sides saw the need for an
alternative to the existing European polemics. 71
In order to accomplish this prerequisite for the “Third Europe” bloc as it was
conceived, Czechoslovak territory needed to be acquired. Both the Polish and
Hungarian governments saw an opportunity for this in what they expected to be Hitler’s
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next foreign policy conquest, as since the late summer of 1936, Berlin had been exerting
varying degrees of pressure on Prague for resolution of the Sudeten-German minority
question. 72 Signals from Germany, particularly those directed at Budapest, led to the
belief that action was imminent and, rather than oppose a move both the Hungarian and
Polish governments viewed as inevitable and positive, they chose to take advantage of it
instead. They only disagreed as how to approach the situation so as to serve both
individual and mutual interests simultaneously and justify their activities to the
international community.
At this early stage of their collaboration on Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment,
both governments harbored ambitious and contradictory aims. As the Slovak lands were
a portion of Hungary’s historic territory, Budapest naturally wished to reincorporate
them into its expanded realm. Beck had other designs on the eastern portion of
Czechoslovakia, wishing to transform it into a Polish-dominated protectorate to serve as
a buffer between Germany and Poland and an exploitable economic dependent. On this
particular issue, neither side was able to come to an agreement. However, rather than
deal with the issue directly, Beck persuaded Horthy and Kánya to make contacts with
the Slovakian separatists, ostensibly so that any future action could be coordinated with
the groups there. This was a ruse. From his own sources in Slovakia, Beck was aware
that there was little desire to return to Magyar domination and, since Budapest preferred
to have its forces invited rather than invade, knew that this would prevent any Hungarian
move until a more profitable situation was presented. 73
While collaborating with Hungary, Beck also took steps to reinvigorate Poland’s
waning relationship with Romania. The process was begun shortly after the reoccupation
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of the Rhineland, with negotiations that eventually produced a warming of the waning
alliance between Warsaw and Bucharest. However, this was limited to no more than a
reaffirmation of the existing alliance due to the constraints placed on Romanian policy by
Soviet threats and Carol’s own policy on non-alignment. 74 This was sufficient for the
moment and with the two governments’ attention directed elsewhere, strengthening an
arrangement that neither side desired to be more than defensive was unnecessary. The
perceived threat of growing German power prompted each government to action in 1937,
with an exchange of official visits that led to renewed discussion of collective security
issues, but nothing concrete. Divergent views on how best to effect that end prohibited
any agreement, with Beck’s initial proposal of the formulation of a new Entente
consisting of Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia, working in concert with
Germany being received warmly by Victor Antonescu, the Romanian foreign minister,
but rejected by Carol. The latter, wishing to preserve freedom of action in Romanian
policy, viewed the arrangement as restrictive of that principle and, as Beck’s plan did not
include Czechoslovakia, a violation of Bucharest’s existing alliance system. Carol
eventually let himself be persuaded by Beck and agreed to consider loosening Romania’s
relations with the Little Entente and France, although still he would not push the country
firmly in the direction the Polish foreign minister wished. 75
Beck’s attempts at gaining support for his “Third Europe” concept during this
time were met with modest success. As a response to the political threat that both
Hungary and Romania thought Germany to be, the idea was certainly attractive. It
required no surrender of national independence and, as Beck presented it, was defensive
in nature, involving no foreign policy risks that held the potential for detrimental results.
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Inherent in the arrangement, though, was a moratorium on revisionism between the
potential member states, which was a bitter pill to swallow for Hungary, as the possibility
of Transylvania’s recovery in the short term would rely entirely upon Romanian
beneficence. Although a suspension of irredentism was unlikely to raise objections in
Bucharest, the addition of Bulgaria, another power with eyes on Romanian territory, in
exchange for Czechoslovakia, did not sit well. As an extension of Piłsudski’s
Międzymorze doctrine, Beck’s “Third Europe” was designed to serve Polish interests first
and foremost. A large, fairly powerful regional bloc would accomplish this primary goal
of security for Warsaw and, by association, afford the same protection to the other
nations. However, in working towards this one particular goal, Beck failed to account for
the myriad of differing ambitions that needed to be accounted for in order to even begin
moving the project forward.
During the period of March 1936 until March 1938, this was complicated by the
poor state of Hungarian-Romanian relations, which, despite German suggestions of
rapprochement, failed to develop. Berlin’s interest in fostering a temporary détente was
ulteriorly motivated, but even those attempts proved insufficient to alleviate the root
causes of Hungary and Romania’s differences. This left affairs between the two
countries much as they were before German troops entered the Rhineland. To an extent,
this mutual mistrust was beneficial to Hitler, as it enabled him to execute a policy of
divide and conquer, easing the long-term strategic German objective of economic
domination of Southeastern Europe and delaying a choosing of sides. Although this was
a desultory method of managing foreign policy in a region of such importance to his
greater European designs, it was entirely consistent with Hitler’s tendencies, and allowed
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both sides to come to him. 76 The Hungarians were already moving in this direction and,
though there was some Romanian resistance to German overtures, the Germans continued
to make steady inroads with the latter as well.
Lithuania continued to remain diplomatically isolated from the rest of Europe.
The de facto state of war still existed between it and Poland, and despite secret
negotiations between the two, no progress was made to break the deadlock that would
allow the resumption of normal relations. At issue was still the status of Vilnius, as the
desire for its return had not dissipated. However, the Polish government refused to
consider relenting in its official cold-shouldering of its Baltic neighbor unless the existing
status of the city was recognized by the Smetona regime. For domestic reasons, this was
impossible, and consequently, by the beginning of March 1938, the conflict remained
unresolved. 77 This was shortly to have severe consequences for the Lithuanian
government, which despite its best efforts over the preceding two years, had failed to
develop the relationships with Germany and Poland that it desired. Partly because of
both governments’ lack of need and partly due to the Smetona regime’s unwillingness to
remove the historic capital from its conditions, no movement was possible and this
resulted in Lithuania being stuck in much the same position it was before.
As it had been prior to March 1936, regional scheming remained paramount to the
foreign policy designs of East Central Europe, although with the additional impetus of an
increasingly aggressive Germany, grandiloquence tended to give way to pragmatism.
Beck’s “Third Europe” concept, in each of its proposed forms, specifically had collective
security as a counter to the menace presented by both Germany and the Soviet Union,
although he broke from Piłsudski’s Międzymorze design by tactically setting aside overt
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Polish dominance of the alliance system for the short term in an effort to generate
interest. However, Beck’s belief in his nation’s ability to hold its own in an increasingly
antagonistic relationship with the Third Reich lessened the vigor with which he pursued
constructing the bloc, resulting in limited progress towards that end.
Hungary, faced with increased German hegemony in Danubian Europe, found its
“Free Hand” policy limited by a lack of options. Germany’s growing domination of the
country’s economy made moving against Berlin’s wishes a serious gamble, as Germany’s
reach ensured that there would be consequences for any intransigence. Hitler had in the
past pledged not to instigate “swastika propaganda” directed at the Hungarian
government, although this gesture could be reversed to the detriment of Hungary’s
nationalistic government. 78 The lack of a land border with the Reich afforded the
Hungarian regime a degree of freedom to maneuver and entertain alternatives to
following the German path, although the possibility of being rewarded for loyalty was
equally persuasive. Hitler’s vague promises of assisting in the repatriation of foreignruled Magyars and the recovery of former Hungarian lands resonated with the core of the
regime’s desires, making them too tempting to pass upon.
Titulescu’s dismissal ushered in a new phase of Romanian diplomacy that was
primarily concerned with undoing the perceived damage that the former foreign
minister’s policies had wrought. This entailed a near total reversal of the government’s
policies, although a complete reorientation was stopped just short. Even after souring
Romania’s relations with the Soviet Union, King Carol and his new foreign minister,
Victor Antonescu, refused to move affirmatively towards Germany, instead choosing to
follow a path similar to Poland. The two had faith in the collective security offered by
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the Little Entente, and the reinvigoration of the Polish alliance served as further support
in the quest to pursue non-alignment. In accordance with this policy, the improvement of
relations with Germany was considered requisite, but with material resources to barter
with, the Romanians were able to dictate somewhat their own terms. However, this
advantage was tenuous, as it was predicated upon the maintenance of a status quo that
Romania was only partly able to influence. Were the Entente to crack, Bucharest’s
insulation from German pressure would evaporate, leaving the country exposed with little
recourse other than submission. Measures were taken to buttress the nation against this
possibility, but, in the wake of the remilitarization of the Rhineland, they bore more
resemblance to the intricate alliances of pre-Great War Europe than reinforcements of
collective security. For the moment, they were enough.
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CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS GERMANY

The events of March 11-12, 1938, shattered the calm that had descended upon
Europe following the reoccupation of the Rhineland by German troops in 1936. In
response to Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg’s call for a plebiscite to determine
whether Austria was to remain independent of Germany, Hitler issued an ultimatum on
March 11 demanding that governmental power be transferred to the Austrian National
Socialists by noon the next day or the country would be invaded. Faced with no
prospects of international assistance, Schuschnigg resigned his post and left President
Wilhelm Miklas the unenviable responsibility for relinquishing governmental power to
the Nazis, which he finally did at midnight. Acceptance of Arthur Seyß-Inquart as
Schuschnigg’s replacement was, by this point, irrelevant, as Hitler had already signed the
order directing the Wehrmacht to march on Vienna two hours earlier. The next day
German troops crossed the border, initiating the Anschluss.
In little over twelve heated and confused hours, one of Hitler’s fundamental
foreign policy initiatives was realized in a bold stroke that was a watershed for both the
German dictator and his Third Reich. Again, he had moved in violation of Versailles,
and again the democracies of Western Europe had failed to challenge him, allowing the
move to stand uncontested. All of Central Europe was now under the dominion of the
Rome-Berlin Axis, separating one side of Europe from the other behind a fascist curtain.
Emboldened by the relative ease with which he had initiated and consolidated Germany’s
first expansionist move, Hitler began to believe that the process he had once thought
might require another “great leader” such as himself to complete could be realized in his

own lifetime. 1 He, and not a successor, could be master of the Great German Reich. All
that was left now was to initiate the end game, for with the Danubian basin cracked, the
board was set. Only the pieces remained to be propelled into motion.
Following the Anschluss, the diplomatic activity of East Central Europe
accelerated in response to German foreign policy aggression. What resulted was a
regional grab for gains either in conjunction with or in the wake of Hitler’s expansionism.
This fomented greater intimacy between the governments of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania,
and Romania as they attempted to fulfill their irredentist desires than had previously
existed. However, the consequence of this change was a loss of focus on collective
security. The Third Reich also became an omnipresent force, acting as either puppetmaster or regional arbiter. For this reason, it is necessary to analyze the events following
the German take-over of Austria until the beginning of war collectively so as to illustrate
the particular facets of this phase accurately and in the proper context.
I
The Anschluss had not surprised the Polish government, as the move had been
expected for some time. However, the timing of the event caught Beck off-guard as, on
March 11, the foreign minister was in Rome attempting to gain support for his latest
permutation of the “Third Europe” project and was forced to witness events from the
Italian capital. When he was informed of the events transpiring in Austria, news of a
border incident between Polish and Lithuanian security forces that had resulted in the
shooting death of a Polish soldier, Stanisław Serafin, near the village of Trasninkai was
also reported. Beck decided to use the Anschluss as cover to force the reestablishment of
normal relations with Lithuania and, during his return to Warsaw, began formulating a
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plan to that end. At a conference at the Royal Castle between himself, the head of the
Polish military Marshal Edward Rydz-Śmigły, the president, and other cabinet members,
Beck forwarded a proposal for an ultimatum to be delivered to the Lithuanian
government. It was moderate in its aims, only requiring that affairs between the two
Baltic neighbors be normalized. All mention of Vilnius was excluded in the hope that
this would result in its acceptance by the Lithuanian government. Any demands too
severe were likely to be rejected and, with collective security in mind, Beck wanted to
prevent that possibility. The failure of negotiations over the past five years had stalled
his Baltic policy, since without Lithuania, Beck believed that Estonia and Latvia could
not be brought into the fold. To accomplish this broader aim, if forceful methods had to
be utilized, then the ends would justify that means. 2
On March 17, the ultimatum was issued to the Lithuanian government. In it,
Poland rejected the Lithuanian position that a commission be created to look into the
Trasninkai incident. Instead, the Poles required that an envoy be dispatched to Warsaw
and one be accredited in the Lithuanian capital by March 31, in addition to the restoration
of normal diplomatic relations. The Smetona government was given forty-eight hours to
reply. Silence would be interpreted as a negative response. Explicit or implicit rejection
of the Polish demands would be followed by military action. As further incentive, the
Polish army was put on a state of high alert and four divisions (fifty thousand troops)
were massed along the Polish-Lithuanian border. About one hundred planes from the airforce were concentrated outside of Vilnius and Lyda, and the Polish fleet was ordered to
assume positions close to the Lithuanian shore. 3
This sparked a flurry of calm, deliberate activity in Kaunas as the Smetona
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government scrambled to discern the best course of action. Inborn patriotism demanded
that Lithuania resist the Polish affront, and internal surveillance confirmed that, should
armed conflict result, the public overwhelmingly supported an aggressive defense of the
country. General Stasys Raštikis informed Smetona that mobilization of the army could
take place in as little as twenty-four to seventy-two hours, offering 250,000 troops for a
decentralized deployment. However, diplomatic feelers put out by the Lithuanian
government did not register the same positive prognosis, as international support was not
forthcoming. Both Great Britain and France urged Lithuania to accept the ultimatum as,
in their view, the conflict between Warsaw and Kaunas did not warrant the risking of an
already tenuous European peace due to their belief that the situation had arisen from
German-Polish collusion. Even Lithuania’s allies in the Baltic Entente abandoned the
country, declining to take action in what both the Latvian and Estonian governments
considered a strictly Polish-Lithuanian affair. Smetona also turned to Germany for
advice, but rather than the traditional anti-Polish support usually offered by Berlin,
Foreign Minister Juozas Urbšys was informed by Joachim von Ribbentrop, von Neurath’s
replacement as Reich Foreign Minister, that, in light of the current political realities,
unconditional acceptance of Polish demands was the only prudent course of action. The
consequences of refusal were unforeseeable. In the reply, von Ribbentrop also indicated
that following the settlement of this conflict, a settling of German-Lithuanian issues
would be next on Lithuania’s agenda. 4
The German response was dictated in part by Hitler’s goal of reincorporating the
Memelland into the Reich, as any conflict between Poland and Lithuania could result in
that region being occupied by the Poles. To counter this possibility, on March 18, Hitler
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ordered German forces in East Prussia to be ready, in the event that Poland invaded
Lithuania, to immediately enter the Klaipėda region to prevent it from falling into Polish
hands. This position was also made clear to Warsaw, likely in a bid to dissuade the
Polish government from taking military action that would swallow the entire country. To
a degree, German fears were unnecessary, as Polish plans called only for a one-kilometer
violation of the border should the deadline for the ultimatum expire as a show of force,
with deeper incursions to follow should the Lithuanians fight. Such resistance was still
under consideration as an option as late as the evening of March 18, although at the final
cabinet meeting, General Raštikis was the deciding figure that averted war. He told the
Lithuanian government that, despite the vigor and exuberance of the soldiers and
citizenry, the ultimate outcome of the conflict could not be in doubt. Ringed by enemies
with far superior numbers and material, Lithuania would fall. The next morning an
exchange of notes between Polish and Lithuanian envoys took place, followed by acting
Prime Minister Jokubas Stanisauskis reading the official government reply before the
Siemas. The Lithuanian parliament accepted the government’s settlement of the issue
with only one adjustment to the language of the official response, adding “that we
accepted because of force” to the end of the document. 5
Poland had flexed its muscle and Lithuania bent under the pressure. Partly
inspired by Hitler’s tactics with Austria and partly relying upon Berlin’s need for a period
of calm following the annexation of Austria to achieve his ends, Beck again played the
role of a statesmen representative of a Great Power. As had been the case with Hitler, his
target was weak and without international support, virtually guaranteeing the success of
his action, although Polish aims were more limited in scope than German objectives.
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This made the ultimatum palatable to the international community, though it was not
excused. Poland appeared no better than the Nazi regime and, despite the incidental
nature of the two governments’ collaboration, the stigma endured. As architect of the
scheme, Beck was, for the moment, free to revel in his personal glory.
The Polish ultimatum to Lithuania was significant beyond the change in the
political relationship of two of the region’s nations, for in this instance Hitler reacted to
an East Central European government rather than the reverse. To a degree, a German
precedent had been followed by another power in an effort to effect its own ends that,
though limited at the outset, held the potential to develop into something far larger, as
had happened with the Anschluss. 6 Had Lithuania chosen to fight, total absorption of the
country, either through direct annexation or, more likely, the establishment of a puppetgovernment similar to Beck’s designs for Slovakia, was possible, and it was this fear that
spurred the Germans into action. Although the Reich’s own interests in the Memelland
were paramount, Berlin wished to keep Lithuania independent so as to retain the
possibility of exchanging its annexation for the Polish Corridor. 7 However, now was not
a fortuitous time for such action, and, consequently, subtle indications were made that
Germany would take the necessary precautions to ensure that its interests were protected.
Without the Danzig issue settled and Beck afraid of bringing the country into direct
conflict with the Third Reich over a purely Polish political aim, he was forced to respect
Berlin’s position. As the boldness of Hitler’s plans increased, this microcosm would be
repeated.
The impact of the Polish ultimatum was minimal. The quick resolution ensured
that the entire episode was merely a ripple in the water within the scope of continent-
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wide diplomacy, as larger events soon resumed the place of international importance.
Though relations were now normalized, Lithuanian policy towards Poland failed to
change in any substantial way. 8 As the Polish government sidestepped the Vilnius issue,
this implicitly meant that no resolution to the situation technically existed, keeping the
potential for its return alive, even if remote. At its core, Polish policy towards Lithuania
remained equally unchanged, although now Beck was able to pursue his agenda in a more
concrete manner. However, the way in which ties were established limited the usefulness
of what he had forged, as the animosity it bred did not rapidly dissipate, even in the
shadow of a mutual threat. 9
Shortly after the acceptance of the Polish ultimatum, the Lithuanian government
was struck with a similar demand from Berlin. The German ultimatum required
Lithuania to adhere to a detailed, eleven-point memorandum that provided for absolute
freedom of action for the pro-Nazi elements in the Klaipėda region. The language of the
memorandum was vague, a measure taken by the Germans to ensure that no matter how
diligently the Smetona regime observed the barely disguised dikat, at a later point it could
be claimed that the Lithuanians failed to abide by its tenets and thus justify any
subsequent action. Technically, the presentation of the memorandum violated the Memel
Statute, although in light of the international community’s failure to act in Lithuania’s
defense during the Polish crisis, the country’s government had little faith that the
signatory powers would intervene in any meaningful way. To ward off German pressure,
the Lithuanian government chose delaying tactics as its primary defense, promising to
concede most of Berlin’s demands in exchange for guarantees on border security and a
non-aggression pact. Neither Lithuanian proposal interested the Germans, and both were
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ignored. Hitler preferred to let the situation in Klaipėda deteriorate on its own, though
with substantial support for the National Socialist elements, rather than force the issue.
He did not have to wait long. By December the pro-German parties had gained a
crushing majority over the Lithuanian groups in the Memel parliament and quickly
presented Kaunas with another list of demands, this time requiring that the secret state
police apparatus within Memel be dismantled, which the Smetona government did. 10
To the Lithuanians, it appeared that following the presentation of both
memorandums in March and December, the Reich inexplicably lost interest in delivering
the final blow when the opportunity to do so was within easy reach. This temporary
reprieve that spared Kaunas from the full potential of a concerted German onslaught was
ephemeral and came at the expense of German interest being directed elsewhere. In
March 1938, shortly after the Anschluss, Hitler turned his full attention to
Czechoslovakia, the country he considered a “cancerous tumor,” and Saisonstaat, which
had been integral to his expansionist foreign policy designs since 1937. 11 German
agitation over the treatment of the Sudeten-Germans had been fairly consistent
throughout 1937 and into 1938. Following the conclusion of the Austrian affair, the
pressure on Prague was again to be ramped up, though now with the objective of forcing
a resolution.
Integral to Hitler’s strategy for dismantling Czechoslovakia was its isolation from
the rest of the European community. In this endeavor, Germany could not act alone. The
nations of East Central Europe were needed to play an active role in encircling Hitler’s
victim to prevent outside interference by assisting in the kurtz und vives military
operation envisioned for Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment. This would enable Germany
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to present a fait accompli to the international community before aid could be rendered.
Such absolute and brutal rejection of the “artificial” state’s existence by all of its
neighbors would also inherently justify Hitler’s long-standing negative conception of the
country. 12 Aspects of this plan had already been central to Berlin’s discourse with the
Hungarian government for quite some time. Since Gömbös had first visited Hitler in
June 1933, the Germans had attempted to focus Hungarian revisionism northward. Now
Hitler would call on the Magyars to act.
Despite previous assurances from Budapest that the Hungarian government would
be a willing participant in Czechoslovakia’s destruction, the resoluteness of Britain and
France in response to the breaking-off of negotiations between the Sudeten- German
party and the Czechoslovak government in mid-May had weakened its determination.
Horthy in particular was fearful of being harangued into a conflict that he believed
Germany had no hope of winning, but with the Third Reich now far less remote than it
had previously been, he was forced to tread carefully. Flatly rejecting Hitler held the
potential for disaster; Hitler’s annexation of Austria had put Hungary’s only other major
trading partner under German control, and offending Berlin could result in serious
economic consequences. Still, the need for Hungarian participation in Hitler’s planned
action against Czechoslovakia ensured that alternative options to becoming completely
subservient to Germany remained open. 13
In an effort to demonstrate this independence, in late August representatives of
the Hungarian government and member nations of the Little Entente met at Bled,
Yugoslavia, ostensibly for the purpose of settling long-standing differences. Kálmán de
Kánya, the Hungarian foreign minister, approached the conference with this objective in
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mind. However, the change in Europe’s political climate since March 1936, and the
deteriorating internal dynamic of the Little Entente indicated to him that an appropriate
moment to wrench concessions from the alliance had arrived. To this end, he presented
the Romanian and Yugoslav representatives with three Hungarian demands calling for a
mutual declaration renouncing war as a means to conflict resolution, an unconditional
recognition of Hungary’s right to rearm and the conclusion of separate agreements for the
protection of Magyar minorities. Of critical importance was the last demand, which, due
to the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia already receiving the best treatment in any
Entente state, Kánya required that Prague extend even further guarantees than he was
asking of the Romanians and Yugoslavs. He did this in the hope that this would cause
the Czechoslovak government to reject the proposal and isolate itself from its alliance
partners. The plan worked and, contrary to earlier promises by the Entente to negotiate
collectively, Belgrade and Bucharest abandoned their ally and concluded individual
agreements with Budapest on August 23. 14
Later that same day a communiqué was issued that stated an accord had been
reached between Hungary and the Little Entente on the first two points of the agreement,
but Kánya withheld the fact that its activation was contingent upon acceptance of the
entire document. The rationale for this is unclear, although it appears that this was done
to indicate to Germany that despite Hungarian reliance upon the Reich, it could and
would pursue independent action in to its own interests. However, the timing of the
announcement could not have been less opportune, as it came during a state visit by
Horthy to Kiel to witness the launching of the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen the previous
day. During political discussions, the Hungarian regent had pushed Hitler to delay his
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planned operations against Czechoslovakia until the next spring so that Hungary would
be able to fully participate. When news of the agreement reached the German dictator, he
launched into a tirade, blasting Horthy and the Hungarians for attempting to move away
from Germany and renouncing the use of force against Czechoslovakia just when military
action against Prague was imminent, a sentiment echoed by von Ribbentrop. Calmly
enduring the tantrum, the Admiral related to Hitler that his government’s actions were
dictated by the low state of the army’s readiness, exacerbated by a lack of large-caliber
guns, few planes, and shortage of ammunition. Further, any action against a member
state of the Little Entente would be impossible without Germany guaranteeing Hungary’s
border with Yugoslavia, as any commitment of Budapest’s forces in a Czechoslovak
campaign would necessitate leaving the country’s southern border minimally defended. 15
With the Bled Agreement, the Hungarian government attempted to satisfy two
divergent aims, and with the exception of the short upset it caused in relations between
Berlin and Budapest, the result was a success. It demonstrated to both the international
community and the Hungarian government itself that the regime was not a German vassal
and could conduct its own affairs as dictated by its own interests. The technical language
of the accords and the fact that an agreement had not been reached with Prague also kept
open the option of pursuing a revisionist agenda against Czechoslovakia, thereby
ameliorating German concerns as well. Though the will to resist becoming too closely
aligned with Germany was strong, the need to give expression to the nation’s irredentist
desires was an equally powerful force. In a limited way, the Hungarian government had
successfully managed to balance both prerogatives simultaneously, and empowered by
this demonstration of political acumen, pursued this dual line further.
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The next opportunity to do so came shortly after the Kiel conference when, on
September 8, the Hungarian representative in Warsaw suggested to Beck that the two
countries conclude a gentlemen’s agreement concerning policy coordination in light of
the Czechoslovak situation that was likely to soon erupt. Such an arrangement would
build upon the already existing policy framework that Beck and Kánya had worked out in
February, although meaningful collaboration was hindered by conflicting Hungarian
desires. On the one hand, Budapest was willing to collude with Warsaw and Berlin to
regain its lost territories and achieve a common border with Poland in the interest of
Beck’s “Third Europe” bloc. On the other, it would not risk war to satisfy those aims. 16
Still, the allure of bringing Slovakia back to the “motherland” and acquiring subCarpathian Ruthenia proved to be incentive enough and, pressured by both Poland and
Germany to act, Hungary became a conspirator in Czechoslovakia’s demise.17
Although both Warsaw and Berlin viewed Hungarian participation as essential to
dealing with Czechoslovakia, their underlying motivations were essentially different.
Beck had decided to use Hitler’s reckoning with Prague as an opportunity to settle
Poland’s long-standing dispute with the Czechoslovak government over the Teschen
district, which, during the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Poles had
claimed on historic and ethnic grounds, but were denied in the redrawing of Europe at the
peace conference in 1919. Understanding that Czechoslovakia’s days as an independent
nation were numbered, Beck also wanted to use the situation to advance his “Third
Europe” concept and finally achieve the common border with Hungary he believed to be
essential to the project. If this objective was accomplished and a Hungarian
rapprochement with Romania and Yugoslavia realized, the structural aspects of the plan
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would be in place, leaving the remaining political aspects to diplomacy. The method
Beck had chosen to pursue this scheme was also theoretically beneficial to the objective.
Accusations of conspiracy could be disavowed once the dust had settled, as there was no
true German-Polish collaboration over Czechoslovakia’s demise. 18 Warsaw, limiting its
argument to equal treatment for the Polish minority in Czechoslovakia, would not appear
as a conspirator, leaving Germany fully responsible for the aggression. If Hungary made
similar claims based upon the same justification, this would inherently lend credence to
the Polish position, and assuming the territorial readjustments went according to plan,
result in a doubly favorable outcome. Beck’s confidence in the scheme was dictated by
his belief that the western powers would not act to save Czechoslovakia, and though he
tried to impart this to Kánya, it was not enough to overcome the Hungarian foreign
minister’s timidity. 19
The subtlety of Beck’s machinations were completely absent from Hitler’s
attempts to persuade Budapest to act, as the German argument revolved around the need
for the operation to be swift and decisive. Berlin had become aware of Polish intentions
earlier in the summer and, though not orchestrated or conceived by the German
government, the additional pressure offered by Warsaw’s independent scheming fit
within the larger scope of Hitler’s plans. Consequently, it was given approval. With two
of Czechoslovakia’s frontiers threatened, all that was needed was to close the door on the
third. If Budapest could be enticed into taking military action against Prague, the
resulting conflict would be decided too quickly for British and French intervention to
take place. This would leave the western powers with the difficult choice of fighting for
a country that no longer existed or accepting the fait accompli. Faced with these
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alternatives, the German dictator felt assured that the pacifist elements in Paris and
London would prevail and there would be no war. Thus, the potential rewards for
Hungary’s participation were great in exchange for what were believed to be minimal
risks, as Hitler was prepared to offer the Hungarians the Magyar areas of Czechoslovakia
and possibly even the whole of Slovakia if Budapest would march when called upon. 20
Despite these promises and reassurances from both the Germans and the Poles,
when events reached their climax following Hitler’s rejection of his agreement with
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain at Berchtesgaden on September 16, 1938,
Hungarian resolve began to crumble. Hitler wanted war in order to be able to swallow
Czechoslovakia all at once, and with the British and French willing to negotiate, it was
clear that the psychological moment to act had arrived. There would be no defense of the
republic. Polish offers of assistance to Romania in the event that the Soviet Union
attempted to deliver aid to Czechoslovakia across Romania’s frontier stiffened
Bucharest’s resolve to deny the Red Army transit, preventing aid from reaching Prague
from the east. 21 The Germans had also done their part to keep Romania a spectator,
having penetrated the country so thoroughly in the economic sphere during the spring and
summer of 1938 that honoring the government’s commitments to its ally would have
risked severe consequences for the nation’s heavily German-funded industrialization and
rearmament programs. Intimidation alone was likely enough to prevent any Romanian
involvement, although in exchange for complicity, Hitler related that he was prepared to
guarantee the Hungarian-Romanian border, providing further incentive for the neutrality
that Carol and his ministers were already inclined towards anyway. 22 In the end, it was
not enough to assuage Hungarian fears, and ultimately the government only offered to

117

send troops into Czechoslovakia after the Wehrmacht commenced its operations. 23
With Budapest’s refusal to march, Hitler felt that the opportunity for a quick and
decisive military resolution to the Czechoslovak issue was untenable. Deprived of the
concentric attack he envisioned, he accepted Chamberlain’s eleventh-hour proposal for a
four-power conference to decide Czechoslovakia’s fate. 24 On September 29, Hitler,
Chamberlain, Mussolini, and the French Prime Minister Édouard Daladier, met at the
newly constructed Führerbau in Munich, and after thirteen hours of negotiation, signed an
agreement that handed over the Sudetenland to Germany and provided for its occupation
by the Wehrmacht over the next ten days. The Czechoslovak government was not invited
to the conference and, when presented with the accord, was given the option of accepting
or rejecting it. If the resolution were declined, Prague would face Berlin alone.
Reluctantly, it was accepted. Though denied his war, Hitler left Czechoslovakia a rump
of its former self. His mood had been exuberant in the hours immediately following the
Munich Agreement, but it soured quickly. 25 The French and British had forced Prague to
make concessions and the Hungarians and Poles had backed out of his plans, in his mind
giving the Western Powers the breathing room necessary to impose arbitration upon the
Czechoslovak government. As punishment for this perceived betrayal, Hitler ignored
Warsaw and Budapest’s revisionist interests that he had promised to represent at Munich,
leaving the task of standing with his co-conspirators to Mussolini, who managed only to
gain the promise that these issues would be sorted out at a later date through four-power
arbitration. With the Czechoslovakia crisis apparently resolved, Paris and London soon
lost all interest in pursuing any resolution of their claims. 26
With a favorable set of circumstances for a quick settlement of the Czechoslovak
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issue to the benefit of both Poland and Hungary, their inaction during the crisis demands
further inquiry. Certainly the German plan as Hitler had conceived it was feasible. The
gains to be had as a reward for participation were significant, but to attain the territories
promised by Berlin, a very large gamble was required. Germany could risk war. Its
rearmament program had provided the country with a menacing “big stick,” one that
Hitler was eager to use. 27 Hungary could not take that risk. Budapest’s army was small,
and an invasion of Czechoslovakia, even if coordinated with the Wehrmacht, would leave
the country vulnerable to threats from another power. During the Czechoslovak crisis,
the primary Hungarian fear was that any military aggression directed against
Czechoslovakia would trigger the mutual assistance of the Little Entente, resulting in
military action from Yugoslavia and Romania. With the border only lightly defended, it
would be a short march to Budapest, resulting in unforeseeable, but undoubtedly
negative, consequences. A public announcement from Hitler that the German
government guaranteed Hungary’s borders would have done a great deal to assuage that
fear, though, for his own reasons, Hitler refused to offer one. 28 Without this assurance,
the likelihood of Budapest’s active participation in Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment
was minimal, as the excuse to follow the peaceful revisionist path Kánya favored was too
convenient to pass upon. Forces within Germany also conspired to keep the Hungarians
from participating as well. Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, the head of the Abwehr, the Reich
intelligence organization, and General Ludwig Beck warned Horthy and Kánya via a
secret envoy that, although Hitler was immovable in his desire for war, they and others in
the Wehrmacht had little faith in the plan. 29 Also significant was a reluctance to be
aligned, even if only due to a commonality of interest, with the Reich. This would have
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ended Kánya’s “Free Hand” policy and left the Hungarian government with no other
recourse than to move completely into the German orbit, a proposition that, despite the
drive to see its irredentist desires fulfilled, Budapest was not yet willing to embrace.
Poland chose not to participate for much the same reason, and while Beck
harbored no moral compunctions about benefiting from Czechoslovakia’s demise, he did
not wish to be caught on the same side as Germany, should there be war. 30 This factor
determined the course Warsaw followed, which entailed remaining aloof from direct
involvement with Berlin and limiting its objective to the recovery of Teschen based upon
the same ethnic minority justification that Hitler used with the Sudetenland. In this way,
Beck believed it would be possible to settle the border dispute without appearing as an
aggressor. 31 However, Hitler’s failure to raise the issue of Polish and Hungarian interests
at Munich and the fear that German designs now included the strip of territory he desired
forced Beck to act. On September 30, 1938, he issued an ultimatum to the Czechoslovak
government demanding that the region be ceded to Poland. 32 Fresh from the Munich
settlement and abandoned by its former Little Entente allies, Prague acquiesced. The
next day Polish troops began to occupy the territory. In an eerily prophetic exchange
between the incoming General Władysław Bortnowski and his departing Czechoslovak
counterpart, the latter noted that, although Poland was now taking the territory from
Czechoslovakia, it would not be long before it was ceded again, this time to Germany
from Poland. 33 In the confusion of events, Beck hoped that this action to prevent the
Germans from controlling a strategically important rail-hub in the town of Bohumín
would go unnoticed. It did not, and the aggressive methods used by Warsaw to gain the
district helped to foster exactly the international sentiments that Beck had sought to
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avoid. 34
During the entire episode, Romania remained a vitally important factor in the
calculations of all parties, exerting enormous influence on the eventual course of events
without raising a finger in the process. Both Germany and Poland attempted to keep the
country passive with promises that were designed to assuage Bucharest’s specific
security concerns: the Poles by bolstering Carol’s position in regard to the Soviet Union
and the Germans by guaranteeing Romania’s continued possession of Transylvania.
Though Beck’s actions pertained more to his “Third Europe” concept than they did to the
Czechoslovakia issue, his bolstering of the Romanian alliance ensured that the only road
to Prague went through Poland. To deliver aid to its ally, Russia would have to violate its
1932 non-aggression pact with Warsaw. This would trigger Poland’s defensive alliance
with Romania, leading to an uncertain series of events that held the potential to ignite
another world war. However, concern about the Soviet Union was eliminated with the
sacrificial offering of Czechoslovakia at Munich, alleviating Polish and Romanian
concerns on that particular front. The Reich also based its Romanian policy on security,
as its offer to guarantee the country’s border with Hungary was an effective cure-all for
nearly two decades of anxiety. All that Hitler required of Carol was a pledge to remain
neutral should events lead to war. This was immensely important to the German
dictator’s conception of the operation, to which, before his meeting with Chamberlain at
Bad Godesberg, Hungarian involvement had been integral. Without this guarantee to
stay uninvolved, Budapest’s fears of becoming embroiled in a conflict with the Little
Entente could not be allayed, limiting Hungarian usefulness to the entire endeavor. On
this issue, the Romanian government could not be swayed. While Carol wished to avoid
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being forced into conflict with Germany, he also felt compelled to honor Bucharest’s
commitment to Czechoslovakia. Technically, this made a resolution of the situation
simple, for as long as there was no Hungarian aggression against Czechoslovakia,
Romania would not be obliged to come to her defense. 35 Although this position allowed
Carol to wash his hands of culpability in the crisis, it complicated both German and
Polish designs, and by eliminating the possibility of Hungarian participation, prolonged
Czechoslovakia’s existence another five and a half months.
This result was not a consequence of any particular desire to provide assistance to
the Czechoslovaks, as foremost in Romanian decision-making was the power-dynamic
between Romania and Hungary. Were Hungary to gain the whole of Slovakia and
Ruthenia, Carol feared that this would extend Hungarian influence into the subCarpathian region and threaten Romania’s hold on Transylvania, setting a revisionist
precedent that could have severe consequences for Romania, were the trend allowed to
continue. This would also upset the geopolitical balance of the region, as with increased
territory and manpower reserves, Hungary would be able to compete for influence in East
Central Europe and the protection of the Great Powers that Romania currently enjoyed.
Though Hitler would not provide assurance that Budapest would be restrained as events
reached their culmination, Mussolini’s Italy was willing to do so. Foreign minister Count
Galeazzo Ciano provided assurances to the Romanian ambassador in Rome that the
Hungarian government “would not commit any imprudence” and limit itself to ethnic
revision. 36 This vague promise was enough, and Carol resigned his former ally to his
fate.
The decision to abandon Czechoslovakia following Munich proved to be the final
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death-knell for the Little Entente. It finalized a process begun shortly after the
remilitarization of the Rhineland, when both Bucharest and Belgrade dismissed
Czechoslovak suggestions that would have transformed the alliance from a limited
arrangement directed against Hungarian revisionism to one of general mutual assistance,
and continued with the separate treaties resulting from the Bled conference. Fear of
becoming entangled in the conflict brewing between Germany and Czechoslovakia
dictated that response, with the events of September 1938 retroactively proving that
decision to be correct. As long as the Hungarians did not become involved, there was no
technical aspect of the agreement that would draw Romania or Yugoslavia into the fray,
unless moral sympathies prevailed. However, such sentiments were in short supply and
restrained by an even greater desire to preserve national independence, which, if they
were drawn into a regional conflict, there was no guarantee of ensuring. To further
distance the remainder of the Little Entente from the rump (renamed Czecho-Slovakia),
Carol and the Yugoslavian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović renounced all obligations
to Prague, justifying the act based upon the flimsy argument that, since Czechoslovakia
had compromised its territorial integrity, the nation with which they had entered into
alliance no longer existed. This absolved Bucharest and Belgrade of their commitments.
Though a weak case, it was little more than a confirmation of their previous September
26 decision when they privately agreed, along with a double-dealing Beck, that it was
better to feed Czechoslovakia to the wolves and preserve their own security than become
victims of another nation’s aggression. 37
The feast commenced shortly after the ink had dried on the Munich Agreement.
On October 9, in Komárom, a city on the Hungarian-Slovak border, the Hungarian and
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Czechoslovak governments entered into negotiations to settle their border dispute as
dictated by the relevant provisions of the accord. 38 Warsaw was required to do so as well
but had instead decided that negotiations and possible arbitration might result in the
Teschen region being denied to Poland and claimed by Germany, prompting the
government to move unilaterally and annex the territory on October 1. 39 Without a
military option, Budapest was forced to the table. However, after the Czechoslovak
delegation rejected Kánya’s demands that would have ceded the Magyar majority areas in
southern Slovakia and Ruthenia to Hungary and provided for self-determinant plebiscites
in the remainder of those regions, the discussions broke down and he was compelled to
seek out an alternative course. The possibility of gaining the whole of Slovakia seemed
remote, and conceding that, he abandoned the idea of pursuing it further. Instead, Kánya
focused on regaining the ethnic Hungarian areas and pushed for the creation of a common
Polish-Hungarian border via annexation of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. This met with
German opposition, as Hitler viewed a mutual Polish-Hungarian frontier as a threat to
Berlin’s interests with its potential to facilitate the creation of an anti-German bloc. 40 To
counter this dual Polish and Hungarian threat, the Germans increased their support for the
now dependent Czechoslovaks, utilizing the same ethnic minority principle they had
previously used to wrench the Sudetenland from Czechoslovakia, in the country’s
defense of its continued possession of Ruthenia. When the Hungarians, through their
envoy in Berlin, Kálmán Darányi, informed Hitler that they were prepared to fight for
their claims, the German dictator replied that if Budapest chose that path, they would do
so without the support of the Reich. 41 Taking the cue, the Hungarians resumed
negotiations on October 22, rejecting a proposal from Czechoslovakia that would have
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given Hungary roughly half of what had originally been asked for and, after Kánya
declared that the discussions had again failed, the two sides decided to seek arbitration. 42
By asking for arbitration, it was understood that the judgment was final. The
Hungarian government was confident, though, that the parallel diplomacy it had
conducted with the Italians would enable them to net greater gains than through direct
negotiations with Prague. On that front, Count István Csáky had been sent to Rome to
convince Ciano and Mussolini that Italian support for Hungary’s claims was a strategic
necessity to counter increased German influence as a result of the Munich settlement. A
strong Hungary, he argued, would better be able to resist German pressure and thereby be
able to align itself more closely to Rome, buttressing Italy’s faltering position in the Axis.
Ciano agreed to this in principle but warned Csáky that, by proceeding with arbitration,
all Hungarian hopes of regaining sub-Carpathian Ruthenia would be extinguished. Since
Budapest, working with Warsaw, had already begun instigating an alternative plan for
acquiring the region, the Hungarians acquiesced, and a date for the adjudication was
shortly set for November 2, 1938, in Vienna. 43
Originally intended to be a four-power arbitration similar to the Munich
conference, Britain and France had little interest in the issue and relieved themselves of
the burden of further parceling out Czechoslovak territory, leaving that duty to the
Germans and Italians. Ribbentrop and Ciano, after hearing arguments from Prague and
the autonomous Slovak and Hungarian delegations, retired behind closed doors. After
wrangling over the final border that had more to do with the interests of their own
governments than those of the Czechs, Slovaks, or Magyars, they returned with a
decision. A line drawn from Kassa (Košice), Csua, Losonc (Lučenec), Ungvár
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(Uzhorod), and Munkals was to be the new border, with all the Slovak and subCarpathian Ruthenian lands south of the line to be annexed to Hungary. The subsequent
agreement was to be final, and both von Ribbentrop and Ciano warned the Hungarians
that they were to go no further than the award, implying that the judgment was an act of
benevolence. Budapest’s designs for acquiring sub-Carpathian Ruthenia to forge a
common border with Poland would not be tolerated. 44
The Vienna Award satisfied a portion of Hungary’s revisionist aims and, though
the government had not achieved the decision on its own, resulted in the first true
“success” that the Horthy regime could claim. However, it came at a price. Hungary was
now fully culpable in Czechoslovakia’s dismemberment, and this guilt was noticed
throughout the international community. This limited Hungary’s options for friendship to
the Axis or the German dominated bloc’s collaborators. The era of Kánya’s “Free Hand”
policy was at an end. Although there was still some room for maneuver, Hungary was
now bound to Germany.
Though not a part of the negotiation and arbitration process, Poland, guided by
Beck’s increasingly active diplomacy, still played an integral role in the events
surrounding the settlement. Following the breaking-off of the original talks between the
Czechoslovak and Hungarian governments at Komárom on October 13, Kánya began
discussions with Beck to formulate an alternative method by which to gain possession of
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. The two eventually decided upon a course of action that
involved instigating a popular uprising in the region and, once an appropriate level of
violence had been achieved, sending in troops under the auspice of restoring order.
Annexation would be subsequent upon request by the Polish- and Hungarian-controlled
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leaders of the revolt. In a bid to ensure the operation went according to plan, Beck
traveled to Galaţi, on the Romanian Black Sea coast, to discuss the situation with Carol.
During their meeting, Beck emphasized the importance of linking the Polish and
Hungarian frontiers as a barrier to further German expansion in the Danubian region.
Although understanding the king’s reluctance to see Hungary aggrandized at
Czechoslovakia’s expense, he stressed the need to deal with the realities of the new
European landscape and to acquiesce in Budapest’s control of the area. To soften the
blow, Beck suggested that Romania take possession of the very eastern portion of subCarpathian Ruthenia, which, in addition to the compensatory value, would also provide a
strategically important second rail-link between Poland and Romania. Further, Beck
offered to act as mediator in all disputes between Budapest and Bucharest, noting that
dialogue was the only constructive path to a general détente in their relations. This would
have numerous benefits, the most important being the implied result that would have the
three East Central European neighbors becoming the foundation of an anti-German
defensive bloc. 45
Although interested in the framework presented by Beck, Carol was reluctant to
commit himself or his country to such a radical proposition, particularly in light of
foreign and domestic sentiments to the contrary. The Germans had made their position
on the matter clear and, faced with an ascendant Germany and weakening West, divided
opinion both inside and out of the Romanian government prohibited any action. Equally
important to Carol were the lingering scruples he still harbored concerning Romania’s
former ally. While he and Stojadinović had abandoned Czechoslovakia, participating in
its dismemberment was not morally permissible. Even in its diminished form,
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Czechoslovakia was still useful to Romania, especially regarding armaments. The
railway used to ship them from the Škoda factories to the depots in Romania traversed
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, and for this reason it was important to maintain a semiindependent Czechoslovak state. This ensured that Czechoslovakia would continue to
have access to the Black Sea and the Balkan markets for its goods, which Bucharest
considered vital to the country’s longevity. Were Czechoslovakia to collapse politically
and economically, the Romanian government feared that Hungary would waste no time
in seizing the remainder of Slovakia, altering the regional power-dynamic to Romania’s
detriment. 46
This setback did not deter Beck, and on his return from Galaţi he wired Lipski
with instructions to sound out the scheme to Göring, who, from the information gathered
in the course of the conversation with Carol and Petrescu-Comnen, was identified as the
Romanian source on German regional policy. 47 The next day, Lipski met Göring at
Karinhall, relating to him the essence of the Polish argument for returning sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia to Hungary, although couched in pre-Trianon terms. After explaining to the
Field Marshal that the Romanian government believed Berlin to be opposed to a common
Polish-Hungarian frontier, Göring exploded. He calmed down after subjecting Lipski to
a lengthy tirade decrying Petrescu-Comnen’s limited understanding of the situation in
Central Europe, and admitted that, as he had not been in contact with Hitler for a few
days, he was not himself sure if the official German policy had changed. Göring was not
against the idea of a Polish-Hungarian border, believing the danger to Germany from the
incorporation of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia into Hungary to be a creation of Western
propaganda. 48 However, without the authority to speak conclusively regarding the true
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German position, Göring’s opinions were of little use. This forced Lipski to search
elsewhere for the information he sought, and in light of decisions made by Hitler
unknown to his Luftwaffe head, he temporarily delayed the dropping of a diplomatic
bombshell.
On October 24, Lipski met with von Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden to discuss the
matters raised with Göring, but rather than substantive dialogue on the Polish-Hungarian
border issue, the German foreign minister instead presented the Polish ambassador with a
list of demands for the settlement of outstanding German-Polish differences. This
included the reunion of Danzig with the Reich, the construction of the oft-suggested
extraterritorial railway across the Corridor, and Warsaw’s adherence to the antiComintern pact. In exchange, Germany would offer guarantees of Polish rights and
access to the city. Poland’s frontiers would be similarly insured. The Germans also
offered to extend the 1934 non-aggression pact to a term of twenty-five years and to
acquiesce to Hungarian possession of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. 49 This caught Lipski offguard, as there had been no indication from the German government that a policy shift
away from the détente that had characterized relations between the two governments was
nearing its end. Ribbentrop’s words were that signal. The future of German-Polish
relations now hinged upon Warsaw’s subservience to Hitler’s will.
Once related to Beck, these revelations brought the Polish government and its
foreign policy to a crossroad. On the one hand, Warsaw could accept the German
proposal, as there were benefits both practical and exploitable. Hitler’s consent to a
common Polish-Hungarian border would have fulfilled a portion of Beck’s “Third
Europe” concept without any risk. It also would have provided for a tactical outflanking
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of the Reich in sub-Carpathian Ruthenia should relations deteriorate in the future. 50 This
would be traded for nothing that Warsaw had not previously offered, as the Poles had
already suggested the idea of an extraterritorial corridor across the Corridor, making that
demand acceptable. Even the question of Danzig’s continued status as a free city was not
inviolable, as within government circles, there had been some thought given to the
matter. At various junctures, Beck had contemplated allowing for the return of the city to
Germany as long as special privileges were retained. Following subsequent conferences
with Hitler and von Ribbentrop in Berchtesgaden, Munich, and Warsaw, respectively,
during late December and early January 1939, he began to consider the feasibility of
dividing the city between the two countries, giving Germany the eastern two-thirds of
Danzig and Poland the remaining western portion. This latter scheme would have
potentially forestalled any immediate armed conflict with Berlin, affording Poland more
time to complete its rearmament and work towards building a regional security bloc. It
would also have the benefit of widening the Corridor and, with the construction of a canal
linking the city to Gdynia, reduced Polish dependence upon Danzig as the nation’s
primary harbor. 51
However, there were aspects of the German overtures that were dangerous. None
of these potential benefits could be derived without a reorientation of Polish foreign
policy along German lines. Though Warsaw had previously demonstrated a willingness
to work with Berlin on initiatives that were complimentary to Polish designs, Beck
harbored no illusions as to what abject subservience to Hitler’s aims entailed. The
original demands forwarded by von Ribbentrop on October 24 had indicated to both Beck
and Lipski that in Danzig, a situation that had once been finalized could become subject
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to further revision. This made the promised border guarantee little more than an olivebranch concealing a dagger. Adherence to the Anti-Comintern pact was equally
hazardous, as aside from placing Poland in the German orbit, it carried the possibility of
realizing one of Warsaw’s greatest fears: placing the country in the center of a conflict
between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Such a move was, in Beck’s mind,
almost certain to incur Moscow’s wrath and likely alienate Poland from France, leaving
servile friendship with Germany the only option left available.
Maintaining the status quo carried with it an entirely different set of risks,
foremost among them the possibility of war with Germany. However, Beck believed that
in having to choose between the lesser of two evils, this second choice offered the better
chance for continued national independence by keeping all options on the table. With
that in mind, he countered German pressure throughout the winter and into the spring
with stubborn but polite refusal of Hitler’s demands, hoping that firm rejection devoid of
inflammatory rhetoric would prevent any action being contemplated in Berlin. 52 In this
endeavor, Beck was aided by Hitler’s attention being focused elsewhere, since before
Hitler could deal with Poland, he had to attend to other issues first.
For the Germans, the presentation of demands on October 24 not only inaugurated
a new Polish policy but served in a tactical capacity as well. During the negotiations
preceding the Vienna Award, the Hungarian and Polish governments had both been
searching for a workable method to bring about Budapest’s acquisition of sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia, and with the option of arbitration available, they privately agreed that the
region could be annexed by Hungary with Warsaw’s support during the adjudication.
The German government was aware of this collusion, and as Hitler was still opposed to
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the creation of a common Polish-Hungarian border in early October, used the situation to
remove Warsaw’s influence from events and initiate a policy that had long been at the
heart of German aims. By forwarding demands that Berlin knew the Polish government
would, at least initially, not accept, Hitler placed the Poles in a position that held the
potential for conflict, and with the negative international perception of the regime still
fresh from the Sudeten crisis, limited its recourse, forcing them to back down. Without
support from Poland, the Hungarians were hesitant to press for further gains beyond what
the Germans would allow and accepted the arbitration as it was.
The effects of this were temporary and impacted only the official policies pursued
by the Polish and Hungarian governments. As has been previously stated, plans to
instigate a popular uprising through the infiltration of sub-Carpathian Ruthenia with
Polish and Hungarian agents had already been discussed. In November, that scheme was
initiated. Taking a page out of Hitler’s tactical manual, both Warsaw and Budapest
launched their own propaganda campaigns against the Czechoslovak administration of
sub-Carpathian Ruthenia, which, combined with the effects of the agitators, resulted in an
orchestrated chaos that awaited only the request for Hungarian troops to quell.
Preparations for the move had already been undertaken. Logistical and material support
from both the Polish and Italian governments had been secured. 53 All that remained was
the order to march. However, on the eve of the operation, Horthy and Kánya’s resolve
wavered as it had previously during the Czechoslovak crisis in September, and the
invasion was postponed.
At the heart of the eleventh-hour stay was the Hungarian concern over the
potential German reaction to the move that carried with it the possibility of incurring a
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wrath that would be disastrous for the regime. Horthy’s and Kánya’s anxiety was not
unjustified. With the annexation of Austria, the Wehrmacht was poised to smash through
the Hungarian border with little opposition and would be within easy striking distance of
Budapest in a matter of hours. The Hungarian army was in no condition to match its
German counterpart, and, according to the Hungarian government’s assessment, neither
were the Polish or Italian militaries. 54 Support from Romania or Yugoslavia was also
discounted as a possibility, as Berlin’s dismemberment of their former ally had instilled a
fear of the Reich within both governments that had reoriented their policies towards
Germany with emphasis on non-confrontation and accommodation. A healthy mistrust of
Hungarian intentions and trepidation over Budapest’s irredentist aspirations to the south
and east further guaranteed their inaction.
Faced with this nightmare scenario, Kánya decided that Hungary was in no
position to present Hitler with a fait accompli and, on November 18, contacted Berlin to
probe the Germans on the plan. Without divulging that the entire operation was
dependent upon their consent, Kánya related only that a crisis had developed in the
Carpatho-Ukraine and that Budapest had received requests from the local administration
to send in troops to subdue the violence and, in accordance with wishes of the populace,
annex the area. The reply he received the next day was negative but vague, stating only
that “if Hungarian action gave rise to difficulties, Germany could not support Hungary,”
and that Hitler considered the moment for action “inopportune.” 55 The intent of the
message, unequivocally a warning to abort the invasion, was not lost upon Kánya.
However, he saw opportunity in the obscure wording. He purposefully misinterpreted it
to mean that Germany would not come to Hungary’s aid if the invasion became mired in
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difficulties, but that otherwise Hitler had no objections to Hungarian occupation of subCarpathian Ruthenia. Subsequently, he informed Rome and Warsaw that Hitler had
given his approval of the scheme according to this misleading interpretation. Whether
Kánya knew his intrigue was sustainable is doubtful. It appears he intended it only to
serve the immediate need of acquiring Italian aircraft for the operation and hoped that,
even if Hitler’s true position on the subject became apparent, there would be a
continuation of the anti-German collaboration similar to that between Ciano and Csáky
prior to the Vienna arbitration. This would allow for gains to be made even if confronted
with opposition from the Reich. In hedging his bets on this set of developments, Kánya
misjudged the situation. Once the actual German position became known to the Italians,
Mussolini became livid, reproaching the Hungarians for their duplicity and canceling the
planes he had previously promised. The plan and any further notion of independent
action was put to an end on November 21 following the joint issuing of a strongly worded
German-Italian démarche warning the Hungarian government of the consequences of
moving against sub-Carpathian Ruthenia. 56
The stalling of Hungarian designs to annex the Carpatho-Ukraine halted all
further regional revision for the next four months. German power and Berlin’s ability to
project that strength was a significant factor in this moratorium on revision. Without a
challenge to his burgeoning hegemony, Hitler was able to impose his will upon East
Central Europe and shape events according to his own concepts. This was the beginning
of the end of independence. Though the Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian
governments did not know this, each was aware of the force that was to be integral in the
reshaping of the region. The Third Reich did not yet have the ability to dictate the terms
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of the region’s various national prerogatives, but its power made German policy an
omnipresent consideration for all future decisions. However, the gravity of this
development was temporarily alleviated by Hitler’s need for international quiet in the
wake of the Czechoslovak affair and its chaotic aftermath. Quiet, though, did not entail
inaction, and Berlin maintained a steady pressure on East Central Europe that kept
German interests at the fore of regional intrigue and national considerations.
Throughout the winter and into the spring of 1939, both the Polish and Lithuanian
governments were subjected to subtle but stern warnings that a continuation of their
current relationships with Germany were no longer adequate. Following the conclusion
of the Czechoslovakia issue, the Memelland and Danzig questions were to be addressed
with allusions to a final settlement. 57 However, the language and tone of the messages to
each government was different in character. Those related to Kaunas were more akin to
threats of inevitable action, whereas the firm but subdued “negotiations” with Warsaw
reflected Hitler’s still wavering conceptions of how Poland was to fit into his
reorganization of East Central Europe. As in September 1938, the German dictator still
believed that Polish action against the rump Czechoslovak state would be beneficial to a
quick resolution of the affair, and the tone of the diplomatic exchanges over the winter
and early spring of 1939 reflected this position. The restraint, misinterpreted by Beck,
was intended to preserve the possibility of Polish participation in Czechoslovakia’s final
demise until Hitler finalized his decisions regarding the ultimate fate of both countries.
However, contingents both for Warsaw’s participation in and exclusion from events
existed.
The Hungarian government, in the aftermath of its attempt to annex sub-
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Carpathian Ruthenia, was also required to confront a new set of political realities.
Indirect pressure exercised through political organization and domestic agitation by the
country’s German minority, in addition to clamoring by the homegrown Hungarian
fascist Arrow Cross Party for closer cooperation with Germany and the Axis, resulted in
a reshuffling of the government. 58 Horthy, in an attempt both to appease Hitler and
subdue the Magyar pro-Nazi political elements, replaced the unpopular Kánya with
Csáky as foreign minister, as he was more favorably disposed to and received by Berlin.
To further cement this new relationship and signal Hitler that Hungary was, in the future,
to be a more cooperative partner in foreign policy initiatives, in January 1939 Csáky
promised Hitler that he would sign the Anti-Comintern Pact and terminate Hungary’s
membership in the League of Nations. 59
Although prompted by German pressure, there were specific Hungarian concerns
that also dictated moving into closer alignment with Berlin. Foremost among these were
the subtle signs that Germany and Romania were working towards a rapprochement. 60
Were this to occur, Budapest feared that without any improvement of its relations with
the Reich, Hungarian revisionist aims would be compromised in favor of the maintenance
of Romania’s current borders or, worse, a truncation of the country’s frontiers. Shifting
headlong into the German orbit provided the only apparent security against such a
possibility, and it was hoped that by virtue of the political gestures and an expressed
willingness to participate in Hitler’s future endeavors, Hungary’s revisionist interests
would be given priority over that of other nations.
Though binding the country to the Third Reich was dangerous in the long-term,
the potential for significant, immediate gains was alluring. Certainly, the fear of such
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gains being made at Hungary’s own expense was an integral factor in the underlying
motivations for the decision, but there were domestic considerations as well. The
acquisition of Slovak lands provided Hungarian extreme-right political parties with a
taste of revisionist success. Because, in their view, Hungary’s territorial acquisitions
were the result of fascist power, groups like the Arrow Cross and the German-endorsed
National Socialist Party of Hungary viewed alignment with the Reich as the only way
that a Nagy-Magyarország, or Greater Hungary, could be realized. Appeasing those
parties and promising government expression of their desires bought the Horthy regime
political capital that also secured its position against the domestic threat they posed. It
also purchased the Hungarian government renewed credit with Hitler, who despite having
been forced into arbitration at Munich because of Budapest’s hesitancy, now decided that
the Magyars should be granted another opportunity to demonstrate their newly professed
obeisance. However, for Budapest to be allowed to share in the final destruction of
Czechoslovakia, the Hungarians would be required to follow precisely his timing and
work according to his designs. 61
This meant no acceleration of the timetable in an effort to seize sub-Carpathian
Ruthenia before Hitler was ready to strike. Such action would be resented by Berlin and
result in German, rather than Hungarian, occupation of the region. 62 Budapest was also
to restrain its relations with Romania, restricting itself to efforts that held the potential for
positive ends, even if these were only limited in scope. 63 More important to Hitler than
any meaningful rapprochement between Hungary and Romania was achieving quiet on
his southern front. This would prevent any interruption in the delivery of oil and grains,
both vital supplies for his military machine. Economic deals that secured these had
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already been worked out during November and December of 1938, although mistrust
between Hitler and King Carol of Romania resulted in a tense situation that could quickly
become unsettled. Any Hungarian agitation for revision was enough to negate the
inroads Berlin had made with the Romanian government. It was also possible that such
rhetoric could drive Bucharest towards the West, upsetting both Hitler’s timetable and
strategic framework. In an effort to keep the Hungarians quiet, Hitler sweetened his offer
of the Carpatho-Ukraine in its entirety with a further promise that none of the region
would have to be shared with hated Romania. 64 This promise, along with subtle
intimidation, proved to be an effective combination that reined the Hungarians in and
ensured that they would follow Hitler’s plan.
To gain Romanian acquiescence to his plans for Czechoslovakia’s final
dismantling, Hitler relied upon indirect methods. At the heart of his policy was economic
domination of Romania, which, with varying degrees of success, Carol and his
government had resisted. This kept Germany’s market penetration at a manageable level
of twenty-five percent. This number and, by extension, economic dependence upon the
Reich increased to nearly forty percent as a result of the trade agreements signed between
Bucharest and Berlin, although this was tempered through favorable agreement language
and trade balances that provided more material benefit to Romania than was received by
Germany. 65 The arrangements, however, had an effect that was incalculably more
valuable to the Reich, for they contributed to the further eroding of ties between Romania
and the Western Great Powers. The arms for oil deal signed in November 1938
particularly had this as a consequence, with Germany replacing France as the primary
armaments supplier for the Romanian military. By picking up the French deficit in return
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for petroleum and a promise that Germany’s arms not be used against the Reich, the little
confidence that remained in France’s continued commitment to the country was severely
shaken. Despite this success, further attempts to force a reorientation of the Romanian
economy towards German needs were blocked, as Carol understood that allowing Berlin
any greater influence upon his kingdom would threaten independence. With Hitler’s
policy based upon material need, the king believed that this afforded him an advantage in
dealing with the Germans and enabled him to maintain positive relations without
becoming subservient to the Reich. 66 This policy was, though, contingent upon
alternative outlets for Romanian goods and the insurance provided by collective security,
rending it untenable if either of its foundations were threatened. A turn of events in
November 1938 offered Hitler the opportunity he needed to expose and exploit the
weakness in Carol’s foreign policy of balance, and begin the process of drawing Romania
tighter into the German sphere.
The murder of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu, the imprisoned, charismatic head of the
Iron Guard, on November 30, 1938, offered Hitler exactly the excuse he needed to launch
an aggressive propaganda campaign against the Romanian government, in the hopes of
bullying Bucharest into submission where negotiation and subtle influence had failed.
Hitler had no particular sympathies for Codreanu and the Iron Guard, preferring the
official regime and dealing with the traditional institutions of power over a group of
politically unstable fascist adherents. However, the German dictator was willing to
utilize such revolutionaries as an expedient when necessary, only to cast them aside when
his particular objective had been realized. He had already demonstrated a willingness to
do this during the Röhm affair with the SA and now, as he had with his brown-shirts, the
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green-shirted Iron Guard was to be exploited for political gain.
Hitler portrayed the murder as a personal affront against him by Carol and used it
as a demonstration of Romanian malicious intent towards Germany despite having
remained vague and non-committal regarding Codreanu’s fate when the king had
broached the subject with him personally the week before. Carol had suspected that the
Germans desired to retain the Iron Guard’s leader as a form of political blackmail,
unleashing him and the movement to exercise influence on Romanian internal affairs and
pulling the organization back when those objectives had been realized. Hitler’s inquiries
as to Codreanu’s whereabouts and the conditions of his confinement, coupled with a
sudden, violent increase in Iron Guard terrorism during Carol’s state visit, seemed to
confirm such a relationship. The subsequent execution was intended both to decapitate
the Iron Guard and eliminate a means for Berlin to influence Romanian policy. However,
no program coordination existed between the Iron Guard and the German government,
rendering Codreanu’s bullet-riddled, acid-dissolved, concrete-encased corpse little more
than a convenient excuse for Hitler to forward his existing agenda. 67
The Germans did this with considerable vigor, portraying Carol as they had
Edvard Beneš, the former President of Czechoslovakia, during the September crisis, and
discreetly indicating to the Romanian government that an acceptable replacement had
already been designated. Though the occupation of Romania and the installation of a
new, potentially Iron Guard-dominated regime was beyond the extent of German aims,
the fear of military intervention and removal of the monarchy forced Carol to reexamine
his foreign policy and determine what assistance his government could expect from the
international community. The prognosis was poor. Diplomatic feelers extended to the
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British and French confirmed a lack of interest in Romania and the region. Both London
and Paris urged that Bucharest concede to Germany’s demands, explaining that economic
incursion was not a serious enough issue over which to start a war, and as conciliation,
offered the Romanians limited economic assistance packages to mitigate Bucharest’s
dependence upon German trade. Though accepted, these deals did little to alleviate
Romania’s predicament and confirmed that the west had abandoned the country to the
Reich in the interest of peace. Even Italy, previously the intra-Axis counterbalance to
Germany, was hesitant to engage the situation in any meaningful way, deferring to
Berlin’s view. Poland was encumbered with its own difficulties with the Germans,
negating any possibility of aid from that quarter as well. Going into 1939, Romania had
to face Hitler alone. 68
The one advantage that Romania had during the crisis was the understanding that
economic need was the motivation for German action, and as long as Bucharest kept this
issue central to its diplomacy, the storm could be weathered. Consequently, Carol made
personnel moves at the foreign ministry reflecting his change of policy, replacing the
collective security advocate Petrescu-Comnen with the more realistic Grigore Gafencu.
Gafencu, after assessing Romania’s geopolitical position, believed in the necessity of
making certain economic concessions to the Reich. The country’s independence did not
need to be compromised, as he thought that, contrary to the intelligence being received
from the state secret service, conquest was not an immediate German aim. 69
With this in mind, both he and Carol worked to resolve the crisis. The first step
they took was to extend preferential treatment to Romania’s German minority. Later,
they appointed many of the minority’s political leaders into positions of authority in the
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new Front for National Rebirth, a government-invented, state-controlled political “mass
movement.” This offered Germany an approved alternative to the Iron Guard. The
gesture was ignored, and it was not until January 1939 that Berlin responded to the
overtures. The Germans demanded that a long-term, all-inclusive economic plan be
arranged between the two countries. Such an agreement was the only way in which
Romania could convince those in Berlin who still doubted the usefulness of friendship
with Bucharest otherwise. As further incentive, Wilhelm Fabricus, the German minister
to Romania, informed Carol that although no specific offer of support for Hungarian
revisionism had been given to Budapest, the only way in which Romania could ensure
that its borders would not become subject to readjustment was to strive for relations as
good as, or better than, those Germany shared with Hungary. 70
The threat was not lost on Carol, and in response to the German “suggestions,” he
replaced his pro-Western economics minister Mitiţă Constantinescu with Ion Bujoiu, who
was more acceptable to Berlin. Together with Gafencu, Bujoiu formulated an economic
collaboration program that was designed to enable Germany to regain its pre-World War
I position of economic preponderance in Romania, presenting it without details or
specifics. Bucharest’s tradition of promising much while offering little resulted in
confusion as to the intent of the Romanian program, which the Germans believed to be a
capitulation to their demands. However, when their delegation presented its own formal
proposal, which included a comprehensive restructuring of Romania’s economy and gave
Germany full responsibility for developing nearly all its sectors, the true gulf that existed
between the two sides became evident. Though not explicit in the German arrangement,
Gafencu and Bujoiu were apprehensive about the implied political and economic control
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the proposal granted Berlin. In an effort to secure protection against any such overt
predominance, they demanded that the accord be linked to specific guarantees for the
security of Romania’s frontiers and Carol’s regime. 71 This stalled the negotiations but,
more importantly, alleviated some of the pressure being applied by the Germans.
The calm was illusory. Hitler had not abandoned his objective of forcing an
economic arrangement upon Romania, but he was now considering alternative methods
to achieve about his desired end. Direct negotiations had resulted in stalemate, and any
further pressure threatened to drive Bucharest towards the West. However, there were
alternative approaches available. A demonstration of force that played upon Romanian
fears in connection with a firm restatement of Germany’s demands was one such
possibility, although for the moment, the situation was not opportune. However, the time
to settle the Romanian issue, as well as Hitler’s other outstanding foreign policy
objectives, would soon be at hand. With this in mind, he was prepared to act swiftly and
decisively when that hour arrived.
II
On March 15, 1939, the Wehrmacht crossed the Czech border, finalizing the
process that Hitler had initiated five months previously. In one swift action that drew
only verbal protests from Great Britain and France, Czechoslovakia was crushed.
However, this triumph was entirely different than his previous conquests. Upon his
arrival in Prague the next day, the only adoring crowds greeting him were the columns of
German soldiers his motorcade overtook on its journey to Hradschin Castle, the
traditional seat of the Bohemian kings. The local population had deserted the streets, and
the only Czechs who responded to his outstretched arm with a reciprocal gesture did so
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with a defiant clenched fist. Back in Germany, the jubilant crowds that had once
celebrated Hitler’s prior victories were as reticent as the Czechs. Hitler’s justification
for destroying the remainder of Czechoslovakia as part of his program to restore
Germany’s historic living space in an area relatively devoid of ethnic Germans was
utterly lost upon the average German. The prestige boost was, however, undeniable,
allowing all objections and criticism to be cast aside. For the moment, at least, Hitler was
the “greatest German in history.” 72
In addition to satisfying German strategic aims, the final dismemberment of
Czechoslovakia also served to propel Hitler’s broader foreign policy agenda in East
Central Europe and was representative of the manner in which he planned to execute his
designs. The Czechs had been crushed through the delivery of an ultimatum that had
threatened violence as the only alternative to accepting Hitler’s demands. Though it was
the most visible policy action undertaken by the Reich, it was not the first in what was a
two-week succession of similar démarches that initiated a final phase of German
diplomacy. In the past, Hitler had vacillated considerably on his methodology, usually
acting out of convenience when a fortuitous set of circumstances was presented to him.
Now, as indicated by his demeanor in the ultimatum he had presented to the Romanians
and those he was to shortly present to the Polish and Lithuanian governments, he had
firmly settled upon a course of action. In East Central Europe, Hitler was going for broke
in his bid to establish German hegemony over region.
The first ultimatum presented by the German government came, in fact, five days
earlier than the one delivered to Emil Hácha on March 12, although it was far more subtle
than the chaotic scene played out in the Reich Chancellery that evening. With the
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Romanian economic negotiations deadlocked since the end of February, Hitler and
Helmuth Wohlthat, the chief of the German delegation to Bucharest, had been searching
for a way in which to bring about Germany’s desired ends without compromising
Berlin’s Hungarian policy. With the settling of the Czechoslovak issue scheduled for
mid-March, any gesture towards Romania carried the possibility of upsetting Budapest’s
commitment to the operation. 73
Although not integral from a military aspect, Hungarian participation and seizure
of the Carpatho-Ukraine would almost completely bind the country to the Reich, making
its contribution useful politically. Consequently, the Germans decided to achieve both
ends simultaniously and, on March 10, submitted a new proposal that was a hardening of
their original position, amounting to the total submission of Romanian agriculture,
forestry, and industry to German requirements. 74 While the deal was still being
considered in Bucharest, Czechoslovakia disappeared. The message was clear: stand
against the Reich and share Czechoslovakia’s fate. Even without that message,
Romania’s previously manageable problems were now complicated by the new regional
realities. Germany, following the occupation of its puppet-state Slovakia, was now
within striking distance of the country’s frontiers, with the only barrier being Hungary,
which, in light of Budapest’s recent behavior, seemed to have no compunctions about
acting upon its revisionist aspirations. Were these to be given expression, naturally
bolstered by German support, then a compromise of Romania’s territorial integrity was a
very real possibility, leaving Bucharest with little recourse.
These considerations brought the Romanians to the negotiating table in March
1939, with the fear of open German support for Hungary providing the necessary
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motivation. An eleventh-hour plea to Britain and France for investment capital and
material support to mitigate the substantial German economic penetration of the country,
in an effort to bolster Bucharest’s bargaining position, resulted in renewed promises of
Western commitment to Romania and Southeastern Europe. However, very little of the
promised economic assistance was actually delivered. 75 The confidence Carol and his
government had previously placed in London and Paris was dramatically shaken as a
consequence of their inaction during the events on March 15. In light of the altered
European landscape, the king made the choice to cast Romania’s lot with Germany.
On March 23, 1939, the Treaty for the Promotion of Economic Relations between
Germany and Romania was signed. This effectively handed the keys to the kingdom,
both figuratively and literally, to the Reich. Due to the language of the agreement, each
government was able to claim victory in the aftermath of the affair. Bucharest had
weathered the storm and, from its perspective, come through no worse for the wear. The
treaty only provided for general guidelines of economic coordination, which were to be
mutually consulted upon during periodic meetings between German and Romanian
commissions. This was intended to offset most of Berlin’s more drastic demands and led
the Romanian government to believe that those could be favorably negotiated in the
future from a position of greater strength. On other issues that arose during the
agreement talks, such as devaluing the leu against the Reichsmark to enable Germany to
purchase a greater amount of Romanian oil and agricultural surplus, along with Berlin’s
promise to respect Romania’s right to maintain economic relations with other nations, the
Romanians held firm in their resistance to German pressure for their acceptance. As a
reward for their perseverance, they were granted those concessions. 76 However, such
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technical victories deluded Bucharest into a false sense of security. While the vagueness
and loose framework that characterized much of the accord was viewed as beneficial, the
Germans were equally capable of utilizing those same aspects of the treaty to force their
own conceptions of economic coordination upon Romania. All that was required was an
increase in pressure in conjunction with the removal of Romania’s economic alternatives,
leaving Bucharest no other options than those offered by Berlin. Such a policy could be
conducted indirectly and at Germany’s convenience, as the foundations of Romania’s
market-dependence had already been set. For all intents and purposes, the economic
conquest long desired by Hitler was now complete. 77
Hungary’s transformation into a German satellite came as a byproduct of the
Romanian and Czechoslovak ultimatums. Although Budapest had not received
categorical threats as had both Bucharest and Prague, the warnings that any deviation
from Berlin’s plan would not be tolerated were no less ominous. 78 Fear of Hitler
choosing Romania as his new primary collaborator in Danubian Europe worked to ensure
Budapest’s adherence to his conceptions of the region’s reorganization, although the
restructuring of the Hungarian national economy as part of the price for participation in
Czechoslovakia’s demise was equally significant. 79 Imposed economic coordination
with the Reich deepened Budapest’s dependence upon Berlin and, as a result of the
increasing scale of German investment, led to a virtual conquest of the country. This, in
addition to the debt the Hungarian government owed Hitler for his allowing of Hungary
to annex sub-Carpathian Ruthenia and select districts of eastern Slovakia, inexorably tied
the two countries together politically. These two factors provided Berlin with an almost
unlimited amount of influence in the country’s domestic affairs and firmly anchored
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Hungary’s place in orbit around the Third Reich. As was the case with Romania, there
was still some room for maneuver, although it was extremely limited and of little
consolation. In one fell swoop, Hitler had seized Danubian Europe and brought it under
his sway. Now only affairs in the north needed to be attended to.
Since December 1938 Hitler had largely ignored Lithuania, having satisfied
himself with the domination of the Memelland parliament and a thorough Nazification of
the local German population. With the more pressing matter of Czechoslovakia’s
liquidation completed, he returned his attention to the Baltic republic. Throughout the
winter and early spring of 1939, the Germans kept a steady pressure on the Lithuanian
government, reminding it that the loss of the Klaipėda region was inevitable and that,
despite this lull, Berlin had not forgotten about its promised settlement of the issue amid
the general European upheaval. These threats were enough to elicit a conciliatory
attitude from the Lithuanians for most of the winter, although Hitler’s delay on any action
directed at the republic may have deceived Smetona and his cabinet into believing that, as
a consequence of the international impact of the Munich settlement, the following calm
would be of significant duration.
Taking the gamble, the Lithuanians reversed their policy of accommodation
towards Germany, rescinded their previously announced deference to Berlin’s
interpretation of the Memel Statue, and informed the Germans that if the document were
violated, Kaunas would in the future use all means at its disposal to defend both the
region and the country. As a demonstration of resolve, in early March, a portion of
Lithuania’s armored forces were deployed in Klaipėda and the surrounding territory. 80
Hitler’s focus on destroying Czechoslovakia required the affront to be temporarily
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ignored, although once that issue was resolved, the Germans were free to act. As they
had with Romania, Hitler used Prague’s fall as leverage in effecting his foreign policy
initiatives. On March 20, the German government issued its third ultimatum, presenting
the Lithuanian Foreign Minister, Juozas Urbšys, with two stark alternatives: surrender the
Memelland to Germany or face an invasion. Ribbentrop warned that if Lithuania chose
the latter option there could be no guarantee as to where the Wehrmacht would halt. The
threat posed to his country’s independence was not lost on Urbšys and, in an effort to buy
time, he informed von Ribbentrop that his government had not authorized him to discuss
Klaipėda in this context, necessitating his return to Kaunas to deliver the German demand
in person. Just before Urbšys’s departure, he was informed that Hitler had set March 22
as the deadline for a decision, and he would be expected back in Berlin with a reply on
that date. He was also instructed not to consult with any other governments, possibly as a
result of German anxiety over a second territorial grab coming so quickly after
Czechoslovakia’s disappearance, and fear that this would spur the Western Powers into
action. 81
Upon learning of the German ultimatum later that evening, the Smetona
government was faced with a dilemma. Public opinion was in favor of accepting the
challenge, partly as a consequence of the humiliation endured at the hands of Poland the
previous year. 82 That embarrassment had cost the government credibility and now, faced
with this new demand, it was expected that the regime would stand firm against Germany
and united with the people. However, the situation required prudence. The Lithuanian
military was no match for the Wehrmacht, and with inquiries as to the possibility of
receiving assistance from Britain, France, Poland, and the Soviet Union given a negative
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reply, Smetona had no options available to him. With units of the German military
already taking up positions for an attack, the Lithuanian government accepted the
necessity of acquiescing to Hitler’s ultimatum and dispatched Urbšys to Berlin to sign the
documents, completing the transfer of territory to the Reich. To soften the blow
domestically, news of the decision was characterized as a temporary retreat in the face of
an incredibly volatile international situation in which Lithuania was overwhelmingly
disadvantaged. Kaunas would recover the region when the Third Reich fell. 83
By the time Urbšys arrived in Berlin to sign the accord, Hitler had already left
aboard the battleship Deutschland along with a small armada of vessels in anticipation of
the annexation, leaving von Ribbentrop to conduct affairs with the Lithuanian envoy. On
March 23, the agreement was signed just hours before Hitler set foot on the soil of his
newest acquisition. The dictator spent a little under three hours in the city, departing as
quickly as he came, and was back in Berlin by noon the next day. No fanfare welcomed
him. Not only were most Germans uninterested in the tiny Baltic port, but the regime had
expressly forbidden a triumphal return. Hitler did not want such events to become
routine. 84 Certainly, he expected celebrations of far greater importance and magnitude to
be in Germany’s future, although those would require sacrifice that had not yet been
asked for. Besides the minor propaganda value, the act was not particularly worth
celebrating anyway. The strategic value was limited to securing another Baltic port for
the Kriegsmarine, and if Lithuania could be converted into a satellite, a slight extension
of the already existing border on Poland’s flank. In any event, with the addition of this
territory and the newly available frontier offered through control of the Slovak puppetstate, this acquisition permitted Germany to exert only a slightly greater degree of
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pressure on Warsaw than Berlin was already able to apply in the negotiations for the
return of Danzig and the Corridor. However, the use of Slovakia’s territory for any
potential offensive operation was far more valuable.
For Lithuania, the surrender of Klaipėda was devastating. Though only six
percent of the national territory and five percent of the population, more than a third of
the country’s industry was located in the region and seventy percent of its trade passed
through the port. 85 Monetarily, Kaunas lost more than 42.28 million Litai from banks
and credit institutions. 86 This unbalanced Lithuania economically and resulted in a loss
of the substantial investments the government had put into the region’s industry and
infrastructure. The strategic situation of the country was also jeopardized, leaving
Kaunas far more susceptible to German and Polish influence, although the pressure from
the latter was alleviated by Hitler’s subsequent foreign policy focus. In a bitter twist,
Lithuania did receive some marginal benefit from the loss of Klaipėda in the form of
amicable relations with Germany, though there was nothing genuine about Berlin’s
change of demeanor. Hitler, as part of his shifting focus to Lithuania’s southern
neighbor, sought, if possible, to bring Kaunas into the fold as part of his encirclement of
Poland. If the Smetona regime played according to his rules, similar to Hungary during
the Czechoslovak affair, then it would be rewarded with the realization of Lithuania’s
primary foreign policy objective: the return of Vilnius. 87 The Lithuanians were initially
reluctant to take the bait, and consequently the German government continued to present
overtures to them throughout the summer, eventually reaching a point where a decision
on the issue would have to be made.
The fourth and final ultimatum came as rapidly as the previous three, coinciding
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with the finalization of the agreement that transferred the Klaipėda region from Lithuania
to Germany. On March 21, von Ribbentrop met with Lipski in Berlin and reiterated the
routine “suggestion” of returning Danzig to the Reich and agreeing to the construction of
a highway and railroad across the Corridor. As he had before, Lipski respectfully
declined to discuss the issue, instead redirecting the conversation towards the Polish
government’s concern over the Reich’s occupation of Slovakia and the anti-Polish
aspects of this move. Despite this polite and tactical diversion, the German foreign
minister was dogged in his determination to bring about a resolution of the question.
Unexpectedly, he insisted that Lipski personally deliver a message to Beck indicating that
Hitler wished the Polish foreign minister to come to Berlin, as Hácha had, to sign a
treaty. Although silent on the exact nature of the document, von Ribbentrop was explicit
as to the consequences of refusing the invitation: the end of Poland through partition by
Germany and the Soviet Union. 88
The next day Lipski returned to Warsaw in a dejected mood, one that was further
exacerbated by the inexplicable optimism of several officials at the foreign ministry.
However, Beck, to his ambassador’s relief, shared with Lipski the realization that the
policy Poland had until now been conducting towards Germany was at an end. After
reviewing the situation over the evening, Beck, in an internal memorandum, outlined
what he believed to be the problems facing Poland regarding Germany and forwarded his
new strategy for confronting those issues. First was the question of calculability, a
quality that the Polish foreign minister thought the Third Reich and its leader had lost. In
the realm of foreign policy, this created numerous difficulties and prohibited the
formulation of a cohesive agenda that Warsaw could pursue. The solution to this
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problem was, Beck stated, to define the limits of accommodation. These he held to be
the inviolability of Poland’s frontiers and the acceptance of the country’s right to exist.
Danzig was integral to both aspects of this limit, as its reunion with Germany would
place Poland among the number of eastern states that had bowed to Hitler’s will and
allowed the rules of the game to be dictated to them. Giving in on this issue would invite
Berlin to make further demands and, if Hitler was still not satisfied, would bring about
even more requirements in a cycle that could potentially end with Poland’s disappearance
from the map of Europe. For this reason, Danzig was to become symbolic of Warsaw’s
will to resist Germany’s “nine division” march across the continent. Only a firm
demonstration of strength was necessary. If Hitler escalated the situation to the brink of
war, Beck believed that Poland entered the arena “with all the trump cards in our
hands.” 89
In accordance with this new policy directive, Warsaw responded to the German
ultimatum by partly mobilizing the army and deploying it for maneuvers in the Corridor
as a show of strength, while officially offering a polite refusal to the German government.
Lipski also reminded von Ribbentrop that Hitler had promised to respect Poland’s
interests in the Free City. This sent the German foreign minister into a rage and,
exceeding his instructions from Hitler, he angrily indicated to Lipski that any aggression
against Danzig, possibly referring to the Pomeranian exercises being conducted by the
Polish military, would be viewed as if it were directed at the Reich. Lipski responded by
calmly stating that any further attempts by Germany to bring about the return of Danzig
would result in war. This position was confirmed by Beck during a conversation with
von Moltke on March 28. 90 Poland had drawn its line in the sand.
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This set the tone for German-Polish relations for the remainder of the spring and
throughout the summer, although Beck sought to prevent conflict by issuing further
policy outlines that belied the unyielding rhetoric of the late March exchanges. On April
1, he informed Polish diplomats at home and abroad that, unless Germany landed troops
in Danzig, necessitating a military response in kind, all matters pertaining to the city were
to be kept localized and as peaceable as possible. The entry of the Kriegsmarine into the
harbor was to be treated as a strictly isolated diplomatic incident, as was any popular
uprising not directly involving the Wehrmacht. If any situation arose, it would be
Germany, not Poland, that escalated it beyond the realm of diplomacy. All the while,
Beck kept the possibility of reaching an understanding with Hitler open, but would only
negotiate if the Germans did so with “peaceful intentions” and according to “peaceful
methods of procedure. 91 ” Peace had a definite price.
Hitler was not prepared to pay such a cost. At the end of March, Hitler told
General Walther von Brauchitsch, Commander in Chief of the Army, that if diplomatic
methods failed to yield results with the Poles, he was prepared to use force to achieve his
ends. He simultaneously ordered the General Staff to initiate operational planning for an
invasion of Poland. By April 3, the army had generated Fall Weiß, or Case White. From
this point on, there was no turning back. The opposition to the military solution that had
permeated the upper echelons of the high command during the Czechoslovakia crisis in
1938 was virtually non-existent. Now, the vast majority of the officer corps relished the
opportunity to smash Poland in a kurtz und vives, or short and lively, campaign. This was
due in part to Case White giving expression to the more traditional “Prussian” sentiments
of the General Staff that were absent from the Czechoslovak Fall Grün, or Case Green. 92
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Indications that Berlin had largely abandoned any ideas of a diplomatic resolution to the
crisis became apparent in May when, as per orders from the Wilhelmstrasse, German
diplomats in both Poland and abroad became more aloof and evasive towards their Polish
counterparts. This resulted in a virtual moratorium on the exchange of view between the
two governments. 93
This development was not lost upon Beck, and as the summer waned, he
abandoned his strategy of foreign policy independence and Great Power posturing. In a
reversal of orientation, he threw Warsaw back towards alignment with Great Britain and
France as completely as his own reading of the situation permitted. With assurances
from Paris that the alliance between the two countries was still effective, he opened
discussions to forge a military alliance with Britain during the summer. These, however,
became stalled by Beck’s belief that war could be averted simply by bringing London to
the table. To actually follow through with the finalization of an agreement was viewed as
too provocative a measure, and Beck feared that an alliance might actually force Hitler to
act impetuously rather than serve as a deterrent. 94 Partly due to this rationale and partly
due to the Polish foreign minister’s own bloated ego, he delayed the conclusion of the
military arrangement by several days through insistence upon Britain’s recognition of
Poland’s right to colonies for “prestige, materials and immigration,” even as Germany
increasingly set itself on a war footing. 95 Although these demands seem ludicrous in
retrospect, they are indicative of Beck’s confidence that Hitler was bluffing and, in
accordance with his diplomatic style, were attempts to maximize gains on both ends of
the spectrum.
It was not until mid-August that, as a consequence of increased German military

155

activity on Poland’s borders, Beck began to accept the possibility of a very real German
threat. 96 Since May, he had understood that concessions of some sort would be required
to alleviate the situation, and his negotiations to form an alliance with the Western
Powers had been conducted with that in mind. His objective was to place the Polish
government in a position of increased strength for that process. 97 This would offset some
of the expected economic pressure from Berlin while preventing any German attempt to
achieve its goals via a fait accompli. 98 However, Hitler was not interested in bargaining
and had chosen war as the only means of recourse. In a further weakening of Warsaw’s
already tenuous position, on August 24, Poland’s greatest fear was realized: the coming
together of the nation’s two traditional enemies, Germany and Russia. The MolotovRibbentrop Pact, ostensibly a non-aggression treaty that secured the Reich’s eastern front,
also contained a secret protocol that divided East Central Europe into respective spheres
of influence and, as it pertained to Poland, divided up the country between Germany and
the Soviet Union. This event signaled to Beck that British and French efforts to conclude
an agreement of their own with the Soviets had failed. The next day Warsaw formally
entered into an alliance with Great Britain.
The German invasion had originally been set to commence on August 26, but at
the last minute, partly due to the circumstances surrounding von Ribbentrop’s journey to
Moscow to work out the details of the non-aggression treaty and partly to provide Berlin
with one last opportunity to further isolate Poland diplomatically, Hitler called off the
attack. 99 It was rescheduled for September 1. The German government acted at a
frenzied pace and even made a weak attempt to wrench Britain from its new ally. 100 On
the other side of Europe, the Germans were far more successful, although not exactly in
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the manner that they had planned.
Throughout the summer, in conjunction with the pressure the Third Reich was
applying to Poland, equal treatment was being delivered to the governments of Hungary,
Romania, and Lithuania so as to secure their participation in Poland’s liquidation. This
time, Hitler’s overtures fell upon deaf ears. Lithuania, the most recent victim of German
expansionism, was offered the opportunity to realize its fundamental foreign policy
objective of the past two decades, the return of its historic capital Vilnius and possibly
more, if it would march when called upon. Though an alluring proposition, Berlin’s
advances were declined on the grounds that the issue of Vilnius was a diplomatic rather
than a military question and that the acquisition of the city through forceful methods was
an unacceptable course of action. Perhaps more important to the Lithuanian decision was
the explicit fear of becoming a de facto German ally as a result of aggressive action
against Poland. Kaunas had no faith in Germany’s chances for victory in the war Hitler
was intent on launching and was loathe to sit beside the Reich during what Smetona and
his regime viewed as an inevitable final judgment. This resulted in a declaration of firm
neutrality, which the government hoped would exclude Lithuania from the increasingly
complicated situation developing to the south. 101
Neutrality was not an easy course to maintain. Although the Lithuanians had
given Warsaw assurances in May that it need not worry about any aggression from its
quarter and that Poland could redeploy troops stationed along its border without fear of
aggression in order to concentrate its forces against Germany, this failed to remove the
small Baltic country from both German and Polish machinations. 102 As the date for
which Hitler planned his attack approached, proposals from both the German and Polish
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governments attempting to sway Lithuania to actively participate in the coming conflict
increased. Berlin repeated its standing offer but included the entire region surrounding
Vilnius and possibly more as part of Kaunas’ potential territorial gains. The Poles
countered by hinting that Lithuania’s support could result in the recovery of Klaipėda and
its environs, in addition to portions of East Prussia. 103 Though both lucrative offers, each
was filled with danger that was dependent upon the decisions of the other powers
involved in the crisis.
Aligning with Germany risked retribution from Britain and France, as each was
capable of indirectly inflicting damage to the country. A march on Vilnius, even if fears
of inciting Poland’s Western allies could be allayed, was made hazardous by the
unknown quality of the Soviet reaction to such a move. Moscow harbored its own
designs towards the region and, even after August 24, the obscure nature of Stalin’s
disposition to the German proposal made such an endeavor perilous. Before and
especially after the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, siding with Poland ran
the risk of providing an opportunity and, later, a pretext for a Soviet invasion which, with
the memory of imperialist Russian domination still fresh, proved to be an effective
deterrent. These geopolitical considerations, in addition to sympathy for Warsaw’s
predicament, or, perhaps more likely, antipathy towards Germany as a consequence of
Poland’s prior handling of relations with Kaunas, mandated that Lithuania preserve its
own vital interests, the foremost of which was the maintenance of national independence.
The prudent course and, given the dangers of the various hypothetical scenarios, the only
viable policy decision was strict neutrality. However, unknown to the Lithuanian
government, this pragmatic choice ultimately sealed Lithuania’s fate, although it would
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be some months before the full ramifications were felt. 104
The Hungarians were equally hesitant to participate in offensive operations
against a nation with which Budapest had shared a long and historic friendship. Despite
German pressure and the promise of great rewards, Horthy and Count Pál Teleki, the new
prime minister, diplomatically maneuvered themselves out of the order of battle,
affirming to Hitler Hungary’s continued commitment to the Axis, but declining the
Reich’s offer on moral grounds. This angered Hitler, who was quick to remind Budapest
who its friends really were: a reminder to Horthy of who had allowed Hungarian
revisionism to occur. 105 The threat, coupled with Berlin’s subsequent offers of the small,
oil-rich southeastern portion of Poland in exchange only for the passage of troops and the
use of the Kassa (Košice) railway, steeled Horthy and Teleki’s resolve to deny their
support to Hitler. On this issue, Hungary held the advantage. In a meager attempt to
render assistance to Poland, Budapest denied the Germans use of its territory and, as a
result, shortened the front of opposition that the Poles would initially be forced to face.
This was a gamble. However, if Hitler decided to press the issue and impose his will
upon Hungary, Horthy and Teleki had made preparations for a last act of defiance in
order to uphold the national honor. Bridges and railways near the Polish border were
mined, and the Hungarian army was instructed to destroy them if the Wehrmacht violated
the frontier. Plans were also made to create a government in exile, either in the United
States or Great Britain, in the event that Germany occupied the country as punishment for
Budapest’s intransigence. 106
Such a sudden outburst of previously dormant moral compunction is conspicuous
as a motivating factor in Horthy’s rationale, although it is lent some credence given the
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admiral’s propensity for traditional chivalric values pertaining to honor. The Regent had
demonstrated this behavior before, perhaps most notably when, in a drafted but unsent
letter, he challenged Czechoslovakia’s President Hácha to a sword duel, with the two
leaders acting as champions of their nations, as a means of settling their governments’
differences. Within this context, Horthy also felt betrayed by Germany’s non-aggression,
mutual-assistance pact with Soviet Russia, which, through his personal litmus-test of
anti-communism in practice, indicated to him that Hitler was not truly the “right”
thinking statesman he presented himself to be. 107 Coupled with his belief in Germany’s
inability to triumph in any protracted conflict against the Western Powers, especially
Great Britain, he solidified his resolve to keep Hungary out of the brewing conflict.
Though limited in its ability to influence events, Hungary acted in the capacity
that it could. 108 Although this altruism was tempered by the opportunistic, irredentist
character of Budapest’s policies towards other countries – Romania and Yugoslavia in
particular – the restraint exhibited towards Poland forced Germany to react and, by the
very nature of the Wehrmacht’s desire to utilize Hungarian territory for its attack, alter its
plans. The significance of this, though minimal in the grand scheme of Germany’s
military preparations for the Polish operation, was to become evident later in the waning
days of the Polish Second Republic.
The Romanian government also sought to abstain from involvement in the Polish
crisis. In the months preceding the final climax of the conflict between Germany and
Poland, Bucharest acted according to the tenets of its policy of balance between the
European Great Powers. At its core, the policy formulated by Carol and Armand
Călinescu, his new prime minister, mandated the maintenance of Romania’s non-
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alignment with any nation for as long as possible. Only when the situation had developed
fortuitously and the army, which was in a pitiful state of readiness, achieved an adequate
level of rearmament would Romania participate in the war its government viewed as
inevitable. 109 Until then, Carol felt compelled to limit his diplomatic entanglements so as
not to provoke Germany, the one power that he feared would act against him unprovoked.
This required careful diplomacy with the British and French, as both governments
believed Romania to be an essential component of regional security and attempted to
solicit Bucharest as a partner in a revived alliance system with German encirclement as
its aim. A first and necessary step in that process was the expansion of Romania’s
existing defensive arrangement with Poland. However, gaining Bucharest’s acquiescence
to this proved to be exceedingly difficult, as the Romanians were hesitant to violate the
policy that they viewed as the only viable defense against aggression in an increasingly
unstable Europe.
The issue that stalled the negotiations was Bucharest’s insistence upon linking the
widening of its defensive accord with Warsaw to include an unconditional security
guarantee from both Paris and London. The Romanian government believed this to be a
fair price for aligning the country against the Third Reich. However, as Romania was not
threatened in the same way as Poland, the British and French were hesitant to offer such a
far-reaching promise to Carol. Their goal was to build an anti-German coalition, not to
singularly act as the guardians of Europe. They saw no need to offer any such
commitment as, from their perspective, they thought it to be implicit as part of collective
security and incumbent with that obligation. To the Romanians, this was not nearly as
evident, and it was precisely this differing view that prevented movement on the issue.
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Whereas the British and French were thinking in the long term and implementing their
policies accordingly, Romania, by virtue of its limitations and regional encumbrances,
held a shorter perspective. With virtually no offensive military capability and an
economy permeated by German investment, a unilateral alignment with the Western
Powers risked instigating a conflict with the Reich for which the country was not
prepared. 110 Time to rearm and mitigate the influence of Germany’s economic
domination was essential for enabling an open declaration of allegiance to the West.
Consequently, this required – at least for the interim – that equilibrium be pursued as
official policy. 111 The extension of an unconditional guarantee would have alleviated
some of the pressure from Germany, but it did not ensure that the entire endeavor would
be worthwhile. 112
This the British were unable to guarantee, as the value of their collective security
scheme was dependent upon the perceived mutual benefit of widening Poland’s and
Romania’s defensive alliance by those two governments, which both failed to see. In
exchange for security, each was being asked to take on the problems of the other. But
just as the Romanian government wanted no part of Poland’s conflict with Germany,
neither did Warsaw wish to encumber itself with Romania’s complicated and antagonistic
Hungarian relationship. In early April, Beck still believed Hitler’s threat of a military
solution to the Danzig question was a bluff, and he was hesitant to burden his government
with any additional commitments following the expected conclusions of the crisis,
particularly when the impetus to do so would later be revealed to be of little
importance. 113 Working under this assumption, he was purposefully vague, elusive, and
mercurial towards the British during his conference with Chamberlain and Lord Halifax
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in London. With the extension of Britain’s unconditional guarantee to Poland two weeks
earlier and no pressure from London to expand Warsaw’s existing agreement with
Bucharest a condition for a formal alliance, Beck was under no obligation to act, so he
remained inert. 114
Where Western diplomacy had failed, Axis action succeeded, although not in the
manner expected by the British. On April 7, Mussolini ordered the invasion and
annexation of Albania, a move that prompted Britain to extend a guarantee of
independence to Greece, as that country was now exposed to the Rome-Berlin threat.
The French government, traditionally more interested in Southeastern Europe than the
British, was perplexed by Romania’s exclusion. Paris viewed Romania as an equally
important case with which to demonstrate the determination of the Western Powers to
resist German ambitions within the region. To protect Greece and abandon Romania
would have indicated to Hitler that Bucharest had been abandoned, a move that would
have sent exactly the wrong message, signaling to Berlin that the Western Powers were
discordant. On April 12, the day before Great Britain planned to announce its guarantee
of independence to Greece, the French government communicated to London its intent to
issue a similar extension of protection to Romania, with or without the British. Aware of
the developing rift between the two allies, Gafencu, the Romanian foreign minister,
decided to use the circumstance to his advantage. During a meeting the same day with
Sir Reginald Hoare, London’s ambassador to Bucharest, he pressed the British
representative to tell his government that he had recently received confirmation from the
Germans that Hitler was now ready to extend the political guarantee he had long dangled
before Romania. The details were to be worked out shortly in Berlin, on April 18. To
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prevent any extortion of further economic concessions, he extolled to Hoare during the
negotiations the great benefit a guarantee from Britain and France would be, as it would
allow Gafencu to resist the inevitable German pressure. 115 It was all a lie. It was also
ineffective.
By chance, a spontaneous Hungarian démarche provided the impetus that
Gafencu and his fabrications could not. In response to the mobilized status of Romanian
divisions along the Carpatho-Ukrainian border, Budapest announced that it was forced to
counter this threat with military measures of its own. Though the Hungarians intended to
draw attention to their own concerns, the move had exactly the opposite effect and
inadvertently focused international attention on Romanian security. This enabled
Gafencu to use the situation as further leverage with the British and, in conjunction with
French pressure, finally gain London’s acquiescence to granting the coveted security
guarantee without the required expansion of Bucharest’s alliance with Warsaw. 116
After receiving the Anglo-French guarantee, Bucharest’s interest in developing
more intimate relations with the Western Powers waned. There was no need to pursue
that avenue further. An explicit warning from Berlin indicated the guarantee would be
tolerated but also made clear that any attempts to expand its scope or move towards
alignment with the West would have detrimental consequences. This ensured that similar
dealings were at an end. The point was reiterated when Gafencu visited Hitler and
Göring in mid-April. Now, however, the threat was tempered with a conditional
guarantee promising equitable relations as long as Romania maintained its neutrality and
remained a strong trading partner for the Reich. Any deviation from that course could
direct Germany’s hunger for territory in a southeasterly direction. 117 Although
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technically a setback to German aims, the impact of the Anglo-French guarantee was
limited. Though it satisfied Bucharest’s objectives, it did not impede Berlin’s. A
minimal outlay of force, restricted to an oral threat, kept the Romanians in line and
served to enforce the neutrality Bucharest had adopted as official policy. With the
complacency of Poland’s last neighbor attained, Hither was free to initiate his end game.
On August 30 all the preparations for Poland’s liquidation were in place. Direct
contact between Berlin and Warsaw had been non-existent for some time. The previous
evening, Hitler had requested that a Polish plenipotentiary be dispatched to Berlin by the
next day to negotiate or, more accurately, to accept Germany’s demands for the return of
Danzig and a plebiscite to be held regarding the fate of the Corridor. This was
impossible. Predictably, none arrived. The task of receiving Hitler’s ultimatum fell to
Neville Henderson, the British ambassador to Germany. What ensued upon his arrival at
the meeting with von Ribbentrop would have been comical were it not for the gravity of
the situation. The German Foreign Minister read aloud Hitler’s demands in German too
quickly for Henderson, who was not fluent in the language. This prevented him from
making any notes. When he asked to be allowed to read the document, von Ribbentrop
refused and then tossed it on the table, stating that it was now out of date, as no Polish
emissary had arrived by midnight in accordance with Hitler’s communiqué from the
previous evening. 118 There was no turning back. The die had been cast.
The last day of European peace passed with a deceptive normality that belied the
tension brewing on both sides of the German-Polish border. The Wehrmacht was ready,
in position and poised to strike when the order to march was given. In Poland, the army
was in the midst of its mobilization, although the process begun three days before was
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nearing completion. 119 The delay had been deliberate, as Warsaw had sought to balance
political, defense, and economic concerns until the last possible moment. Yet with war
now only a question of when, there was no need for prudence. Even amid this calamitous
backdrop, however, the Poles still harbored hope of averting disaster and achieving a
détente with Germany through negotiation and concession. During the evening, Lipski
met with von Ribbentrop in a final effort to maintain peace, but without authorization
from Warsaw to do anything more than receive Hitler’s demands and promise to relate
them directly to the Polish government, the eleventh-hour bid failed. 120 Even if Beck had
granted Lipski plenipotentiary powers, it is unlikely that at this late stage it would have
mattered. Whether von Ribbentrop even informed Hitler that the Poles were ready to
deal was irrelevant. By the time Lipski arrived in Berlin, the orders to commence
offensive operations had already been signed. Border incidents rather than diplomacy
foreshadowed what was to come. A staged “Polish attack” on a German radio station in
Gleiwitz carried out by the SS in Polish military guise provided the necessary pretext. At
4:45 a.m., Fall Weiß commenced with an opening salvo from the German battleship
Schleswig-Holstein in the Danzig harbor that struck the Polish garrison on the
Westerplatte and coincided with the general advance of the Wehrmacht as it rolled across
the frontier into Poland. The Luftwaffe had struck minutes earlier, destroying the town of
Wielun. Hitler’s war had begun. Beck received the official German declaration as the
first wave of He 111 bombers delivered their payloads upon Warsaw.
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THE END

Shortly before the German declaration of war on Poland, Lipski met with Göring
in Berlin. Over the years, the Polish Ambassador had developed a working relationship
with the German. During their discussion, Göring expressed regret that the policy of
friendship he had advocated and pursued towards Poland was now at an end. With the
coming of war, he was required to lead his Luftwaffe against Germany’s eastern
neighbor. Without missing a beat, Lipski replied that he was also upset at this
development, as he was forced to respond to the call of duty and join the Polish army so
he could shoot down the invading planes. Though he would not see action on his home
soil, Lipski, as an enlisted man, fought with distinction against the Wehrmacht
throughout the war. 1
The diplomat became a soldier, an act as symbolic as it was patriotic. In a
microcosm, this was reflective of the wider changes imposed upon Poland by Hitler and
the Third Reich, as with the onset of war, Polish diplomacy came to an end. Though
caught by surprise, Warsaw carried on its defense valiantly for over a month, only
succumbing to the Wehrmacht and the Red Army on October 6, when the last operational
Polish units under General Franciszek Kleeberg surrendered near Lublin after expending
all their ammunition. 2 With their capitulation, so fell the Second Republic.
In defiance of Hitler, the governments of Lithuania, Romania, and Hungary each
refused to participate in the liquidation of Poland. Although officially neutral, each
offered Warsaw an escape avenue, so that even with the totality of Polish territory
conquered, the nation’s prosecution of its war effort could continue. The Lithuanians

allowed several thousand Polish troops to flee from the Wehrmacht through its territory,
as did Budapest, which permitted 70,000 soldiers to escape and resume fighting in
France. 3 The Romanians, despite breaking their defensive alliance with Poland, restored
their honor by enabling thousands of Polish civilians and most of the government to seek
refuge from the bloodshed and acted as a supply depot and staging ground for British
arms and relief forces. 4 These gestures and declarations of neutrality were the region’s
last meaningful acts of defiance to Hitler.
With Poland’s liquidation, Germany finalized a process Hitler began with the
Anschluss in 1938, achieving total dominance over East Central Europe and ending the
independence of Lithuanian, Hungarian, and Romanian foreign policy. The fates of those
governments subsequently rested upon the German dictator’s whims and their ability to
remain in his good graces. This entailed accommodation of, and subservience to,
Berlin’s policy directives. The cost of failing to comply, with Poland and
Czechoslovakia as examples, was evident. One by one, each nation paid the price.
Lithuania was the first. As punishment for refusing to assist Hitler in destroying
Poland, on September 25 he transferred the Baltic nation from Germany’s sphere of
influence to the Soviet Union’s, trading the country to Stalin for a greater slice of
occupied Polish territory. As Moscow harbored more immediate and direct interests in
Lithuania, this act accelerated the pace of an already rapidly dwindling clock on the
country’s continued independence. It ran out sooner than expected. On October 10,
1939, the Lithuanian government was forced to sign a mutual-assistance treaty with the
Soviet Union. With no international recourse, acceptance was the only option. Vilnius
was returned, fulfilling Kaunas’ twenty-year ambition, but the price for that success was
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the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil. This shadow independence lasted until
June 15, 1940, when, following another ultimatum from Stalin, the Red Army crossed the
border and formalized the process of annexation. It was finalized on July 21, with the
inclusion of the new Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Soviet Union. 5
Romania was next to fall. King Carol’s policy of non-alignment proved to be
untenable when confronted with the realities of German hegemony in Danubian Europe,
and throughout the remainder of 1939 and into 1940, Bucharest moved into the German
sphere. Economic domination, intimidation, and a limiting of the country’s options in
both trade and alignment had, without firing a shot, indirectly brought about the conquest
of Romania exactly as Hitler had envisioned. 6 The subjugation of the country through
economic means afforded the Germans nearly unlimited influence in Romanian domestic
affairs, which Berlin utilized to great effect in the latter half of 1940. Carol was
compelled to include the Iron Guard in the government, and most pro-Western ministers
were sacked in favor of pro-German counterparts. Revision was also imposed upon
Romania, which, as a result of the Secret Protocol to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and
Second Vienna Award, marked the end of România Mare and precipitated Carol’s fall. 7
With Carol forced to abdicate in the face of massive public outrage at the humiliation and
political maneuverings of his pro-German prime minister, Genral Ion Antonescu, who
invited German troops into the country, the final curtain closed on Romanian
independence. 8
Hungary fared the best of all these four East Central European nations, retaining
nominal independence until March 19, 1944, when it was overrun by the Wehrmacht in
Operation Margarethe I to prevent the government from concluding an armistice with the
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Allies. However, during the interim, Budapest greatly benefited from continued
collaboration with Hitler, gaining the nothern portion of Transylvania from Romania and
the Vojvodina region from Yugoslavia. Though these acquisitions anchored Hungary in
the German orbit, the circumstances of war afforded the government room to manevuer,
which it exploited to procure those particular spoils. 9 Such a policy was fraught with
peril, however, as the maintenance of Hungary’s revisionist acquisitions became
inexorably tied to Hitler’s ultimate triumph. When the tide of the war turned against
Germany, it also turned against the fortunes of Hungary’s foreign policy gamble,
resulting in its abject failure.
To accredit the failure of Polish, Hungarian, Lithuanian, and Romanian foreign
policy from 1933 to 1939 entirely to the malevolent character of Hitler’s aggressive
policy tells only part of the tale. The German dictator and the Third Reich were
contributory factors, but if sole responsibility for the region’s failings is attributed to
Hitler, then the leadership of those nations is given an undeserved pass on their own
culpability. Warsaw, Budapest, Kaunas, and Bucharest each were instrumental in their
own downfalls. On an individual basis, they all made the decision to use the revisionist
opportunities provided by Hitler and Germany as a vehicle for the realization of their own
nationalist regional aspirations. In doing so they collectively sacrificed the unity each
government recognized as essential for checking German irredentism and ensuring their
continued independence. This resulted in a chronically myopic implementation of
foreign policy moves that ultimately served Hitler’s long-term strategic goals. By
enabling Berlin, particularly after the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936, to
capitalize on the various rivalries between the regional governments, Germany was able
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to achieve its ends with the assistance of one regime or another to the detriment of the
region as a whole.
Though an old strategy, Hitler’s policy of divide and conquer that he pursued
towards the region was highly effective, simply because it undermined the weak regional
commitment to collective security and exacerbated precisely the weakness the region’s
governments understood to be essential to their own national security, by offering the
potential for the rapid realization of national aims. Without solidarity, expressed either
through the League of Nations or a broad, regional bloc, Hitler was able to slowly isolate
each nation and impose upon their governments a new international paradigm, one that
they could either profit from or be destroyed by. A strong League of Nations and greater
commitment to that institution and collective security on the part of Europe’s Great
Powers would have mitigated Germany’s power over Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, and
Romania by providing a legitimate alternative for alignment. However, the reluctance of
those powers to act as guarantors of a fledgling system or offer an alternate type of
support forced the regional governments to revert to the old European order and ensure
their own security as best they could. In the end, as a result of these four nation’s
inability to set aside their rivalries to face a common threat, it was a charge in which they
all failed. With that failure came the realization of the nightmare scenario shared by each
of the various national leaderships: the end of independence and subjection to the rule of
the Soviet Union.
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